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Abstract 	
This thesis, which critically examines the ability of Police and Crime Panels 
(PCPs) to subject Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to effective and robust 
scrutiny, presents the findings of a mixed methods study conducted across 
England and Wales. The views of PCCs, members of PCPs, panel clerks and 
other stakeholders, were sought in respect of the effectiveness of the current 
governance model. As politics is central to the new model, the participants reflect 
the main political parties, including independent PCCs and panel members.  
 
Democratic oversight of policing was changed radically in 2012, with the 
replacement of police authorities by directly elected PCCs. While the focus was, 
quite properly, on making the police more accountable, there has been growing 
concern from criminal justice commentators about the lack of provision in the new 
arrangements for holding PCCs to account.  
 
There is now a growing body of evidence that PCPs are unable to exercise even a 
modest degree of scrutiny, leaving PCCs free to ignore advice or censure 
(Loveday, Lewis and Bailey, 2014). Often cited by the critics are examples of 
maverick behaviour by PCCs, which have frequently gone unchecked by PCPs. 
Some have seen an ironic twist in the new model of democratic oversight in that 
the only effective scrutiny of PCCs has occurred at a national, rather than local 
level, something not intended by the legislators (Chambers, 2013).  
 
The findings provide compelling evidence that further reform is necessary if PCPs 
are to be effective in their statutory role of holding PCCs to account. Each of the 
key research areas attracted critical comments from the study participants, 
especially in relation to panel funding and training for panel members. Similarly, 
the lack of representiveness of panel members, their high turnover and brief 
tenure drew sharp criticism. The potential for undue political influence was 
recognised by many as a problem, as was the need for strong panel leadership. 
The research also addressed the challenges in identifying suitable candidates to 
stand in PCC elections, particularly given this is largely undertaken by the main 
political parties.  
 
This research suggests that the current arrangements do not equip PCPs with 
either sufficient powers or adequate resources to be effective in their scrutiny role. 
There is also evidence that panel members, through growing frustration, are losing 
confidence in their ability to hold PCCs to account, something which will impact the 
effectiveness of the governance model.  
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Introduction	
 
This thesis, which has been developed from an earlier case study of the Surrey 
Police and Crime Panel (Bailey, 2015), will draw upon the relevant literature 
throughout and highlight the major criticisms of the present governance 
framework. Following a literature review, it will detail the research methodology, 
and explore the key factors which appear to limit the ability of Police and Crime 
Panels (PCPs) to hold Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to account. It will 
also critically examine the contrasting views of PCCs, PCPs, panel clerks and 
other important stakeholders and reflect on how those divergent views may help to 
identify the impact on scrutiny. The findings, which are grouped under five main 
headings, will include a critical commentary of the major issues emerging from the 
research. These are: 
 
• Demographics, representiveness and background experience  
• Structure and organisation  
• Scrutiny  
• The role of politics   
• Effectiveness of the current model 
 
Prior to the introduction of PCCs in 2012, local police authorities had responsibility 
for democratic governance of the police. However, they came under mounting 
criticism, notably for their inability to hold chief constables to account. The key 
reasons are explored in the literature review.  
 
Given the critical lack of confidence in police authorities, there was an increasing 
clamour for reform, culminating in the Coalition Government’s Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act, 2011, and the introduction of PCCs in November 2012. 
Claims soon followed of cronyism, nepotism and antagonistic relationships with 
Chief Constables (Lister, 2014).  
 
Further serious concerns were raised by the Home Affairs Select Committee 
(HASC) in May 2013 and by the House of Lords Committee on Standards in Public 
Life (2015). Concern was raised about the lack of constructive challenge or active 
support to PCCs and the barriers faced by police and crime panels in their scrutiny 
role. These included lack of support, inadequate resources and absence of timely, 
accessible information. The lack of consistency and credibility of representative 
membership was also seen as a major impediment and, citing Lister (2013), the 
House of Lords’ report acknowledged the inability of PCPs to hold PCCs to regular 
and effective scrutiny.   
 
PCPs were a late and unwelcome addition to the legislation by the policing 
minister, Nick Herbert, who only agreed to their introduction following pressure 
from the Liberal Democrats, coalition partners with the Tories. He remained of the 
view that PCPs should be ‘light touch’ in their approach to PCC scrutiny. It is 
unsurprising that the resulting legislation proved to be ambiguous. In their 
determination to make the police service more locally accountable, the Tories 
	 2 
have, ironically, introduced a governance model in which the accountability of 
PCCs has been called into question. Such uncertainty or confusion about the role 
of PCPs may impact on their ability to provide effective scrutiny (Centre for Public 
Scrutiny, 2013; Chambers, 2014; Bailey, 2015; Davies, 2016) 
 
PCPs have an important role in the new governance model and this research sets 
out to explore their effectiveness in holding PCCs to account.
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Chapter	1	Literature	review	
 
Although there is relatively limited academic literature on the issues of PCP 
effectiveness (Lister, 2014; Bailey, 2015), there is a wealth of relevant material 
relating to other public scrutiny bodies, where the structures and objectives are 
broadly similar to those of PCPs. Local government scrutiny panels and health 
body scrutiny committees share many of the challenges now being faced by 
PCPs. There is also extensive literature on police authorities and the tripartite 
governance model, which preceded PCCs. Police authorities also faced similar 
criticisms to those now being levelled against PCPs. 
 Literature	on	current	governance	model	
 
November 2012 saw the controversial introduction of PCCs in the 41 provincial 
forces in England and Wales. In the months that followed, critics drew attention to 
claims of cronyism, political nepotism and antagonistic relationships with Chief 
Constables (Lister, 2014).  
 
These concerns led to the announcement of a formal enquiry into PCCs by the 
Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) in May 2013. In a highly critical report, the 
HASC had earlier already made public its concerns about the ability of police and 
crime panels (PCPs) to scrutinise PCCs. (HASC, 2013C). The Chair of the HASC, 
Keith Vaz, stated that, 
 
 “Police and Crime Panels must redouble their oversight of their PCCs. 
Already, we have seen the suspension of a chief constable without consultation in 
Lincolnshire, controversial personal and political appointments without scrutiny by 
the PCP in Kent and other areas (….). We need to guard against maverick 
decision-making .” 1 
 
Similar anxieties were highlighted in 2015 by the House of Lords Committee on 
Standards in Public Life. Concern was raised about the lack of constructive 
challenge or active support to PCCs and the barriers faced by police and crime 
panels in their scrutiny role. This included lack of support, inadequate resources 
and absence of timely, accessible information. The consistency and credibility of 
representative membership was also seen as a major impediment and, citing 
Lister (2013), the report acknowledges the inability of PCPs to hold PCCs to 
regular and effective scrutiny.   
 
There was widespread criticism, notably from the HASC, even before the 
implementation of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2012, about 
the lack of real power for PCPs to hold their PCCs to account (HASC, 2010). It 
                                                
1 www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/home-affairs-committee/ 
news/130523-pcc-rpt-published/ 
	
	 4 
seems clear that Nick Herbert, who was the policing minister in the coalition 
government in 2010, did not support PCPs. He believed they were inconsistent 
with his model of local accountability. Their inclusion in the legislation was due to 
pressure from the Liberal Democrats, who were coalition partners with the 
Conservatives (Reiner, 2013).   
 
Although Herbert subsequently agreed to the creation of PCPs, he remained of the 
view that they should be ‘light touch’ only, with limited powers. This would prevent 
any danger of recreating police authorities (Loveday, 2017). Ironically, the only 
characteristics shared by police authorities and PCPs are their deep structural 
flaws, which fatally undermine their role (Ibid). Indeed, Reiner (2013) notes that, 
far from being a balanced counterweight to the power of PCCs, panels were weak, 
and without any real authority to challenge. Reiner casts doubt over claims that the 
model introduces greater democratic accountability and regards PCCs as 
providing a ‘veneer of electoral legitimacy’. The question of their democratic 
legitimacy, however, is not addressed in this research. 
 
It is unsurprising that the resulting legislation proved to be ambiguous (Lister, 
2014; Raine, 2015; Bailey, 2015). In their determination to make the police service 
more locally accountable, the Tories have, ironically, introduced a governance 
model in which the accountability of PCCs has been called into question. Such 
uncertainty or confusion about the role of PCPs may impact on their ability to 
provide effective scrutiny (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2013; Chambers, 2014; 
Bailey, 2015; Davies, 2016) 
 
Despite these reservations, the legislation was enacted. The Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act, 2011 details several statutory functions, all of which are 
aimed at providing checks and balances. However, the Local Government 
Association (2012a, p.9) describes most of these as “set piece events” or specific 
tasks in a formal setting. Although Section 28(6) of the Act requires the Panel to 
‘review or scrutinise’ the PCC in the exercise of their statutory functions including, 
for example, the dismissal of a Chief Constable, the PCC is not bound by the 
Panel’s decisions. Rather, the legislation states simply that PCCs ‘must have 
regard for’ the reports of the Panel. As a result, the Panel relies solely on its 
powers of persuasion in its scrutiny role (Lister, 2014; Bailey, 2015). 
 
Section 28(2) of the Act requires Panels to be supportive of their PCCs in the 
effective exercise of their functions. Reiner (2013) sees panels as having an 
‘explanatory and co-operative’ relationship with their PCCs, in which they have no 
real authority. This clearly creates an inherent role conflict, where administrative 
bodies are asked to be critical friends (Coulson and Whiteman, 2012; Leach and 
Copus, 2004).  
 
As will be evidenced in this study, panel members do not reflect the diversity of the 
public they represent, with just 28% of them, in the first year, being women (Gains, 
2014). Representativeness is a key requirement for panel membership and, 
without it, there may be questions about its legitimacy (Ibid). 
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There has been a significant reversal in the status of chief constables in the new 
governance arrangements (Loveday, 2017). Loveday asserts that whereas chief 
constables appeared to act as the ‘principals’ and the police authorities were, in 
effect, the ‘agents’ in the former tripartite system, that has been changed 
fundamentally. In the current model, he argues, PCCs are now the ‘principals’ and 
chief constables have become the ‘agents’. This has considerable significance in 
such a key power relationship, something acknowledged by Davies and Johnson 
(2015), who themselves advocate the use of ‘Principal – Agent’ theory, to help 
resolve the conflict caused by the new governance arrangements. Centrally 
imposed performance indicators have now ended, although the reduction of crime 
remains a target for all forces. Consequently, this means that additional 
performance targets are now locally derived by PCCs in their force police and 
crime plans, with no input from central government (Loveday, 2017). 
 
However, the seeming pre-eminence of PCCs has been tested recently in the High 
Court and its judgement on 9th June, 2017 has significant implications for the 
power of PCCs to dismiss Chief Constables. The court’s ruling was that the South 
Yorkshire PCC, Alan Billings, had acted unreasonably and disproportionately in 
suspending the then Chief Constable, David Crompton, (and later calling upon him 
to resign) over his response to the Hillsborough Inquest. In doing so, the court 
sought to tighten the scope for a PCC to initiate a dismissal procedure under 
section 38 of the Police reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (Muir 2017).  
 
A key finding was that PCCs must have proper regard for the operational 
independence of their chief constable, something not evident in this case. The 
court had to judge between the conflicting tensions of operational independence 
and democratic oversight and responsibility (Muir, 2017). Limiting the discretion 
exercised by the PCC in relation to suspension or dismissal procedures under 
Section 38 of the Act would appear to be the main outcome of this ruling (Ibid). 
However, the same judgement also made it clear that the PCC was not just 
entitled but ‘obliged to hold the relevant chief constable to account in respect of all 
the functions of the chief constable and for all the functions of those acting under 
his direction and control’ (QBD Para 76;2017). This seemingly contradictory 
statement implies that operational independence is not beyond the supervision of 
the PCC. Whether this can, as Loveday (2017) suggests, be regarded as a 
significant challenge to the doctrine of police operational independence from both 
central and local control, remains to be established. This is a legal dilemma, 
requiring further judicial clarification.   
 
The court also found that the PCC had given insufficient weight to the advice from 
HMCIC, Tom Winsor. Indeed, it stated that the PCC should only depart from the 
HMIC’s recommendations if he had cogent reasons for so doing. This judgement 
seems to imply that the power of HMIC, far from being weakened under the new 
governance model, has been reaffirmed. It remains to be seen whether the 
Association of Police and Crime Commissioners wishes to appeal against this 
judgement, but legal clarification will certainly be necessary.  
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Muir (2017) believes that while the ruling of the High Court is technically correct, it 
runs against the spirit of the legislation. Of significant interest to this research, 
however, is the fact that the PCC had consulted with, and sought approval from, 
his PCP before issuing his ultimatum to the Chief Constable. The panel offered its 
full support in respect of the commissioner’s decision.  
 
The new governance model was intended to enhance local democracy and was 
seen by the Home Secretary, Theresa May, as an opportunity for the public, 
through the ballot box, to hold their chief constables to account, particularly in 
relation to cutting crime (Loveday, 2017). However, many challenged the notion 
that they would enhance local democracy and improve police effectiveness 
(Reiner (2013).  Rather, PCCs are regarded as a populist measure, which run 
counter to liberal policing traditions (Ibid).  A similar point was made by Wood 
(2016), who argued that liberal values, which have long informed British policing, 
are a necessary counterweight to populism. 
 
For many authoritative commentators, the new governance model has been 
interpreted as a failure (King and Crewe 2014, pp 406-407). The average voter 
turnout of 15.1% in England and Wales was by far the lowest recorded in any 
comparable round of elections since 1832 (Ibid, pp 406-407). Given this very low 
turnout, there was arguably no clear public mandate for PCCs. In describing this 
reform as a blunder, King and Crewe argued that, at best, the new arrangements 
had not made any tangible improvements to those that existed previously. This 
was a view shared by the late West Midlands PCC, Bob Jones, who believed the 
posts should be scrapped (The Economist, 15th March, 2014). In a further article 
for Democratic Audit, Jones (2013), claimed police authorities were far more 
successful in the reduction of crime, which was directly at odds with the Home 
Secretary’s claim. The Stevens Commission (2013), established by the Labour 
Party, reported that PCCs were a failed experiment and that the role should be 
abolished. Stevens, a former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, had already 
recommended to the Labour Party that PCCs should be abolished, because they 
had neither increased police accountability, nor been cost effective (King and 
Crewe, 2014, pp 406-407). However, given that the evidence to the Stevens 
Commission came almost entirely from serving, or recently retired, senior police 
officers, this conclusion was not at all surprising (Loveday, Democratic Audit LSE 
2013).  
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Police Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act still represents the most significant change in police governance since the 
1964 Police Act. Indeed, these reforms are the most far-reaching in the nearly two 
centuries since the establishment of the modern British police (Reiner, 2013). 
Furthermore, it is also of interest that Ministers in the Cameron government were 
to refer to PCCs as ‘disruptive technology’, which would be used to deliberately 
challenge the existing status-quo (Loveday, 2017). 
  
By introducing direct election for PCCs, as well as according wide-ranging powers, 
the government sought an end to the relative autonomy of chief constables, 
established over many years (Marshall, 1965). The legislation also effectively 
ended the old tripartite system in handing over immediate responsibility for local 
policing to directly elected PCCs (Loveday, 2017). 
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It also ended Home Office intervention in local policing, which had increasingly 
characterized the tripartite system in recent years but especially during the time of 
New Labour. The Blair and Brown governments, in the name of police 
performance improvement, pursued ever more intrusive performance measures 
and central oversight, which served to undermine local police service delivery and 
local accountability even further (Loveday, 2017). It can be argued that, as the 
local police service delivery model was introduced, it became significantly more 
important to ensure police accountability was given a much greater profile locally. 	Literature	on	local	government	scrutiny		
 
Scrutiny in local government has also attracted criticism. Scholars have noted that 
scrutiny, as an institutional mechanism of public accountability, has met with 
limited success (Lister, 2014). Lister points to recurring themes from the literature, 
which suggest a lack of understanding of the role, weak leadership, poor 
management, ineffectual processes of inquiry, low profile and perceptions of 
limited impact (Snape and Taylor, 2001; Stoker et al., 2004; Coulson, 2011). 
Where such barriers exist, it is difficult for effective scrutiny to flourish (Coulson 
and Whiteman, 2012). Moreover, its capacity is limited by the willingness of 
councillors to find the time (Ibid). For local government scrutiny to be effective, six 
conditions are necessary (Snape, 2002; Coulson, 2010). These are panel 
leadership and engagement, a responsive executive, non-partisan working, 
effective and dedicated officer support, a supportive senior office culture, and a 
high level of awareness and understanding of the scrutiny role (Coulson and 
Whiteman, 2012). 
 
Coulson and Whiteman also found that just one third of councillors and council 
officers believed that scrutiny was effective (Ibid). This may have a negative 
impact on their perceived status as a scrutiny body, an issue identified in respect 
of police authority members (Millen and Stephens 2011).   Furthermore, a scrutiny 
committee depends on the skills of its elected members, with the Chair having a 
pivotal role (Ibid).  
 
It is not unreasonable to assume that PCPs, given that most members are local 
councillors, are similarly affected by such issues (Bailey, 2015). In his case study 
of Surrey PCP, Bailey found that similar problems were evident (Ibid). 
 
Party political allegiance has also been identified as a potential barrier to objective 
and effective scrutiny in public bodies (Leach and Copus, 2004; Leach 2009; 
Coulson and Whiteman, 2012; Sandford, 2013). The evidence suggests that party 
groups engage frequently in discussions on scrutiny investigations. Such 
discussions may influence the conclusions of the scrutiny panels (Coulson and 
Whiteman, 2012; Ewbank, 2011). This is especially acute where the scrutinised 
and the scrutinisers share the same political affiliation (Ewbank, 2011), something 
similarly identified by Colman and Glendenning (2004), in their study of health 
scrutiny bodies. Party political affiliation, and its potential for influencing PCP 
effectiveness, was one of the main research questions in this study.   
 
Representativeness is a major challenge for local government (Rao et al, 2007).   
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There have been many studies which have drawn attention to a democratic deficit 
generated by the under-representation of key groups, such as women, minority 
ethnic groups, young people, and people in paid employment (Ibid). Women and 
ethnic minorities have never enjoyed significant representation in national or local 
government. The 2006 Census of Local Authority Councillors revealed that 69.3% 
of councillors are male (compared to 48.0% of the adult population) and 95.9% are 
white (compared to 90.5% of the population. Young people and individuals in full 
time employment are also under-represented. Councillors are, on average, older 
(58) and not particularly representative of the communities they serve (Rao et al, 
2007). Given that most PCP members are local councillors, this poses a problem 
for their legitimacy (Gains, 2014, page 127). 
 Literature	on	scrutiny	of	health	bodies	
 
Many of the challenges encountered in health scrutiny bodies appear similar to 
those found with police governance.   
 
As with PCPs and local government scrutiny panels, health body scrutiny 
committees have a dual role of support and scrutiny (Coleman, Gains, Boyd, 
Bradshaw and Johnson, 2009). However, The Local Government and Public 
Involvement in Health Act, 2007 shifted the interpretation of overview and scrutiny 
from initial network building to a greater focus on external scrutiny and challenge 
through the introduction of councillor calls for action (Ibid). However, the study 
conducted by Coleman et al in 2009, suggested that there has been more 
evidence of collaboration, as opposed to challenge, within the health scrutiny 
process (Ibid). Evidence from this research into PCP effectiveness, suggests that 
many participants find their panel role ambiguous, with scrutiny not being given the 
priority it needs. 
 
The literature from health body scrutiny points to several key challenges, which 
appear to parallel many of those experienced with PCPs. Without adequate 
resources, particularly officer support and material resources for training, 
consultations, meetings, research and publicity, effective scrutiny will be 
compromised (Colman and Glendenning, 2004; Coleman, Gains, Boyd, Bradshaw 
and Johnson, 2009).  Given that local councillors are overburdened and have 
neither the time nor the capacity to fulfil their role, more independent committee 
members should be co-opted (Colman and Glendenning, 2004; Coleman, Gains, 
Boyd, Bradshaw and Johnson, 2009). The same study also drew attention to the 
fact that local councillors, because of democratic churn, have insufficient time and 
capacity to become more knowledgeable and authoritative in their scrutiny role 
(Ibid). 
 
As will be seen in this research, there is strong evidence that PCPs are 
inadequately trained, have insufficient resources and have a need for additional 
independent members. Moreover, the high turnover of local councillors, as with 
health scrutiny committees, has a negative impact on effectiveness. The absence 
of training and development presents a major challenge for panels, a point 
acknowledged in the report of the House of Lords Committee on Standards in 
Public Life, 2015, (page 126). It reported that panel members often felt 
insufficiently trained, and therefore unprepared for the role. 
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Colman and Glendenning (2004) drew attention to the threat of Party political 
influence, as loyalties may exert a strong influence over scrutiny activities. This is 
a major risk when NHS policies are also heavily shaped by national political 
agendas, so that scrutiny may become either wholly uncritical or wholly 
oppositional, depending on the alignment of local and national political parties. 
Political interference, as with local government scrutiny, was similarly considered a 
threat panel effectiveness in this study.  	Literature	on	police	authorities	
 
Democratic oversight of the police was, until 2012, the preserve of local police 
authorities. These were independent bodies for each of the 43 forces in England 
and Wales, charged with setting the strategic direction of their forces, as well as 
holding their chief constables to account.  
 
The Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1994, determined the composition of 
authorities, each authority comprising nine local councillors, five independent or 
appointed members and three magistrates. In London, the Metropolitan Police 
Authority had 23 members. These seventeen members were intended to assume 
an acute scrutiny role and undertake a more direct, and local, involvement with 
policing in their areas.  
 
However, police authorities came under mounting criticism for many reasons. 
Millen and Stephens (2011) found that they failed in key respects to deliver what 
was expected of them, principally because of their inability to engage with, and 
effectively represent, local people. Moreover, the same research identified a low 
level of trust by police authority members in their own abilities, together with 
doubts about the rigour with which they were performing their roles (Ibid). Brogden 
(2013) noted that police authorities frequently had neither the understanding, nor 
the expertise, to set long-term policing objectives for their local areas. 
Furthermore, there was considerable public ignorance of police authorities and 
their remit, partly resulting from poor media coverage (Ibid). Consequently, the 
ability of police authorities to hold chief constables to account was questionable 
(Ibid; Reiner, 2013; Loveday, 2013). 
 
The tripartite arrangement between the Home Office, chief constables and police 
authorities, in which chief constables could appeal to the Home Secretary against 
a directive from a police authority, served to undermine and inhibit the scrutiny 
function of the police authority (Reiner, 2013; Loveday, 2013). The pre-eminence 
of central government in this model meant that police authorities were viewed as 
weak and invisible (Reiner, 2013). Rather than as a mechanism for sharing 
governance responsibility, the tripartite system had, over many years, seen a 
significant increase in central direction, at the expense of both police authorities 
and chief constables (Loveday, 2013).  
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Successive pieces of legislation, particularly the Police and Magistrates’ Courts 
Act, 1994, curtailed the role of the police authority (Loveday, 2013). Whilst it 
ostensibly sought to protect the police from political interference, it significantly  
enhanced the status and authority of chief constables (Loveday, 2017). In seeking 
to preserve the operational independence of the chief constable, democratic 
accountability became a primary casualty (Ibid). 
 
The growing central government intrusion, through audit and inspection bodies 
and performance management, was at odds with government claims of local 
policing (Ibid). Indeed, centrally driven performance targets were a key feature of 
the New Labour government (McLaughlin, 2005; Loveday, 2006). HMIC, as strong 
allies of the Home Secretary, reinforced this centralising influence, not least in 
their role of drawing up shortlists of candidates for vacant chief constable posts 
(Loveday, 2006). Similarly, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) could 
wield significant, and disproportionate, influence in the development of policing 
policy (Savage, Charman and Cope, 2000; Loveday, 2000). This contrasts 
markedly with the highly circumscribed National Police Chiefs’ Council, which 
succeeded ACPO (Loveday, 2017). Reiner (2013), claimed the tripartite system 
was fundamentally flawed, in that there was an uneven division of power, which 
left local police authorities effectively impotent. 
 
A further significant development was the appointment of Tom Winsor, as the 
Chief Inspector of Her Majesty’s Constabulary. With no previous background or 
experience in policing, this appointment was unprecedented (Ibid). To highlight the 
significance of this appointment, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, identified her 
preferred candidate following his highly critical Report on police rewards and 
remuneration, which recommended substantial reforms of both, something deeply 
unpopular within the police service (Loveday, 2017).   
 
Given the critical concerns from authoritative commentators about the lack of legal 
clarity, the absence of effective powers, insufficient knowledge and training, the 
need for urgent reform was identified as a priority for the incoming Coalition 
government in 2010 (Millen and Stephens, 2011). The arguments for a transition 
towards directly elected commissioners were heralded by Howard (2005) and, 
more particularly, by Loveday and Reid (2003) in their seminal Policy Exchange 
report, ‘Going Local; Who should run Britain’s Police?’. 
 Summary		
 
Ironically, as will be evidenced in this research, there are marked similarities 
between the weaknesses exhibited by the former police authorities and the current 
police and crime panels. While police authorities struggled to hold chief constables 
to account, police and crime panels have encountered similar problems with 
PCCs, particularly in relation to the high turnover and calibre of local councillors, 
inadequate training and resourcing, legal ambiguity and little confidence in the 
governance system (Bailey, 2015; Loveday, 2017). Moreover, the perceived low 
status of their role by panel members must be a matter of concern for the model’s 
effectiveness.  
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These are not the only issues. The literature from scrutiny in both local 
government and health bodies suggests that scrutiny may be affected by political 
affiliation, especially where the scrutinised and the scrutinisers are from the same 
political party. It also points to the need for the appointment of more independent 
members, who bring not just political neutrality, but also professional expertise and 
consistency.  All these areas were tested fully in this study. 
 
However, as has been noted earlier, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act marks a fundamental change in police governance. With the introduction of 
directly elected PCCs in 2012, democratic oversight of policing is now locally 
based, rather than centrally controlled (Loveday, 2017). Moreover, the relative 
autonomy of chief constables, under the previous governance model, has been 
diminished considerably, although the recent High Court ruling, on the issue of 
police operational independence, may cast some doubt on that. Further legal 
clarification will be required. 
 
This research considers the extent to which the new local accountability model, 
based, in part, on the work of police and crime panels, has proved to be either 
relevant or effective. 
 
	 12 
 Chapter	2	Research	methods	and	methodology	
 Research	focus	
 
The aim of this study is to examine critically the effectiveness of PCPs in their 
scrutiny role of PCCs. Five key research questions are considered pertinent: 
 
• Demographics, representativeness and background experience - How 
important are demographics, representativeness and background 
experience in respect of panel and commissioner effectiveness? 
• Structure and Organisation - What is the impact of high panel member 
turnover, poor attendance, limited training, restricted funding, poor panel 
management and low public visibility? 
• Scrutiny - What do panel members think about their role, legal powers, 
complaint handling ability and the tension between support and scrutiny 
• The role of Politics - What is the influence of party politics and how 
effective are independent panel members? 
• Effectiveness - Is the model working? 
 Reflection	and	Reflexivity	
 
In conducting this study, it was important for the researcher to reflect critically 
throughout the whole exercise, starting with the identification and selection of the 
design and methodology, through to the conduct of the research and analysis of 
the data. The rationale for such reflection is to identify, understand and allow for 
researcher values and biases in order to make the findings more objective. 
However, it is now widely recognised that it is almost impossible to keep these 
values in check when undertaking research (Bryman, 2015). Indeed, Bryman 
notes that researchers are increasingly prepared to alert their readers to their 
biases and assumptions, making clear how these values could have affected the 
findings. (Bryman, 2015; pages 39 & 40) 
 
Models of reflective practice have been developed by a number of academic 
researchers (Dewey, 1933; Borton, 1970; Schon, 1983; Kolb, 1984). Whereas 
Dewey spoke of the contrast between routine and reflective action, Kolb 
developed a model of experiential learning in which an experience would prompt 
inward self-critical reflection, resulting in the formulation of a new concept or 
theory to enable an alternative option for handling a similar situation in the future. 
In exploring the nature of professional practice, Schon argued that reflection 
played a key role in helping professionals cope with their ‘messy’, complex worlds. 
He argued that the knowledge of the practitioner is inherent in the action, rather 
than relying upon a series of simple decision making steps. He coined the term, 
‘refection-in-action’ to describe where practitioners utilise their knowledge from a 
previous experience when assessing a new situation. Schon also described 
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another mode of reflection, that of ‘reflection-on-action’, where practitioners 
consider aspects of practice at times other than the moment of the action. 
Reflexivity, which is often confused with reflection, is a different concept (Finlay, 
2002, p. 532). Whereas reflection can be understood as thinking about an object 
after an event has happened, reflexivity is more about the researcher’s own 
immediate, continuing, dynamic and subjective self-awareness. Herz (1997) 
described it as ‘having an on-going conversation about the experience while 
simultaneously living in the moment’. 
 The	researcher	
 
As a former senior police officer, local councillor and Labour activist, with strong 
views on the current model of democratic governance of the police, the researcher 
had to exercise the utmost care to ensure his pre-existing values and biases did 
not jeopardise the study. He did this by making explicit to all participants his 
previous police role and present political affiliation, as well as by building research 
conditions that helped to mitigate his value assumptions. In doing so, he 
recognised that even with such discipline, it is impossible to eliminate all 
researcher bias. Even the most careful planning has to be seen in the context of 
the social, institutional and political environment in which the research is 
undertaken (Jupp et al, 2000). While this did not create insurmountable issues for 
the researcher, he found his neutrality challenged by some of the interviewee 
responses.  
 Research	philosophy	
 
In designing his research project, the author was aware of the need to be clear 
about the purpose of the study and of the requirement to have in place a 
conceptual framework from which he could derive relevant research questions. It 
was then necessary to develop appropriate methods to conduct the research, 
whilst also deploying effective sampling procedures to validate his findings 
(Robson, 2011). In the case of quantitative research, the data would need to be 
reliable, generalisable and valid. However, in qualitative or mixed methods 
research, these concepts are problematic in that identical circumstances cannot 
be re-created for the attempt to replicate (Bloor, 1997). Some proponents of 
flexible design prefer the use of terms such as credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp 294-301). As will be 
seen in the subsequent discussion, the researcher opted for a pragmatic, realist 
approach in order to maximise his mixed methods strategy. In addition, it was 
important to ensure ethical issues were identified and addressed in order to 
promote greater research objectivity. 
 
Bryman (2015) highlights two important points in the prominent role of theory in 
social research. First, a researcher must be clear about the type of theory he or 
she is talking about and, second, there is a need to differentiate between the data 
used to test and those used to develop theories. Whereas grand theory, such as 
symbolic interactionism, operates at a more general, though abstract level, middle 
range theory is more likely to be deployed in empirical study (Merton,1967). 
Another important distinction is that between deductive theory, where theory 
generates research and inductive theory, where research steers the theory. 
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Merton (1967), in talking about deductive theory, argued that theory and 
hypothesis prompt inquiry. Inductive theory, on the other hand, uses observations 
and findings to generate theory. While deductive theory is generally associated 
with quantitative research and inductive theory with qualitative researched, it is 
clear from the literature that there are no hard and fast distinctions. Rather they 
should be viewed as tendencies (Bryman, 2015) 
 
Approaches to social research carry with them important epistemological and 
ontological considerations (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.29), and the philosophical 
standpoint of the researcher must be identified. In terms of epistemology, where 
the question of what is appropriate knowledge in a discipline, the principal concern 
is whether the social world can be studied in the same way as the natural 
sciences. Positivism and interpretivism are the two contrasting epistemological 
positions (Bryman, 2015). Whereas positivism advocates the application of 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality, interpretivism is more 
concerned with the subjective meaning of social action. Positivism, which focuses 
on measurement, uses theory to generate hypotheses (deductive) and deploys 
quantitative methods to undertake research. Interpretivism, on the other hand, 
rejects measurement and uses research to generate theory (inductive) and utilises 
qualitative methods for research. 
  
Ontological considerations, which focus on whether or not the social world is seen 
as external to social actions, are also important. The two main ontological 
positions are objectivism and constructionism. Whilst objectivism implies that 
social actors are unable to influence social phenomena, constructionism asserts 
the opposite, reasoning that the interaction between social phenomena and social 
actors means they are in a constant state of revision. 
 
While it is the case that many methodologists argue that quantitative and 
qualitative research are two distinct and incompatible approaches (Sale, Lohfeld, 
and Brazil, 2002), it is clear that many researchers are actually using both in their 
work (Bryman, 2006b). Bryman suggests there is a new climate of pragmatism 
and less concern with philosophical doctrine (Bryman, 2006b). Rather, research 
paradigms should be viewed as shared beliefs among groups of researchers 
(Morgan, 2007). In essence, a researcher might use whatever philosophical or 
methodological approach that best serves that study, recognising that no one 
method or combination of methods is perfect (Denscombe, 2010).  One form of the 
pragmatic approach is realism, in which the researcher, in the field, seeks to find 
explanations to ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Robson, 2011). It offers a model of 
scientific explanation unencumbered by the philosophical hostilities between 
positivism and interpretivism.  
 
Although the author inclines more, in epistemological terms, to an interpretative 
approach and, in ontological terms, a constructionist viewpoint, he has adopted a 
pragmatic/realism methodology. This will enable him to obtain, and interpret, the 
subjective views of the PCCs, PCPs members, panel clerks and other 
stakeholders, and compare and contrast those with data from documentary 
evidence, press reports and current academic literature. 
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	Research	methodology	and	methods		
First, it was important to undertake a review of the current academic literature in 
order to determine what was already known, what concepts and theories might be 
relevant, what research methods and strategies have been deployed previously, 
what controversies and inconsistencies exist and to identify unanswered research 
questions (Bryman, 2015). Given that PCPs are a relatively new development, 
there has been little academic commentary, other than in the analogous context of 
local government scrutiny (Lister, 2014; Loveday, 2013; Bailey, 2015). 
 Mixed	methods	
 
The researcher set out to use a mixed methods approach and selected seven 
police areas in England and Wales, which offered a wide range of PCC/PCP 
political relationships. The fieldwork was conducted in late 2015 and early 2016, 
before the recent PCC elections in May 2016. The areas targeted were Thames 
Valley, where there was a Conservative Police and Crime Commissioners and 
Conservative led Police and Crime Panel, Merseyside, South Yorkshire and South 
Wales, where there were Labour Police and Crime Commissioners and Labour led 
Police and Crime Panels, and Kent, Avon and Somerset and Hampshire, where 
there were Independent Police and Crime Commissioners and Conservative led 
Police and Crime Panels. The fieldwork was subsequently extended to include 
Devon and Cornwall, where there was a Conservative PCC and a Conservative 
led PCP, Nottinghamshire, where there was a Labour PCC and a Labour led PCP, 
West Yorkshire, where there was a Labour PCC and Labour led PCP and 
Northumbria, where there was a Labour PCC and Labour led PCP.  
 
Both qualitative/interpretivist and quantitative methods were used, as these were 
thought to be the most effective and pragmatic way of conducting the research, 
not least because it would enable the researcher to triangulate his findings and 
thus render them more valid (Denzin, 1988). Triangulation can help to obviate all 
threats to research validity but also carries the risk of discrepancies and 
disagreements between different sources of data (Bloor, 1997). 
  
Interviews were seen as the most productive method for recording and distilling 
the perceptions of all the individual contributors to this research about the pivotal 
relationships between PCCs and members of PCPs. It was anticipated that 
cooperation would be forthcoming, despite the busy lives of the individuals 
concerned. 
 
There were 5 panel chairs included in the PCP members’ category. Semi-
structured interviews would enable the researcher to probe further on the key 
issues outlined above in the research focus paragraph. Such in-depth probing 
would have proved impossible with structured interviews or self-completion 
questionnaires. This is illustrated powerfully in the case of two of the PCCs (Avon 
and Somerset and Northumbria), both of whom declined to be interviewed but, 
instead, returned completed questionnaires, which proved of little evidential value. 
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Interviews		
 
Three main types of interview have been identified for use in research and these 
are structured interview, semi-structured interview and unstructured interview. 
(Noakes and Wincup (2004, pp. 79-80) 
 
Structured interviews are common in large-scale projects where consistency is 
required due to the large number of subjects and potentially large numbers of 
researchers. Being a quantitative tool, it is concerned only with measurement and 
does not allow for prompting or probing by the interviewer. 
 
A semi-structured interview is a qualitative tool that enables the researcher to 
probe against an interview schedule. Whereas in structured interviews, where the 
emphasis is on maximising the reliability and validity of measurement of key 
concepts, semi-structured interviews focus more on the personal perspectives of 
those being interviewed. There is more scope and flexibility for the researcher to 
ask follow-up questions.  
 
Unstructured interviews, also qualitative, are used where the interviewer has a 
general area of concern or interest and the conversation develops informally. 
Although the researcher may have prompts, unstructured interviewing tends to be 
very similar to a conversation (Burgess, 1984) 	Self-completion	questionnaire	
 
Another valuable method for collecting research data is the self-completion 
questionnaire, which is very similar to a structured interview but without an 
interviewer. It has fewer open questions for ease of analysis and is easier to follow 
and shorter in length. It is both cheaper and quicker to administer and benefits 
from the absence of interviewer bias. However, as a quantitative tool, it is 
concerned only with measurement and cannot probe respondents (Bryman, 2015). 
The researcher opted to conduct semi-structured interviews with each of the 51 
targeted subjects, which comprised 10 PCCs (5 Labour, 3 independents, 2 
conservatives) 33 PCP members (4 conservatives, 16 Labour, 12 independents, 1 
Green), 7 panel clerks and 1 other (chief executive of the office of the West 
Yorkshire PPC’s office and academic commentator).  
 Focus	group	interviews	
 
In the case of South Wales, Merseyside and South Yorkshire, focus group 
interviews were conducted with panel members. Given the large numbers of 
interviewees present and the problems of time constraints and other logistical 
challenges, it was thought more practical and efficient to interview members in 
small groups. Put simply, a focus group is a discussion which explores specific 
sets of issues involving collective activity (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999, p.4). Whilst 
‘focus groups’, or group interviews, do not discriminate against people who are 
unable to read or write and encourage participation from those reluctant to be 
interviewed (Kitzinger, 1995, p229), they are not without ethical concerns (Punch, 
1986). One ethical issue unique to focus groups is the fact that what participants 
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tell the researcher is inherently shared with other group participants as well. This 
raises serious invasion of privacy concerns and effectively limits the kinds of topics 
that the researcher can pursue (Smith, 1995). Another important consideration is 
that the group effect may influence some participants, particularly those who are 
less assertive, thereby rendering the data less reliable (Heine and Lehman, 2002). 
It is important that the interviewer strikes the correct balance between being active 
and passive, so that their involvement does not dominate or project their own bias 
(Sim, 1997). Although not expected to be an expert in group dynamics, the 
facilitator should have at least a basic understanding of the potential barriers to 
effective communication (Sim, 1997). The researcher was mindful of these 
particular weaknesses but found no evidence of them during the sessions. On all 
the key areas of possible contention, the focus group participants didn’t hold back 
on their responses. 
  Simple	observations	
 
Simple observations undertaken at panel meetings in Thames Valley, Avon and 
Somerset, Merseyside and South Yorkshire were also used to complement the 
semi-structured interviews. The principal advantage of simple observation is that it 
can be used to test interview responses with actions in a live setting (Webb et al, 
1966; Auge and Auge, 1999; Robson, 2011). There are two main disadvantages 
and these are in respect of the potential for the researcher to affect the reaction of 
those being observed (McCall, 1984) and the fact that observations are time 
consuming (Robson, 2011). In every case, the researcher sought to be 
unobtrusive in the public gallery and, through his anonymity, was careful to exert 
no influence over the proceedings being observed. Although time consuming, this 
did not present the researcher with any practical difficulties. It proved to be an 
effective method of testing, and validating, interview responses. 
 
The rationale was to compare and contrast the respective viewpoints of the 
different groups of practitioners on the role of the PCP, focusing particularly on the 
‘representativeness’ and high turnover of panel members, the general absence of 
training for both PCCs and PCPs, the role and effectiveness of independent panel 
members and PCP role clarity and understanding. Other areas included the 
possible need for additional powers for PCPs, the impact of funding constraints, 
the leadership and management of PCPs, the influence of party politics, complaint 
handling, the effectiveness of PCPs in holding PCCs to account, PCP visibility and 
perceptions of how the current model is working. A key question was to determine 
if the PCP would be more robust in its scrutiny where there was an independent 
PCC.  
 Research	participants	
 
In identifying the seven areas of Kent, Hampshire, Thames Valley, Avon and 
Somerset, South Wales, Merseyside and South Yorkshire, the researcher was 
seeking to test the widest possible range of political relationships between PCCs 
and PCPs, so that the extent to which party political influence played any part 
could be assessed. At a later stage, research participants from five other police 
areas were added. These were Devon and Cornwall, where there was a 
Conservative PCC and a Conservative led PCP, Nottinghamshire, with a Labour 
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PCC and Labour led PCP, Northumbria, with a Labour PCC and a Labour led 
PCP, Greater Manchester, with a Labour PCC and a Labour led PCP and West 
Yorkshire, where there was a Labour PCC and a Labour led PCP. There were 
particular reasons for including West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester. In the 
case of West Yorkshire, the interview subject was both an authoritative 
commentator on police governance, as well as the chief executive of the office of 
the West Yorkshire PCC. Greater Manchester was included because one of the 
panel members there had set up, and was chairing, a forum for independent PCP 
members for all areas in the north west of England. 
 Interview	Schedule	
 
Following a detailed analysis of the available literature (Lister, 2014; HASC, 2013; 
Leach and Copus, 2004; Whiteman, 2012; CfPS, 2013; Snape and Taylor, 201; 
Stoker et al, 2004; Coulson, 2011; Reiner, 2013; Loveday, 2013; Bailey, 2015), a 
semi-structured interview schedule was developed by the researcher and 
validated by his supervisor. The key questions were developed from the literature, 
as well as from informal conversations with other criminal justice researchers.  It 
was important for the interviewees to be focused on the main research themes, 
but in a way that would enable them to expand or clarify where necessary. Closed 
questions were kept to a minimum, since evidence has shown that such questions 
can skew responses (Noakes and Wincup, 2004, p.77) 
  
The semi-structured interview schedule used in this study for PCP members is 
attached at Appendix 1. The schedule for the PCCs is also attached at Appendix 
2. The self-completion questionnaires sent to those PCCs and PCP members who 
had not been interviewed are identical to the semi-structured interview schedules 
(Appendix 1 and appendix 2) 
 Ethical	issues	
 
Ethics has a very important role in social research, given the potential for harm, 
stress and anxiety to those upon whom the research impacts (Robson, 2011). 
Diener and Crandall (1978), in their discussion of ethical principles, have broken 
down the key issues into four main areas. These concern harm to participants, 
lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception. 
 
Professional associations, such as the British Sociological Association (BSA) and 
the Social Research Association (SRA), have formulated codes of ethics. It is clear 
that researchers should reflect very carefully at all stages of the research journey 
on issues that may affect the subjects of that research, stakeholders and the wider 
community, as well as ensuring the integrity of the methodology and any results 
reported. (Kimmel,1988). 
 
The law also has a part in ethical considerations and researchers must have 
regard for the Human Rights Act 1998 (Home Office 1998) and the Data 
Protection Act 2004 (Home Office, 2004), which deals with the handling of 
personal data. 
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Politics, in a non party-political sense, similarly plays an important role in social 
research. The key issues here are around taking sides, research funding, gaining 
access, getting organizational cooperation, publication restrictions and choice of 
research methods (Bryman, 2015). While some types of research may be 
supported, others are suppressed, and decision-makers in government are more 
likely to support research projects that fit with their current policy priorities 
(Robson, 2012). 
 
Ethical issues must be resolved prior to the commencement of the research study 
(Silverman, 2005). In complying with the University of Portsmouth ethical 
guidelines, the author completed, and submitted for ethical review, an ‘ethics self-
assessment form’, together with a research protocol, describing the methodology 
to be undertaken, and an ethical narrative detailing the ethical issues and the 
methods for mitigating them. This process was invaluable for the author since it 
forced him to think carefully about his methodology and the impact of his research 
on participants. 
 
Politics featured prominently in this study since the majority of those either being 
interviewed or surveyed are political activists. The author, as a political activist 
himself, had to think very carefully about how to maximise his objectivity and 
neutrality in conducting the research. The ethical and political dimensions to this 
research, including the control measures, are discussed in detail in the ethical 
narrative documents submitted for ethical review. (Appendix 3) 
 
Following a favourable ethical review, the researcher proceeded with his study, 
adhering closely to the research protocol and ethical narrative. He recognised that 
any deviation from the agreed protocol would require further ethical approval. 
 Selection	of	research	participants	
 
In selecting the seven police areas subject of this study, the author sought to 
present a full range of political relationships between PCCs and PCPs. This was 
considered to be the best option to evaluate critically the impact, if any, of the 
political influences at work in the scrutiny role of the PCP. The intended 
participants were, therefore, the seven PCCs and as many members as possible 
from the corresponding PCPs. The researcher was keen to ensure that the PCCs 
and panel members came from the widest political spectrum, as well as those who 
were independent. Given the importance and prominence of panel chairs and 
panel clerks in the governance model, efforts were made to include them in the 
study. In the case of panel chairs, all but two agreed to be interviewed, whereas 
with the panel clerks, six participated in the study. 
 
Participants from other police areas (Devon and Cornwall, Nottinghamshire, West 
Yorkshire and Northumbria) were identified for this study early on in the fieldwork. 
One Conservative PCC had made some very interesting public observations about 
the efficacy of the model and he was keen to be interviewed. Similarly, a Labour 
PCC, an advocate of the new model, wanted to share his views on his relationship 
with his panel members. Another Labour PCC was included because, as a leading 
commentator, her views on the evolution of the model were considered important. 
Her Fabian policy report, Letting in the Light (Baird, 2014) highlighted the ways in 
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which Labour PCCs were developing their role. In the event, she declined to be 
interviewed but, instead, arranged for one of her office staff to complete her 
questionnaire. Two additional participants were recruited from another area, one 
being the panel clerk and the other, a chief executive from the PCC’s office. 
Finally, an independent panel member was added because he is the chair of a 
newly created forum for independent PCP members in the north west of England. 
A full (coded) list of research participants, including their political affiliation, is 
shown at Appendix 4 
 
Formal requests were sent to all participants in this study. In the case of the PCPs, 
these were directed through the panel clerks and, in respect of PCCs, via their 
personal secretaries. (See Appendices 5 and 6) These were followed by 
participant information sheets (Appendix 7) and consent forms (Appendix 8) 
 
Although the researcher was satisfied that the participants reflected the major 
political parties and, despite significant efforts on his part to engage them in this 
study, he was disappointed with the take-up of `Conservative panel members. This 
is particularly the case in Kent, Hampshire and Thames Valley, where there are 
big Conservative panel majorities. Ironically, the Conservative panel chairs in both 
Hampshire and Kent were willing participants. This apparent defensiveness on the 
part of Conservative panel members was also to be encountered in his earlier 
case study of the Surrey PCP (Bailey, 2015). 
 Research	Phase	
 
A full schedule of the interviews, including the time, date and venue, is shown at 
Appendix 9 Every effort was made to conduct the interviews in private rooms to 
ensure confidentiality but this was not always possible. Some of the interviews 
were done over the telephone and, in all cases, they were recorded on the 
researcher’s iPad, using the ‘AudioNote’ application. All of the recorded interviews 
were transcribed by the researcher. 
 
Prior to commencing the interviews, the author carefully went through the 
information sheets and the consent forms, which had been sent with the letter 
previously to the participants (Appendices 7 and 8).  
 
All the semi-structured interviews were conducted using the schedule (Appendix 1 
and Appendix 2). The author was careful to listen to what was being said and 
steering the exchanges in order to elicit the maximum data. He was also mindful of 
the context and the potential influences he may bring to bear, whether 
inadvertently or not (Kvale, 1996).  
 
The interview schedule was used as a guide to enable him to cover all the salient 
research issues, rather than as a restrictive template.  This allowed him to probe 
and pursue issues raised by the participants in their answers to the open-ended 
questions, whilst simultaneously reflecting on the potential impact of his presence 
and style of questioning. 
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Research	challenges		
This research was not without its challenges. Difficulties were first encountered in 
respect of the researcher’s failure, despite repeated attempts, to interview two 
prominent PCCs. Although they subsequently agreed to complete and return 
questionnaires, their responses were wholly inadequate, in that their answers 
lacked both clarity and depth. Neither was there a chance to probe further on key 
questions. Compared with the in-depth interviews of the other participants, the two 
returned questionnaires offered little in terms of evidential value. 
 
The small number of participants from the Conservative party was another 
problem. Just four of the 33 panel members were Tories, which meant they were 
not a representative sample. Considerable efforts were made to recruit additional 
Conservative panel members but all proved unsuccessful. These included written 
requests being sent out by panel clerks, in addition to further requests from the 
researcher to panel chairs seeking their help. It is not possible to identify a reason 
for this seeming reluctance on the part of the Conservative panel members but it is 
consistent with the findings from his earlier study (Bailey, 2015), where similar 
difficulties were encountered. This might suggest that the researcher’s declared 
political affiliation, despite explicit assurances of neutrality and objectivity, acted as 
a barrier. Interestingly, two of the four Conservatives were panel chairs, both of 
whom were enthusiastic contributors to the research. 
 
Maintaining anonymity was difficult but every effort was made to minimize the risk 
of participants’ names being revealed. This was done by using codes and 
removing all words and comments from quotations that might have indicated 
identities. This was far more problematic with PCCs, as just 8 of them were 
interviewed, giving readers a one in eight chance of identifying them. 
 
Another significant challenge arose during an interview with a panel clerk, who 
became tearful when talking about her workload and the intolerable pressure this 
placed on her. The researcher had to adapt his interview style to respond to the 
clerk’s distress.  
 Data	analysis	
 
The researcher decided to use a thematic content analysis for the semi-structured 
interviews and the self-completion questionnaire. (Newell and Burnard, 2011, 
pp.118-129; Krippendorff, 2004). He first reviewed the data to familiarise himself 
with it and then focused the data on the six research questions, in an attempt to 
identify themes and patterns.  Where meaningful issues were found, they were 
developed into categories that were deemed relevant to the research questions. 
 
Given that the author himself carried out the categorisation, this analysis strategy 
is potentially open to bias. This could be removed by using additional analysts to 
provide ‘inter rater reliability’ (Pope et al, 2000), or by using computer-assisted 
data analysis software (CAQDAS) such as NVivo (Bryman and Bell, 2003 pp. 444-
461).   
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The researcher took all these considerations into account and, having discussed it 
with his supervisor, opted to conduct the analysis himself. He used a spreadsheet 
(see appendix 10), which listed all the key variables, together with the specific 
themes of the research, such as high turnover of panel members, training and 
induction, effectiveness and recruitment of independent panel members, PCP role 
perception, the adequacy of panel powers, support/scrutiny tension, the impact of 
funding constraints, panel management and leadership, panel visibility, PCP 
effectiveness, political influence/interference and the efficacy of the current 
governance model. The spreadsheet proved highly effective, in that it allowed the 
researcher to list all research participants, together with the variables against 
which interrogation and analysis could be undertaken. Pertinent comments were 
inserted into relevant column cells, enabling the researcher easy access to, and 
analysis of, groups of responses. The spreadsheet allowed the researcher to sort 
and filter the responses, including the variables of gender, demographics and 
political affiliation. 
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Chapter	3	
Demographics,	representiveness	and	background	experience		Findings	and	analysis	–	How	important	are	representativeness	and	background	experience	in	respect	of	panel	effectiveness?	
 
Panel composition, including the diversity, representativeness and background 
experience of members, is likely to have some bearing on effectiveness (Bailey, 
2015). This chapter considers each of the two key elements that together 
determine the composition of PCPs and evaluates their potential impact on 
performance. It will also explore the same issues in respect of PCCs.   
 Representativeness			
Representativeness is a major challenge for local government (Rao et al, 2007). 
There have been many studies which have drawn attention to a democratic deficit 
generated by the under-representation of key groups. Women and ethnic 
minorities have never enjoyed significant representation in national or local 
government (Ibid). The 2006 Census of Local Authority Councillors revealed that 
69.3% of councillors are male (compared to 48.0% of the adult population) and 
95.9% are white (compared to 90.5% of the population. Young people and 
individuals in full time employment are also under-represented. Councillors are, on 
average, older (58) and not particularly representative of the communities they 
serve (Ibid).  
 
Given that most PCP members are local councillors, it might be expected that they 
also experience the same democratic deficit. This is a matter identified by 
Professor Francesca Gains (2014, page 127) in her evidence to the House of 
Lords Committee on Standards in Public Life. She suggested that the lack of 
diversity in PCPs threatened the legitimacy of those panels. The researcher 
sought to ascertain the demographic profiles of the PCCs and panel members in 
the areas examined, although it should be noted that not all panel members 
participated in this research. 
 
Evidence suggests that neither PCCs, nor panel members, in terms of age, 
gender, ethnicity, education, occupation and class, are truly representative, of the 
wider communities from which they are drawn (Bailey, 2015) 
 
Aside from concerns about fairness, it is also possible that this 
underrepresentation may have some bearing on the manner in which panel 
members and PCCs perform their roles. Without a broad range of views that 
reflect diverse communities, it could be that some key considerations are being 
missed by both PCCs and panel members. Indeed, in commenting on local 
councillors, Rao et al, 2007, suggested that fairer representation would lead to 
better political debate, improved decision making and, in consequence, more 
effective service delivery.  
Findings	and	analysis	
 24 
 Representativeness	of	Panel	members	
 
The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011, provides detailed 
guidance for the composition of PCPs. These guidelines are quite prescriptive, 
particularly in terms of the number of local councillors to be appointed. For 
example, where a force area consists of ten or fewer authorities, the number of 
members of the PCP will be ten, not including the co-opted independent members. 
In force areas where there are more than ten authorities, there will be as many 
members as there are local authorities in the force area, plus two co-opted 
independent members. Additional councillors may be co-opted onto the PCP, as 
long as two lay independents are also included, the size of the PCP does not 
exceed 20 and the Secretary of State approves the co-options. Composition 
should be achieved in accordance to the ‘fair representation’ objective, which 
means each authority in the force area must be represented by at least one 
member if the total number of authorities in the area is less than ten, and one 
member if the number of authorities is ten or more (Local Government 
Association, 2011). In Thames Valley, for example, there are eighteen local 
authorities represented on the PCP and two independent members, making a 
maximum of twenty members. This contrasts with Avon and Somerset. Here, there 
are ten local authorities and a total of eighteen panel members, including three 
independent members and five additional co-opted councillors. As will be seen 
later, panels have no influence in who local authorities co-opt onto PCPs but this 
contrasts markedly with independent members, who all go through a rigorous 
selection and interview process. This means that panels, with the exception of 
their independent members, have no control over their democratic profiles. The 
consequences, in terms of representativeness, are significant. Given that most 
local councillors are middle-aged to elderly males, the composition of many panels 
means that many sections of the wider communities are significantly under-
represented. This was confirmed by a panel clerk, who stated that most panel 
members, excluding independents, were from a similar background (Clerk3)  
 
There was a graphic illustration of this point by a female independent member, 
who stated that:  
 
“In terms of representativeness, I once turned to a fellow panel member and 
commented that we had more men called Kenneth on our panel than we had 
women. Yes, the make-up is mainly old white men. I suspect this is mainly due to 
the fact that they are councillors, the majority of whom are retired. This county is a 
Tory stronghold nowadays and so residents are more likely to vote for old white 
men rather than young black women. The panel is not entirely representative of 
the wider community.” PCP12 
 
One respondent with an extensive background in police governance was forthright 
in his criticism of panels and their lack of representativeness. He attributed this to 
a lack of resolve on the part of the government. He noted that:  
“I don’t think they are particularly representative. The issue with panels, of 
course, is that they were an addition in the legislation forced in by the Lib Dems 
during the coalition government. The Tories didn’t want the panels at all. They 
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were put in as a concession. I don’t think they have ever really found their way.” 
OS1 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the age ranges, gender, political affiliation and 
relevant experience of the 33 PCP interviewees. Although it highlights that the 
majority of panel members are men aged between 51 and 80, it needs to be 
interpreted in conjunction with Table 4. This provides a gender split of all eleven 
PCPs covered in this study. This supports the claim that in terms of gender, 
women remain under-represented.  
As will be seen in Table 2, the great majority (84%) of panel members interviewed 
were white British. From the researcher’s observations at Panel meetings in 
Thames Valley, Avon and Somerset, South Wales, Merseyside and South 
Yorkshire, it was clear that there was a similar preponderance of white British 
panel members. It was also clear from his interviews and observations that there 
was a similar majority, judging by their appearance, comments, background and 
demeanour, who were drawn from the middle class, although this is not shown in 
the table below. Of those interviewed, a majority (70%) were in employment. This 
was not reflected in the panel meetings observed by the researcher, where it 
appeared that there was a higher percentage of retired people. As for panel 
experience, 20 of the 33 (60%) had served on their panels for two or more years. 
 
Interestingly, the independent panel members were much more diverse in terms of 
age, gender, ethnicity and expertise. Six of the twelve (50%) independents were 
under 50 years of age, ten of the twelve (83%) were in full time employment, five 
of the 12 (41%) were non-white, three out the twelve (25%) were women. All of 
them had received graduate level education with relevant professional expertise 
and nine out of the twelve (75%) had served on their panels for more than 2 years. 
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Table	1	Age,	gender,	political	affiliation	and	relevant	experience	of	PCP	members 
Age 
range 
 Gender  Politics  Experience  
21 - 30 2 (6%) Men 23 (69%) Conservative 4 (12%) Police 5 
(15%) 
31 - 40 4 (12%) Women 10 (30%) Labour 16 (48%) Legal 2 (6%) 
41 - 50 4 (12%)   Green 1 (3%) Probation 2 (6%) 
51 - 60 10 (30%)   Independent 12 (36%) Social 
Services 
2 (6%) 
61 - 80 13 (39%)     None 
relevant 
5 
(15%) 
      Other 17 
(51%) 
 
	
Table	2	Ethnicity,	employment	status,	time	on	panel	and	councillor	experience	of	PCP	members 
Ethnicity  Working/retired  Time on 
Panel 
 Experience 
as 
councillor 
 
White 
British 
4 (12%) Working 20 
(60%) 
Less than 
1 year 
9 (27%) N/A 12 
(36%) 
White 
English 
18 
(54%) 
Retired 10 
(30%) 
1 to 2 
years 
4 (12%) 1 to 5 years 7 
(21%) 
White 
Welsh 
4 (12%) Full time 
councillor 
3 (9%) 2 to 3 
years 
7 (21%) 6 to 10 
years 
3 (9%) 
Northern 
Irish 
2 (6%)   4 or more 
years 
13 
(39%) 
11 or more 
years 
11 
(33%) 
Black 
British 
1 (3%)       
Mixed 
race 
2 (6%)       
Asian 
British 
2 (6%)       
 
 
Table	3	Cabinet	member,	scrutiny	body,	policing/community	safety	brief	and	experience	on	former	police	authorities	of	
PCP	councillor	members 
Cabinet 
member 
 Scrutiny 
body 
 Policing and 
community 
safety brief 
 Former 
Police 
Authority 
member 
* 
 
Yes 
 
9 (42%) Yes 17 (81%) Yes 15 (71%) No 27 
(81%) 
No 12 (57%) No 4 (18%) No 6 (28%) Yes 6 
(18%) 
*Including independent members 
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Table	4	Gender	split	and	number	of	independents	on	all	12	PCPs	covered	in	this	research 
Police Area Male Female Independents 
Avon & 
Somerset 
12 
(66%) 
6 (33%) 3 
Devon & 
Cornwall 
13 
(65%) 
7 (35%) 2 
Greater 
Manchester 
10 
(83%) 
2 (16%) 2 
Hampshire 14 
(73%) 
5 (26%) 2 
Kent 18 
(90%) 
2 (10%) 2 
Merseyside 5 (41%) 7 (58%) 2 
Northumbria 6 (46%) 7 (53%) 2 
Nottinghamshire 11 
(61%) 
7 (38%) 3 
South Wales 8 (66%) 4 (33%) 2 
South Yorkshire 12 
(92%) 
1 (7%) 2 
Thames Valley 13 7 2 
West Yorkshire 9 (64%) 5 (35%) 2 	Representativeness	of	PCCs	
 
Although there is a fairly even gender balance among the 10 PCCs in this 
research, the national picture is very different, with 34 (83%) men and just seven 
(16%) women (figures from the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners). 
What is also clear is that a majority in this research (70%) were aged between 61 
and 80. It has not been possible to obtain the ages for the remaining 24 PCCs 
throughout the country but it is likely that the age profile would be broadly similar. 
In this study, all 10 (100%) PCCs were white British and the national picture is little 
different, with all but one being white British.2 
 
It appears that all 10 PCCs in this study, in terms of their education and 
professional background are drawn from the middle class. Four (40%) of them had 
been ministers in a Labour government, two had been senior military figures, two 
had been magistrates, one had been a social worker and one had been a senior 
academic. It is likely that this pattern would be repeated across the country. At first 
sight, it would appear that PCCs are not particularly representative of the wider 
communities from which they are drawn but this is a relatively new role and there 
is no precedent as to the ideal candidate. When asked about this, one of the PCCs 
stated: 
 
“I don’t know what the ideal type of person would be, to be honest. This 
would apply to people in various organisations at a certain level, like board 
members. I was, for a time, a board member of the Lottery Panel. I’m a board 
                                                
2	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/police	
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member of the Youth Justice Board. Yes, it’s helpful if you have some experience 
of the business, although in this case, I think what you are trying to do is represent 
the public. Therefore, you need a fairly open mind and a broad general experience 
and the ability to stand up to people who have got stripes or buttons on their 
uniforms.”  PCC6 
 
As will be seen in subsequent sections, it is not just demographic factors such as 
age, class, education, gender and occupation that may have some influence on 
the way in which commissioners regard their role. Politics may also feature as 
well.  
 
Table	5	Age,	gender,	political	affiliation	and	relevant	experience	of	PCCs 
Age 
range 
 Gender  Ethnicity  Politics  Experience  
51 - 
60 
3 
(30%) 
Men 6 
(60%) 
White 
British 
10 
(100%) 
Conservative 2 
(20%) 
Government 
Minister 
4 
(40%) 
61 - 
70 
5 
(50%) 
Women 4 
(40%) 
  Labour 5 
(50%) 
Military 2 
(20%) 
71 - 
80 
2 
(20%) 
    Independent 3 
(30%) 
Magistracy 2 
(20%) 
        Academia 1 
(10%) 
        Social work 1 
(10%) 
 
 What	are	the	reasons	for	this	lack	of	diversity	and	what	problems	does	it	generate?		
 
The majority of panel members are local councillors, which means PCPs have 
little, if any influence, on who is appointed. Given the acknowledged lack of 
diversity of local councillors, who are mainly middle-aged to elderly white middle 
class men, there is little wonder panels are unrepresentative of their wider 
communities. Panels are aware of this problem, although they are powerless to do 
anything about it. Change can be only be effected if it comes through legislation, 
something identified by Gains, 2015, in her evidence to the House of Lords 
Committee on Standards in Public Life. Although the co-option of independent 
panel members helps to mitigate this lack of representativeness, it has little real 
impact, given the limitation on their numbers. 
 
PCCs are similarly unrepresentative of their wider communities, with the majority 
also being middle class, middle-aged to elderly, white men. It is unclear why this 
situation has arisen but it is possible to speculate on the reasons for this. In the 
absence of any clearly defined person specification, the role may have appealed 
more to individuals with a background in senior management, particularly in 
politics, which may have deterred female applicants. It would not appear that there 
is a rigorous selection process at the party-political level either, short of the 
customary hustings events, and these are poorly attended. 
 
The problems this lack of representativeness creates are significant. In the case of 
panel members, it means there are fewer opportunities for panels to reflect on the 
full range of relevant community concerns, thereby missing important issues. The 
same challenge exists for PCCs, although they do have access to a team of 
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professional advisers, who may be able to compensate by providing a broader and 
more representative perspective on policy considerations. 
 Summary	
 
Neither PCP members nor PCCs are representative of the wider communities from 
which they are drawn. Consistent with earlier studies on local councillors, this is 
problematic for both but probably more so for panel members. The apparent 
preponderance of middle class, middle-aged to elderly white men, means that 
panels, with the exception of independent co-opted members, are less able to 
understand, and reflect, the wide diversity of community views. The same applies 
for the commissioners, particularly in respect of their policy development and the 
mechanisms they use for community consultation. In their case, though, this 
problem is largely mitigated by the teams of professional advisers at their disposal. 
However, as will be seen later, it does not always follow that commissioners are 
restrained in their views on controversial topics.  
 
The evidence from this research suggests that independent panel members are 
the clear exception in terms of age, gender, professional background and diversity. 
Not only do they better reflect the wider community, they have specific 
professional skills for their role and have, on average, spent longer on their panels. 
The role of independent members is the subject of a detailed discussion, which 
follows later. 
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Background	experience	of	panel	members	and	PCCs 
 
The background experience of panel members and PCCs is important because 
their roles call for knowledge and authority in a wide range of relevant areas, such 
as criminal justice (in all its forms), scrutiny (particularly in local government), 
mental health, young people, human resource management, diversity and 
governance. The more competent they are in these areas, the more confident and 
effective they will be in the exercise of their roles. The legislation (The Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011) states that panel members must have 
the relevant skills, knowledge and experience to discharge the panel’s functions 
effectively. There is, however, no formal guidance as to what this means, or how it 
is to be achieved. In the absence of any formal advice, the House of Lords 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015) concluded that relevant skills and 
experience included. 
 
 “knowledge of scrutiny, risk management and governance and an 
experience, knowledge or interest in policing, community safety partnerships and 
the justice system” (Page 126) 
 
In respect of PCCs, there is no formal guidance available that sets out the desired 
skills and relevant background experience. Given their important and powerful 
role, this is surprising. It could be that the legislators, in framing the new 
governance model, believed democracy was sovereign and that this was the 
overriding consideration. 
 
This research sought to ascertain the backgrounds and experience of both panel 
members and PCCs to assess the possible impact on role effectiveness. 
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 Background	experience	of	PCP	members	
	
Table	6	Background/professional	experience	of	PCP	members 
Police 5 Two independents 
Lawyers/legal 2  
Probation 3 Two independents 
Social Services 2 One independent 
Crime reduction panel 1  
Mental health 1  
HR/Diversity 2 Both independents 
Community relations 2 Both independents 
Journalism 1  
Local government 
scrutiny 
4  
Assistant Police HMI 1  Independent 
Police Authority clerk 1  Independent 
Senior military officer 1  
Restorative justice 1  
Women’s Aid/ Rape 
crisis 
1 Independent 
No relevant experience 5  
	
Three findings stand out in Table 6. The first is that a significant minority of 
members (15%) have had experience in the police service, something identified in 
an earlier study (Bailey, 2015). Indeed, the extent to which former police officers 
are engaged in the current model, both as panel members and PCCs or deputy 
PCCs, has attracted the attention of many authoritative commentators, who 
question this trend. Indeed, the Home Affairs Select Committee (2014: 23), in 
expressing its concerns, noted that interference in operational matters was more 
likely from ‘commissioners who had prior experience in policing’. In recent 
research, Wells, 2015, found that the election of former police officers evoked very 
strong, negative, feelings amongst both PCCs and chief constables. One PCC 
was quoted as saying: 
 
 “No PCC should ever be an ex copper, because the last bloody thing that a 
chief needs is some bloke that retired (normally at a significant lower rank than he 
or she) over them but tempted to get into that operational level of delivery.” 
 
In the same research, a chief constable noted that: 
 
 “In some areas, they do interfere with operational policing. There’s a 
colleague not too far away from here who is an ex police officer and I know that 
the chief has much more difficulty because ex police officers think they know how 
to run a police force.” 
 
One research participant captured this sentiment:  
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“What is the number of ex-police officers who are PCCs. It seems to be in 
the public mind that having police experience would be advantageous. This makes 
no sense to me at all.” OS1 
 
There are, however, mixed views about the involvement of former police officers in 
the governance model and not all of them are critical. A panel clerk, when asked 
about this, felt that it was helpful for the panel to have access to the insights 
brought by former police officers, although she noted they were not always current 
insights. (Clerk2) 
Second, a similar number (15%) of members said they had had no relevant 
previous experience for their panel role, something which must raise a little 
concern.  
 
Finally, the evidence from this study suggests that the independents have the 
broadest range of professional expertise. There is no surprise in this given that, 
unlike their councillor colleagues, they are all subject to a rigorous selection 
process and are appointed directly because of their expert skills and authority. 
There is, perhaps, a certain irony in that while independents are required to 
possess an array of skills, qualifications and professional expertise, that is all 
‘trumped by democracy’ in respect of local councillor members, who are there by 
virtue of election. The contrast between councillor and independent members is 
illustrated by one panel clerk, who stated: 
 
“The two current independent members make a significant contribution to 
the panel. They both have an incredible amount of relevant experience. The 
original legislation states clearly that the new independent members should plug 
skills gaps in the panel. We’re supposed to do the skills analysis of all the 
individual panel members but we don’t do it anymore. It is for the councils to 
appoint the panel members. We do skills analysis and a gap analysis, and the 
Independent co-optees are appointed to fill those gaps. The problem is the co-
opted members are appointed for four years and the panel members only there for 
one year. So, in actual fact, you will probably be better off doing it the other way 
round.” Clerk6 
  
The advantages of independent members, in terms of their professional expertise, 
commitment and intelligence, was praised by another panel clerk, who much 
preferred to work with them. She also claimed that, unlike the councillor members, 
they had the right skills ‘fit’ for panel membership. (Clerk7) 
 
Another important consideration which may have some bearing on the 
performance of the PCP councillor members is their own experience in their local 
authorities. It is probable that those members with experience in local authority 
cabinets, scrutiny bodies or with a brief for policing and community safety might be 
better able to make a constructive contribution to their PCPs. The majority of 
councillor PCP members in this study had experience on scrutiny bodies (81%) 
and 71% of them were portfolio holders for policing and community safety. 
However, only 42% of them had cabinet responsibility. Of the 33 PCP members 
subject of this research (including independents), 18% of them had served on the 
former police authorities. (Table 3) These findings tend to suggest that local 
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authorities are trying to appoint panel members with an appropriate background. 
However, as was noted by a panel clerk, this is called into question by council 
annual general meetings, when port-folio holders are frequently replaced: 
 
 “There is also a difficulty in that the individual local authorities have annual 
meetings during which they nominate who they want to represent them on the 
various panels. This means that current members of the panel may lose their brief 
from their local authority. My personal view is that the local authorities should have 
a duty to try and retain their nominated members for there to be some consistency 
on the panel.” Clerk6 
 
Interestingly, members with experience on the old police authorities have not 
always found the transition to the new model either easy or welcome, something 
identified by the Centre for Public Scrutiny (2014). One panel clerk, in commenting 
about the challenges this presented, noted that: 
 
 “There were quite a few when we started but now I think it is only two or 
three. It has brought some interesting challenges because they have long 
memories and they are able to provide a direct comparison between what the 
previous authority had done in relation to the current arrangements. When the 
panel was first implemented, there was quite a lot of harking back to what the old 
police authorities could do.” Clerk2 
 
A similar point was made by another panel clerk, who said: 
 
“When the panel was first set up, it was about five or six who had served on 
the police authority. We have lost a couple of those so that there are fewer now 
who were on the police authority. One of our independent members was on the 
police authority. Some of that expertise and history was quite helpful but also it 
took them a little while to realise or understand how the panel works differently.” 
Clerk7 
 
Another panel clerk thought that former police authority members had some 
relevant contributions to make and that they had made a successful transition to 
the new model. She noted, however, that it might be problematic if there were too 
many of them. (Clerk3) 
 
From his observations at panel meetings in five different police areas, it was clear 
to the researcher that it was the independent members who seemed most 
authoritative and confident in their questioning of their respective PCCs. This may 
have been a consequence of the fact that, on average, they had more panel 
experience than their councillor colleagues. It may also have been because of 
their professional expertise. As will be seen later, there is not a great deal of 
effective questioning from panel members in general and, even where there is, it 
often comes from panel clerks supplying the questions. 
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Background	experience	of	PCCs	
	
Table	7	Background/professional	experience	of	PCCs 
PCC1 Senior naval officer Conservative 
PCC2 Teacher, magistrate and 
former Chair of Police 
Authority 
Independent 
PCC3 Senior army officer, 
councillor and former 
member of Police 
Authority 
Conservative 
PCC4 Former government 
minister, youth worker, 
probation officer and 
magistrate 
Labour 
PCC5 Former government 
minister 
 
Labour 
PCC6 Former university vice-
principal and deputy 
leader of a City Council 
Labour 
PCC7 Former Chair of Social 
Services Committee, 
worked with offenders 
with drug and alcohol 
addiction. Criminology 
degree 
Independent 
PCC8 Former government 
minister 
 
Labour 
PCC9 
* 
Business owner, 
magistrate and former 
independent member of 
the Police Authority 
Independent 
PCC10 
* 
Barrister, author, lecturer 
and former government 
minister (Solicitor 
General) 
Labour 
*Declined to be interviewed 
 
As will be seen in Table 7, the PCCs, perhaps unsurprisingly, have all held 
prominent positions in their respective professional areas. It is also evident they 
have been used to taking leading roles, something clearly of benefit to them as 
commissioners. The Labour PCCs stand out, given their considerable experience 
as government ministers. During their interviews, all three (one refused to be 
interviewed) spoke confidently, authoritatively and comprehensively about the 
advantages of being engaged at a senior governmental level and how this had 
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equipped them for their new positions. Their effectiveness was praised by a 
Conservative PCC, who noted that; 
 
“Labour put in very senior politicians and about eight of them are ex-
government ministers. They are all pretty confident people, I think.” PCC3 
 
Two of the commissioners, both Conservative, had been senior officers in the 
military and both sought to claim this experience was of benefit to their role. 
Interestingly, their views on many of the research areas were significantly different 
from one another, as will become apparent later. 
 
Two independent commissioners had both been magistrates and former members 
of their respective police authorities. Whilst one had been a teacher, the other had 
been a business owner. Another independent had been a social worker and had 
chaired his county’s Social Services Committee. 
 
One Labour PCC was a priest and a former vice principal of a theological college 
in Oxford. He had also been deputy leader on a large City Council. Another Labour 
PCC had also had extensive experience in youth work and probation, as well as 
having been a magistrate. 
 
PCCs are elected senior officials with considerable executive powers in the new 
governance arrangements. Like the councillor members of PCPs, there are no 
formal requirements, in terms of education, professional expertise and relevant 
background experience, and no detailed ‘recruitment’ processes to validate their 
candidature either. This is in marked contrast with senior public appointments, 
where there would be detailed job descriptions, person specifications and rigorous 
selection procedures. While all the incumbents in this study may well be highly 
suitable, the present arrangements do not appear to provide sufficient safeguards 
to ensure that only properly qualified candidates can stand in elections. This must 
be a cause for concern. The democratic mandate of PCCs, notwithstanding the 
low turn-outs at elections, might have more weight if they had all been through an 
identical ‘suitability’ process. This would need to be overseen by an independent 
panel to which all the political parties and independent candidates would need to 
subscribe. This would, though, be highly contentious and it might be argued that it 
runs counter to the democratic ideal of the new model. Yet it would, perhaps, 
reduce the risk of attracting maverick candidates, or people with highly 
questionable populist views on policing. 
 Why	are	so	few	panel	members	and	PCCs	coming	to	their	roles	with	limited	relevant	background	experience	and	what	problems	does	it	cause?	
 
Given that most members are local councillors, who are appointed to the panels 
by their local authorities, it seems clear that panels have little influence on the 
constituent councils in respect of their nominations. Although the evidence from 
this study suggests that councils attempt to nominate members who are port-folio 
holders for policing and community safety and/or those with scrutiny experience, 
the high turnover of panel members and poor attendance (covered in the next 
section), effectively negates any attempts to strengthen panel expertise. The 
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contrast between independent and councillor members in this regard could not be 
more marked.  
 
PCCs, many of whom have been either prominent politicians or senior leaders in 
their respective fields, have no reference frameworks and so what represents 
relevant background experience or knowledge, remains unclear.  
 
Unless panels and PCCs have recognized and demonstrable skills, along with 
knowledge and relevant background experience, their effectiveness may be 
impaired. The introduction of independent panel members has shown that it is 
possible to detail relevant and identifiable professional expertise and that 
individuals with these skills can make a profound difference. 
 Summary	
 
Relevant background experience would appear to give both panel members and 
PCCs a distinct advantage in their roles. Evidence from this study suggests that 
independent panel members are generally much better qualified, with relevant 
professional expertise, in comparison to their councillor colleagues. Despite the 
best efforts of local authorities to appoint experienced councillors to their panels, 
evidence from observations at panel meetings suggests there is more effective 
questioning from independent members, which may, in part, be because of their 
greater professional expertise. PCPs have little choice in the appointment of their 
councillor members, which is not the case with independents, who undergo a 
competitive selection process. 
 
The same does not necessarily apply to independent commissioners. The PCCs 
participating in this study had an impressive list of background skills and 
qualifications.  
 
The model, in its current form, does not allow panels to apply the same rigorous 
recruitment processes for its councillor members. It is difficult to see, given the 
overriding priority of the democratic ideal, how this would ever change. The 
situation may be less problematic, although still contentious, with PCCs. It should 
be possible to introduce an independent panel to validate all candidates putting 
themselves forward for election. 
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Chapter	4		
Structure	and	Organisation		Findings	and	analysis	–	What	is	the	impact	of	high	panel	member	turnover,	poor	attendance,	limited	training,	restricted	funding,	poor	panel	management	and	low	public	visibility?	
 
The structure and organisation of a PCP may have some impact on its 
effectiveness (Bailey, 2015). Indeed, without an effective and properly resourced 
structure, panels are likely to be ineffective (Ibid). The key elements, which are all 
addressed in this chapter, are high panel member turnover and poor attendance, 
limited training, restricted funding and resourcing, panel management and low 
public visibility.  	High	turnover	and	poor	attendance	
 
There is clearly an issue with the high turnover of panel members and, in some 
areas, this has been destabilising (Bailey, 2015). This problem was also 
highlighted in the report of the House of Lords Committee on Standards in Public 
Life, 2015 (page 125), which drew attention to the consequent inability of panels to 
build a body of knowledge. The problem has been made worse by the poor 
attendance of some members, which has affected the continuity, consistency and 
effectiveness of those panels. This is an important area for investigation and the 
researcher sought to assess the extent of the problem and the impact that it might 
have on panel effectiveness. 
 Research	findings	
 
Table	8	Breakdown	of	views	on	attendance	record	of	PCP	members 
 All  PCP 
independent  
PCP Tory PCP 
Labour 
Green Panel 
clerks 
PCCs 
 
Other 
stakeholder 
It is a 
problem 
29 
(56%) 
8 (66%) 1 (25%) 10 
(62%) 
 6 
(85%) 
4 
(40%) 
 
 
It is not 
a 
problem 
 
21 
(41%) 
 
4 (33%) 
 
3 (75%) 
 
6 
(37%) 
 
1 
(100%) 
 
1 
(14%) 
 
5 
(50%) 
 
1 (100%) 
 
No 
answer 
 
1 
(2%) 
      
1 
(10%) 
 
 
 
As will be seen in Table 8, a majority (56%) of respondents thought that high 
turnover was a problem. This majority increased with independents (66%) and, 
most tellingly, with panel clerks (85%). The only two groups where there was not 
seen as a problem were Conservative panel members and PCCs. In the case of 
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the former, just four members participated in this study, two of whom were panel 
chairs, who appeared keen to promote their panels. As for the PCCs, they are not 
as close to the issue as the panel members and therefore their knowledge was 
more limited. However, one PCC, as will be seen later, had trenchant views on the 
subject.  
 
The independent members had the most critical comments to offer when asked 
about this problem. Many noted the benefits of having new members but also 
warned how this might impact on panel business. 
 
“I think there is a problem with high turnover of panel members. It is good to 
have some change, especially if the new members bring more interest and 
enthusiasm.  There has been, however, a high turnover of members and this has 
not been a good thing.  This has impacted on continuity, consistency and 
authority.  New members always take quite a while to find their feet and this can 
hold the panel back.” PCP1 
 
“There is a high turnover of panel members. About half of the current panel 
members don’t really know the time of day!” PCP4 
 
There was recognition that it takes time for panel members to acquire knowledge, 
authority and effectiveness and that the regular replacement of members is a 
barrier. An independent member claimed that continuity and consistency came 
only from independent members because, unlike their councillor colleagues, they 
do not face elections. (PCP12) 
 
This churn of members is not entirely down to the turnover of local councillors at 
elections. In fact, local authorities frequently change their panel delegates at their 
annual council meetings. There is also, as one independent member commented, 
a problem with councils taking insufficient care to ensure the right people are 
nominated for panel membership. He suggested that councils often see it as a role 
that must be filled, without proper regard to what is required, or whether that 
councillor has the appropriate skills. (PCP9) 
 
There can be an additional problem with the frequent change of panel chairs. 
Chairs have an important role to play in the conduct of panel business. One 
independent member, the longest-serving on his panel, expressed his frustration 
by noting that: 
 
“Yes, after two years of service as an independent panel member, I am the 
longest serving member of this panel. I think I must have sat in meetings under the 
chairmanship of at least six or seven different councillors. This is not a very 
satisfactory arrangement. The turnover of chairs is dramatic. There has been no 
consistency or continuity. Frequently, you get someone in the chair who has no 
particular brief for policing or community safety.” PCP32 
 
Some Labour panel members also expressed concern about poor attendance. 
 
“Yes, there is a problem. People from the local authorities appoint someone 
on a 12 months’ basis and so, every year, there is probably a 50% churn, if not 
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more. Of the council nominated individuals, that, in itself, becomes a problem.  
Here, it started out as council leaders as PCP members and has since switched to 
some being the cabinet members with responsibility for policing or safer 
neighbourhoods. Yes, there is a churn and very few people are on there now who 
were there at the start. This represents a problem in terms of consistency and 
continuity. For scrutiny, it means that people are not starting from a point of 
knowledge.” PCP13 
 
Another Labour member suggested that the lack of remuneration may have an 
impact on panel attendance. The same member also noted that, given the limited 
powers of panels, some members were not fully committed. (PCP25) 
 
When deputies or substitutes are sent, they are not always equipped to add 
anything significant to the meetings. One independent member was particularly 
critical of this practice. 
 
“It is appalling.  Basically, I had in front of me a list and I know quite a few of 
the elected members anyway, and most of them weren’t there. They tend to send 
a substitute and some of those substitutes don’t even open their mouths.” PCP5  
 
The panel clerks are probably the most authoritative on the question of high 
turnover and poor attendance. When asked if this was a problem, one complained 
about the numerous changes to councillor membership on his panel and of the 
problems this caused for continuity and consistency. (Clerk4) 
 
Some of the clerks commented about the impact to panel membership generated 
by the annual general meetings of the constituent local authorities. 
 
“The electoral cycle means that things can change. Appointments to the 
panel are made on an annual basis and, although we might hope for some 
continuity and consistency, the reality is that you never will. We have been given 
an indication that our current chair, who has only been in that role for the last 12 
months, may not be continuing in May.” Clerk5 
 
For others, it was a combination of the electoral process combined with the 
changes made by the local authorities at their annual general meetings. An 
experienced panel clerk also commented critically about the impact this had on the 
turnover of panel chairs. (Clerk6) 
 
The problems caused by poor attendance were acknowledged by another clerk. 
Her panel had decided not to have deputies or substitutes because of their lack of 
knowledge and understanding. However, because of the large geographical area 
covered by the panel, meeting attendance remained a problem. (Clerk3) 
 
Another clerk alluded to the influence of internal politics in some of the constituent 
authorities in the way it appeared to restrict panel membership to one year only. 
(Clerk7) 
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	PCC	perspective		
 
Although 50% of PCCs didn’t see this as a significant problem, some had very 
critical views. One gave a graphic account of how poor attendance manifested 
itself.  
 
“I think there are several issues. People don’t turn up. There’s one panel 
member who has been to just one meeting since June 2014. We are sent 
substitutes sometimes. Halfway through last year, there was a clear-out, as many 
councils had elections and they had a clear-out. It is appalling. The panel: A they 
don’t turn up, B they send a substitute who doesn’t know what their remit is or 
what they should be doing, C they don’t read the papers. They ask the most inane 
questions but if they looked, the answer was in the paper. They will ask you 
something that has just popped into the head about something and I have this 
thing in front of me, which is awful actually, with the names of all the members 
down one side and the dates and what they turned up for, and what we discussed. 
I do say to panel members when they ask such questions that we had discussed 
this at the relevant panel meeting, at which you were not present.  I feel very sorry 
for the clerks; they do their best. The clerk here has to give them questions to ask. 
They have a pre-meet but only half of them turn up.” PCC2 
 
Another PCC, a former local councillor, cited two possible causes for poor 
attendance, one being geographical coverage and the other the lack of 
recompense for the time and effort put in by panel members. (PCC3) 
 
While, as has already been acknowledged, PCCs, unlike panel clerks, do not have 
the in-depth knowledge of this problem, they can offer important insights. It seems 
clear from their observations that poor attendance is a problem and that it has a 
negative impact on panel business. It also appears to be the case that having to 
travel long distances to attend meetings and the absence of adequate 
remuneration for their time, may also disincline some members from being fully 
committed. 
 Possible	reasons	for	high	turnover	and	poor	attendance	and	the	problems	it	causes	
 
The evidence from this research suggests that the principal reason for a high 
turnover of panel members is the current practice of councils, at their annual 
general meetings, to change their panel delegates. Although panels have tried to 
argue for consistency and continuity, their constituent local authorities appear to 
have been either unwilling or unable to help. Council leaders will have their own 
priorities and they may not always coincide with what is best for PCPs. That will 
not change unless legislation is introduced, which requires a commitment to keep 
panel delegates in post for a minimum of two to three years. Poor attendance, 
which is a problem in the main for councillor members, is most likely as a result of 
those members having other, equally important, roles on their authorities, which 
leads to diary conflicts and absences. There is also, as one PCC indicated, an 
inherent problem with large police areas, which has implications for additional 
time, travelling and expense. Unless there is a financial incentive, at least to cover 
the additional cost incurred by those members, there is likely to be a reduced 
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commitment. It is clear from the evidence in this research that panel effectiveness 
is severely impaired by an unacceptable churn, and poor attendance, of panel 
members.  
 Summary	
 
The evidence from this research supports the view that there is a high, and 
damaging, turnover of panel members, which is made worse by their poor 
attendance at formal meetings. This inevitably has a negative impact on the 
effectiveness of PCPs, especially in their central role of holding commissioners to 
account. Given the relatively few formal panel meetings throughout a year 
(between four and six), this problem is bound to impact the continuity, consistency 
and authority of panels, a point made by several of the respondents. The use of 
deputies or substitutes has also been criticised by many of the respondents, 
particularly in relation to their inability to make effective contributions to panel 
business.  
 
The most critical, and possibly most authoritative, observations came from the 
independent panel members and the panel clerks (Bailey, 2015). Independents 
who, on average, have spent longer on, and have more experience in, panels 
point to the delays, time-wasting and general disruption caused by the frequent 
changes in panel membership and the poor attendance of their councillor 
colleagues. One independent member noted that this churn also applied to panel 
chairs, as his own PCP had suffered ‘dramatic’ problems because of changing and 
inconsistent leadership. Neither is this problem unnoticed by the PCCs, one of 
whom spoke of the challenges this presents at formal meetings, where business is 
frequently delayed because of poor attendance, the ineffective use of substitutes, 
lack of preparation and a misunderstanding of their role. 
 
The evidence suggests this situation has been brought about by several factors. 
These include the electoral process, the regular changing of portfolio holders at 
council annual general meetings, a lack of adequate remuneration to cover time, 
travel and effort of the councillors involved and, finally, there may be a perception 
that the panel is powerless and that the role is therefore lacking in prominence and 
influence. 
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Training	
Training is clearly an important requirement for members of public bodies with a 
scrutiny role. Evidence suggests that effectiveness will suffer where adequate 
provision for training and development is not made. This was acknowledged in the 
report of the House of Lords Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2015, (page 
126) which found that panel members often felt insufficiently trained, and therefore 
unprepared for the role. It recommended training for both panel members and 
PCCs in support of better working relationships between all parties, as well as 
giving clarity on the respective roles.  
In recognition of the need to support their elected members, many local authorities 
have signed up to the Charter for Member Development, which has been jointly 
developed with the Local Government Association. Through a structured approach 
to councillor development and support, it aims to build elected member capacity, 
which is essential for any council dedicated to meeting the needs of its community. 
This means investment in training and development so that local councillors are 
better able to discharge their duties in an effective manner. 3 Research	findings	for	panel	members	
	
Table	9	Training	provision	for	panel	members	and	PCCs 
 All  PCP 
independent  
PCP 
Councillor 
Panel 
clerks 
PCCs 
 
Other 
stakeholder 
Received 
training 
6 
(11%) 
1 (8%) 4 (19%) 1 
(14%) 
  
None or 
insufficient 
training 
43 
(84%) 
11 (91%) 17 (81%) 6 
(85%) 
9 
(90%) 
 
No 
answer 
1 
(2%) 
   1 
(10%) 
 
N/A 1 
(2%) 
    1 (100%) 
 
 
Members of PCPs have an important public duty. This demands that they have a 
good working knowledge of the new governance arrangements and that they 
understand their own powers and responsibilities. They should also be competent 
scrutineers in terms of the PCC’s activities. Given this can only come with regular 
training and development, this research sought to ascertain the extent to which 
panel members received training and thereafter assess its effectiveness. 
 
As will be seen from Table 9, it appears that very little training is offered to panel 
members. 85% of them claimed they had received none or, at best, very little 
training. This is confirmed by six of the seven panel clerks (85%). Most, though, 
claimed to have been given induction briefings at the start of their panel 
                                                
3	http://www.seemp.co.uk/index/cllrgov/emcharter.htm	
Findings	and	analysis	
 43 
membership. One Labour member stated he had received ‘not one scrap’ of 
training. When asked to elaborate, he noted that: 
 
“Now you mention it, it is strange that there is no formal induction program 
for all new members. Had I not have had my background experience and 
information, it could have posed lots of difficulties for me in my new role.” PCP11 
 
Another councillor panel member was similarly disparaging about the poor 
standard of training being provided and noted that:  
 
“There was something they called training. It was done by external 
facilitators. Our panel clerk briefed me on the issues and the way in which the 
panel worked. I don’t think I was particularly aware of the specific nature of the 
panel. I just thought of it as another kind of scrutiny committee but I wasn’t really 
aware that it had its clearly defined legal frameworks. What surprised me was the 
amount of time taken up in discussing events that had taken place two years 
previously. I thought there was insufficient focus on current policing activities.” 
PCP3 
 
Many respondents alluded to ‘pre-meetings’, which are held immediately prior to 
formal panel meetings. One Labour member noted that pre-meetings were a good 
way to learn on the job. (PCP7) The researcher attended pre-briefing meetings in 
South Wales and Merseyside, where the discussion in both cases was on the 
agenda and the ways in which members should make their contributions. The 
panel clerks’ principal role appeared to be that of providing pertinent questions. 
Pre-meetings are an essential means to help members focus on, and prepare for, 
the agenda items. Although important, they could not be described as training. 
 
One panel chair, while acknowledging the lack of clarity in the guidelines, thought 
that training for him was unnecessary. He believed that officer briefings were 
adequate. (PCP8) 
 
It seems the principal reason for the lack of PCP member training is explained by 
inadequate resources, a matter picked up by one of the panel clerks, who said: 
 
“There is some training given to members. They will probably have said you 
they don’t get much and the truth is, they don’t. This is mainly as a result of budget 
limitations.” Clerk1 
 Why	are	PCP	members	not	being	trained	and	what	are	the	consequences?		
There is a general acceptance that panel members are not being trained 
adequately. It is not just the lack of resources that limits the amount of training. 
Time is also a major constraint, and many councillor members cited it as a barrier. 
Most of them have other roles within their own local authorities and this means 
they often have full diaries. On top of that, in large police areas, additional 
travelling and expense would also be incurred by those councillors. 
 
The absence of regular training is problematic for panel members and must be a 
cause for concern in respect of the new governance model. This is made much 
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worse by the high turnover, and poor attendance, of members at panel meetings. 
It limits their ability to be effective in their scrutiny role, something observed by the 
researcher at some of the panel meetings attended. He frequently saw panel 
clerks pass questions to members, a practice which seems to be widespread. 
Poor knowledge of their role and responsibilities inevitably limits their confidence 
and authority. As will be seen later, there are other factors which exacerbate this 
problem. These include inadequate funding, limited time and a lack of clarity about 
their role. 
 Research	findings	for	PCCs	
 
Given their wide-ranging remit and executive powers, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that commissioners would need to have some expertise, 
competence and authority in such an important role. Whilst many of them have 
relevant background experience, it might still be thought that regular training in key 
areas would be appropriate. As noted earlier, other than through a ballot every 
four years, there are no available mechanisms to validate candidates running for 
election. Neither do the main political parties provide a rigorous selection process. 
Given these inherent weaknesses, it might be argued that a formal training and 
development programme for all new commissioners would be essential. 
 
None of the 9 PCCs (90%) responding to this question had received any training 
and their comments appeared to be quite disparaging about the need for it. Most 
felt their considerable experience in former senior roles was more than adequate. 
One of them noted that: 
 
“Who could give it to me?! I probably know more about it than anybody else.” 
PCC3 
 
However, there was recognition that some newly appointed PCCs may not have a 
relevant background and that training would be beneficial for them. The same 
PCC, when pressed for clarification, accepted that commissioners without his 
police authority background might struggle to understand police jargon. In those 
situations, training would be useful. (PCC3) 
 Why	are	PCCs	not	being	trained	and	what	are	the	consequences?		
There are two main reasons why PCCs are not being trained. First, as the 
evidence from this study reveals, commissioners believe it is not required, as their 
experience in senior leadership positions is more than sufficient. Second, there 
has been no requirement from government for them to be trained and neither has 
there been any pressure from groups such as the Association of Police and Crime 
Commissioners. Rather, there has been an assumption from the legislators that 
the democratic process will ensure the right people are elected.  
 
The absence of training for PCCs is problematic, principally because, as with 
panel members, they will be less effective without a current working knowledge of 
criminal justice administration. Although this is somewhat mitigated by professional 
support staff, it remains the case that PCCs are powerful individuals, with 
considerable sway over their staff and chief constables. A relevant and effective 
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training and development programme would, arguably, help them to be more 
knowledgeable, understanding, consistent and authoritative.  
 Summary		
The evidence suggests that the absence of effective training is a problem for both 
panel members and PCCs. Not only does it constrain their effectiveness, it may 
also undermine the whole governance model. The additional problems of high 
turnover and poor attendance make the situation much worse for panel members, 
and the evidence from this study suggests there is little consistency, continuity and 
authority in the way in which they approach their responsibilities. While PCCs have 
dedicated teams of expert advisers on hand and, despite their confidence in their 
own abilities, that still does not compensate for the gaps in their own professional 
knowledge. 
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The	impact	of	funding	limits	on	PCPs	
The issue of inadequate funding has long been acknowledged as a problem 
(Bailey, 2015). The Home Office calculations were based originally upon an 
expectation that panels would require a single full-time scrutiny officer, and that 
they would meet only four times a year. It is now clear that the current funding 
does not reflect the workload of panels, most of which have met at least seven 
times a year (HASC, 2014). Although many panels have been subsidised 
informally by host authorities, to help with legal, finance and HR advice, as well as 
policy and administrative support, the current funding levels are insufficient for 
their growing workloads (HASC, 2014; Lister, 2014; Bailey 2015). Proactive 
scrutiny, in which panels could undertake their own independent enquiries into the 
activities of their commissioners, would almost certainly be impossible under the 
current funding arrangements.  
As has been seen, evidence from this research suggests that, given the legislation 
in respect of PCPs was an after-thought forced upon a reluctant minister by the 
Liberal Democrats, there was never any real intention of creating a fully-funded 
and effective scrutiny body to hold commissioners to account (Reiner, 2013). At 
most, panels were intended as being just ‘light-touch’ in their approach to PCC 
accountability. The evidence from the last four years suggests that such a 
restrictive view, and limited role, is no longer tenable (Bailey, 2015). 
Funding is not just an ideological or political issue, it is also important from a 
practical perspective. If panels are to succeed in their principal role of holding 
commissioners to account, they must be equipped with qualified staff and 
sufficient resources to support them. Training is also affected by funding and, as 
already has been noted, few panels are able to provide it for their members. As 
panels evolve, and the work of their committees develop, more meetings, rooms 
and resources will be required, quite apart from the time and expense incurred by 
the members.  Research	findings	
 
Table	10	The	impact	of	funding	limits	on	PCPs 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Yes 43 
(84%) 
10 (83%) 20 (95%) 6 (60%) 7 (100%)  
No 7 
(13%) 
2 (17%) 1 (5%) 3 (30%)  1 (100%) 
Ask 
Panel 
1 
(3%) 
  1 (10%)   
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As will be seen from Table 17, a large majority of all respondents (84%) thought 
funding constraints had a negative impact on the ability of panels to undertake 
proactive scrutiny. All seven of the panel clerks (100%) believed panel work was 
limited by inadequate funding. Even with PCCs, there was still a large majority 
(60%) who thought scrutiny was affected by limited funding. 
The first two quotations below are from independent panel members, both of 
whom are highly critical of panel funding. The picture they paint is of organisations 
starved of resources and struggling to carry out their work. 
“Proactive scrutiny is affected by funding constraints. We have no money to 
spend. The officers who have been supporting the panel have just been made 
redundant. All we have now is the democratic minute taker coming to meetings. 
We have no one to do any groundwork on our behalf. We don’t have any direct 
relationship with the clerk to panel. We don’t have a dedicated staff. With the 
recent announcement of redundancies for the officers, I’m not sure how we are 
going to progress.” PCP4  
“Funding constraints limit the number of meetings we hold, as well as 
limiting the amount of administrative support we need. If we were to generate the 
amount of work we would like to do, we would need a dedicated secretariat.  If we 
go to any meetings outside of the four held annually, we would have to go on a 
voluntary basis at our own expense.” PCP18 
 
The next two examples are from councillor panel members, who all make similar 
points about the lack of funding impacting their work. 
 
“I would say from all my experience on local government, yes. The more 
money you put into it, the more committee resources can be at your disposal. That 
would mean more scrutinising and you will be able to generate more meetings and 
bring in more experts. Basically, the more resources you put into it the better able 
you are to do it.” PCP11 
 
“Yes, if there was a separate unit full of paid staff working full time on it, our 
scrutiny would be more effective. But it is limited. In fact, the scrutiny team are the 
paid staff on our County Council and they have other jobs in addition to their work 
on the PCP. And because we are not elected to the body, we are appointed by 
various routes, it is one of many, many hats that people wear. Being on the PCP 
and scrutinising the PCC is one of many tasks we have and it’s not our sole task. 
The financial restrictions limit our resources.” PCP13 
 
Panel clerks are also concerned about the impact of limited funding on the work of 
their members. In the three examples below, the clerks raised anxieties about both 
the need to rely on the goodwill of panel members and officers as well as the 
extent of their reliance on information they receive from their commissioners. 
Because of poor resourcing, they are unable to independently triangulate 
information received from the PCC with their own local sources. 
 
“Yes. We have additional meetings and sub-committees and it is important 
that we have a good relationship with the PCC so that he feels able to attend 
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these extra meetings. I sometimes feel that having outside experts to do some 
research on our behalf would be useful. The complaints part of our role takes up 
an awful lot of time. We have to rely on the goodwill of members and officers.  
Panel clerks have occasional network meetings in order to share best practice. It 
is an informal arrangement.” Clerk3  
“Yes. With just me as a part time clerk, the panel is severely limited as to its 
capability.” Clerk1  
“It is very difficult for us to conduct proactive scrutiny because of our lack of 
time and resources. Everybody is rushed off their feet and we mustn’t be allowed 
to take up too much time with the commissioner’s staff. They have already made 
that very clear. Most of the information we get is from the Commissioner’s office 
and if we didn’t put any time into that, we can simply rubberstamp that things look 
quite okay. To try and triangulate that information, our panel like to check with the 
local community safety partnerships and trying to assess what the view on the 
ground is.” Clerk7 
 
The views of the panel clerks are endorsed by one of the commissioners, who 
argued that his panel, which lacks resources, would not manage without help from 
his team. Panels should, he believed, have dedicated officers. 
 
“The county treasurer gives them a little bit of support around budget time 
but, again, it is me and my staff doing some work with them beforehand around 
the issues. This whole business of local authority scrutiny committees, again with 
the cuts, scrutiny committees really need dedicated officers. They are there to hold 
Cabinet officers to account. The officers work with the cabinet members but the 
poor old backbencher gets bugger all!” PCC7 
 Why	panel	funding	is	contentious	and	what	are	the	problems	it	generates?		
There are three main reasons why panel funding is contentious and these are 
concerned with government policy on public sector finance, the philosophy 
underpinning the present governance model and the practical consequences of 
adequately resourcing panels. 
 
In an age of austerity, where public sector resources are being cut back, increased 
funding for PCPs is very likely to be contentious, particularly in a climate where 
police numbers are falling and the criminal justice system is facing unprecedented 
challenges. Even though the additional funding required to properly equip panels, 
in relation to overall spending, would be minimal, it is likely that any request would 
be refused by the Treasury. 
 
As has been noted earlier, panels were not envisaged in the original legislation 
and were added at a late stage. The democratic model proposed by the Tory 
policing minister was focused on police accountability, with PCCs being held to 
account by their electorates, through direct election. This was regarded as true 
democratic accountability and any deviation from that model was not welcomed. 
Thus, the underpinning philosophy plays an important part in Tory government 
thinking and it remains an obstacle in relation to further reform. 
Findings	and	analysis	
 49 
 
Leading on from the philosophical challenges above, it appears likely that any 
reform which fully funded and resourced panels, could see a further erosion of the 
original model, particularly in respect of the balance of PCC accountability moving 
more towards panels and away from the public. Moreover, as one of the research 
participants has noted, emboldened and more powerful panels might demand a 
disproportionate amount of PCC time, something he sees as undesirable. 
 Summary	
 
Additional funding for panels is supported strongly (84%) by all groups in this 
research, the only exception being the ‘other stakeholder’. Most tellingly, perhaps, 
all seven (100%) of the panel clerks argued for more resources and, given their 
close working knowledge, their views cannot be ignored.  
 
Consistent themes have emerged from this research of underfunded 
organisations, struggling to carry out their work in an efficient and effective way. 
Without the goodwill and support of panel members, officers and their 
commissioners, most panels would be unable to function at all. For panels to be 
truly effective, they need to be able to undertake their own proactive scrutiny 
programmes, something rarely possible under the present funding arrangements. 
 
Although there is compelling evidence that panels need extra funding, it is unclear 
how the government would respond, both in terms of its current austerity agenda 
and in respect of the impact it might have on its preferred democratic governance 
model. 
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Panel	management	and	leadership	
The importance of strong and effective panel leadership was acknowledged by the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (Tone from the Top, 2015, page 126) in 
which it was noted that a good chair can enhance the overall effectiveness of a 
panel. Lister (2014), in commenting critically on the analogous literature in respect 
of local government scrutiny, pointed to the poor management and weak 
leadership of local government scrutiny panels. In his case study of the Surrey 
Police and Crime Panel, Bailey (2015) sought to test this hypothesis on police and 
crime panels.  Bailey found that although there was strong endorsement of the 
PCP Chair’s leadership and management by the four panel respondents, he 
advised caution since the chair had selected each of them to participate in the 
study.  
Given all the challenges confronting panels, particularly in respect of their role 
ambiguity, composition, representativeness, limited powers, the impact of funding 
constraints, the high turnover of members and the potential for undue political 
influence, it is especially important for panels to have strong, effective and 
independent leaders, who can provide good and consistent direction. One of the 
aims of this research was to get a greater understanding of how panel chairs 
performed in their pivotal roles and to assess the impact of their leadership, both in 
respect of their panels and of individual members.  Research	findings	
 
Table	11	The	importance	of	panel	management	and	leadership 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Strong 
and 
decisive 
17 
(33%) 
2 (17%) 6 (28%) 7 
(70%) 
2 (28%)  
Good but 
hampered 
by poor 
guidelines 
18 
(35%) 
5 (41%) 10 (47%) 1 
(10%) 
1 (14%) 1 (100%) 
Poor 15 
(29%) 
5 (41%) 5 (23%) 
(all Labour) 
2 
(20%) 
3 (42%)  
No 
Comment 
1 
(2%) 
   1 (14%)  
As will be seen from Table 11, an overall minority (33%) of respondents thought 
that panel management and leadership was strong and decisive. This percentage 
was much smaller with the independent panel members, where just two of the 
twelve (17%) took the same view. Similarly, only two of the seven panel clerks 
(28%) believed panel management and leadership was strong and decisive. The 
only exception among the groups of participants was the PCCs, where seven out 
of the ten (70%) thought there was good panel management and leadership. While 
a similar number overall (35%) thought panel management and leadership was 
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good but hampered by poor guidelines, a significant minority (29%) thought it was 
poor. However, in the case of both the independent panel members (41%) and the 
panel clerks (42%), this was much higher and must give rise for some concern, 
given the prominence of these groups in this research. 
Of the six councillor members (28%) who thought panel management and 
leadership was strong and decisive, two were panel chairs. Similarly, out of the ten 
(47%) councillor members who said it was good but hampered by poor guidelines, 
three were also panel chairs. Consequently, caution should be exercised when 
interpreting this data.  
Dealing first with those who thought panel management was strong and decisive, 
quotations from an independent panel member, a councillor member (also a panel 
chair) and a panel clerk are given below. In the first example, the independent 
panel member, who is also a vice chair, highlights the significance of the officers, 
as well as that of the panel chair. In the second, a panel chair explains why he 
feels that category is appropriate and, in the third, a panel clerk applauds her chair 
for his effectiveness at scrutiny. 
  “I would say it’s strong and decisive because of two factors – our clerk and 
Chair, give strong leadership.  I would say directional leadership because 
leadership comes in different aspects as you know.  Our Chair is someone I would 
support and I always scrutinise the leader, he gets my total support.” PCP9 
“I have been chair for the last five years and so perhaps the best judge of 
my leadership would be my peers on the panel, who nominated me for the role. 
My continued chairmanship has been supported during the last five years. I take 
that as a signal that they are comfortable with the way I operate. I will describe my 
style as strong, decisive and inclusive.” PCP10 
“I would say it is very good. I think our chair is very keen on robust scrutiny. 
He is very experienced at scrutiny and likes to be very challenging. He is both 
supportive and committed.” Clerk3 
In the category of ‘Good but hampered’, there are two main themes emerging, one 
in relation to inadequate resourcing and the other concerned with poor guidelines. 
In the first quotation, the independent panel member, who is also a vice chair, is 
critical of the poor guidelines. In the second, the independent panel member 
highlights the problem of insufficient resourcing while, in the third, the panel chair 
is critical of poor guidance. In the final quotation in this category, the councillor 
panel member asserts that her chair is unduly influenced by his personal and 
political views, sometimes in direct contravention of advice from his clerk. 
“From my perspective, as vice-chair, I have to acknowledge that the 
guidelines are rubbish and I think we have done the best we could do given our 
limitations.” PCP6 
 
“I think again, there is a problem. The chair of the panel is very committed 
to it but doesn’t have enough time, or support resource. The local government 
officer who supports the panel is professional but has minimal time and no 
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resource. So, I don’t think you can blame other people who are there to do the job. 
They are not given the tools.” PCP12 
 
“I think it is somewhere between one and two, quite frankly. I try to be 
decisive, although am fettered by somewhat inadequate guidelines. We try and 
make it work.” PCP8 
 
“I think our chair has been good up to a point but he sometimes has allowed 
his personal or political views get in the way. He has sometimes voiced opinions in 
complete opposition to guidance from the clerk.” PCP3 
 
In the final category of ‘poor’, there are concerns raised about ineffectual 
leadership, the bias towards supporting, rather than scrutinising commissioners, 
the lack of panel cohesion, the absence of strategy, the excessive and rigid control 
of panels and the impossibility of leading panel members from different areas with 
different agendas. The first two quotations are from independent panel members, 
one being critical of the chair’s ineffectual leadership and the other expressing 
concern about the chair’s bias towards supporting, rather than scrutinising, the 
PCC. In the third example, a councillor panel member highlights the lack of 
cohesion and strategy in panel meetings and, in the fourth, a panel clerk is critical 
of her chair’s excessive control over panel meetings, something which restricts 
effectiveness. The final quotation is from a PCC, who asserts that her panel chair 
is frightened of his members because of their negative conduct at panel meetings. 
She also suggests that it is impossible to get a clear strategic view from a 
disparate group of councillor members with their own different agendas. 
 
“Our panel clerk is wonderful. The leadership and direction of the panel by 
the chair is ineffectual. It just isn’t there. It’s also a question of poor guidelines for 
the panel.” PCP1 
 
“One of the things I find difficult is that I actually don’t know everyone’s 
political affiliations. We all have these name cards in front of us when we are 
sitting there that they don’t indicate the political party. That makes it confusing for 
me. Our chair is very personable and he is very cautious in terms of what he wants 
to give away. He seems quite good at getting me to tell them what I think and yet 
he never says what he thinks. He is a poor leader, although he genuinely wants to 
be good at it. He is more concerned with supporting the commissioner rather than 
scrutinising him.” PCP12 
“We’re not a single body and there is no camaraderie. On the day of the 
panel meeting, we have a pre-meeting where we go through the agenda about an 
hour before and then we have meeting. The pre-meeting doesn’t deal with the 
strategy for that meeting. I wouldn’t see myself as part of the dynamic team that 
scrutinises the Commissioner. I just see myself as a member of that panel with my 
own mind and I just focus on certain areas and that’s how it is done. For an overall 
assessment of the management of the meetings. We are not a group of 18 or 20 
who are focused on looking at everything our PCC does.” PCP13 
“The first 12 to 18 months of the panel were really difficult because a very 
firm lid was kept on the proceedings as to who spoke and what was allowed to 
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happen. That situation relaxed after about two years when it was realised that 
there were not conspiracies on every corner. There was no desire to go down any 
real scrutiny route. They felt that that wasn’t their job. To be absolutely fair to the 
panel members, they have had very little time for effective scrutiny because of the 
number of complaints coming in. The Chairman’s role is really important and there 
was a shift at one point when members around the table said they did not like the 
way things were being run and asked the chair to give them more room. There 
was a shift after that.” Clerk1 
 
“I actually think our Chair is frightened of them. They are nasty and they do 
turn on one another. They think it is okay to be rude and offensive because they 
are in the council chamber. I would not allow that at my meetings. So, there is no 
strong leadership. How can you be a leader of such a disparate group of people 
who, quite frankly, haven’t got much respect for you anyway. They are all the 
districts and the leader is the County Council portfolio holder. Just think of the 
dynamics.” PCC2 
 What	are	the	possible	reasons	for	panel	management	and	leadership	being	highly	contentious	and	what	are	the	resulting	problems?	
As has been noted earlier in this section, panel chairs have a key role in the 
overall effectiveness of their panels. While it is not uncommon for panel vice-chairs 
to be independent members, it is almost invariably councillor members who are 
elected as chairs. Where a political party has a majority, the chair will inevitably 
come from that party. The extent to which political influence plays any part in the 
new governance model will be the subject of a subsequent discussion but, for the 
purposes of this debate, it is important to note that politics is a relevant dynamic in 
the relationship between panels and their commissioners. Similar findings were 
identified by Lister (2014) in his review of the literature regarding local government 
scrutiny.  
Panel chairs, if they are to be neutral, authoritative and respected, must be mindful 
of the dangers of political influence, as well as having a clear understanding of 
their panel’s purpose. In addition, they should be experienced and competent in 
chairing meetings, particularly where complex and challenging issues are under 
discussion. Not only are good facilitation skills necessary, chairs should be 
intelligent, fair, pragmatic, insightful and able to delegate where necessary. Finally, 
chairs should be effective communicators, good strategists and competent 
relationship builders.  
All these skills will be demanded, given the many challenges faced by panel 
chairs, which include role ambiguity, limited powers, political conflicts, personal 
agendas, poor attendance and high turnover of members, lack of 
funding/resources and concerns about the current governance model. The 
evidence suggests that where good chairs are in place, panel business will be 
better conducted (Tone from the Top, 2015). Clearly, chairs can make a significant 
difference to panel business, notwithstanding all the other potential barriers to 
effectiveness. 
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This is a contentious topic for several reasons and these include politics, 
appointment/election, the lack of effective monitoring/review, the absence of 
effective protocols and, finally, the understanding of, and commitment to, the new 
governance model. 
The potential for political bias has been acknowledged (Lister, 2014; Bailey, 2015), 
although this is not surprising, given the new model is explicitly political and that 
most of the key actors are members of political parties. This is discussed in some 
detail later. 
Chairs are elected by their fellow members and they will almost inevitably be from 
the majority political party on the panel, irrespective of their suitability for the role. 
Although contentious, it might be beneficial for panel members to agree protocols 
and elect the most able member to the chair. 
The new governance model has many critics but it is important that panel chairs, 
some of whom have served on the former police authorities, are committed to the 
new arrangements. Unless they are, there are likely to be problems with panel 
effectiveness. Summary	
A minority (33%) of all respondents believed their panels had strong leadership but 
this minority was reduced significantly in two key groups, independent members 
(17%) and panel clerks (28%). These groups are particularly noteworthy because 
they are independent from the councillor members from whom the chair is 
normally chosen. There was a significant contrast with the PCCs, 70% of whom 
thought the panel chairs showed strong leadership. This difference may be 
explained by the commissioners having different perceptions of panel powers and 
responsibilities. 
While a similar number overall (35%) thought panel management and leadership 
was good but hampered by poor guidelines, a significant minority (29%) thought it 
was poor. However, in the case of both the independent panel members (41%) 
and the panel clerks (42%), this was much higher and must give rise for some 
concern, given the prominence of these groups in this research. 
Several themes emerged from the responses and these include ineffectual 
leadership, poor guidelines, inadequate resources, personal and political bias, an 
undue emphasis on support, lack of panel cohesion, an absence of strategy, 
excessive and rigid control, bad behaviour and the sheer difficulty of trying to 
manage disparate groups with different agendas. 
Unsurprisingly, ineffectual leadership was highlighted as a problem, particularly in 
relation to developing clear panel objectives regarding scrutiny. Several 
respondents commented about the poor guidelines, which was seen to restrict the 
ability of chairs to lead incisively. Poor resources were also thought to be a barrier 
to effective panel management. Some respondents were critical of the personal 
and political bias shown by some panel chairs, including that of support over 
scrutiny. The lack of a strategic approach and the absence of cohesion were 
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similarly identified as problems. Excessive and rigid control by chairs over panel 
business was also claimed to be problematic. The bad behaviour of some panel 
members was thought to be intimidatory, particularly towards panel chairs. Finally, 
it was claimed that the role of the chair is made much more difficult by having to 
manage disparate political groups with their own agendas. Taken together, these 
issues present a significant challenge to effective panel management and 
leadership.  
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Public	visibility	of	Police	and	Crime	Panels	
 
Given that panels have a public responsibility to scrutinise their commissioners, it 
might be expected they would need a prominent public profile. Poor panel 
engagement with the wider public is a matter of concern and part of the problem is 
their low public visibility (CfPS, 2014). Without public engagement and a dedicated 
web presence, panels are unable to get a sufficient understanding of wider public 
concerns in respect of their scrutiny role (Bailey, 2015). Moreover, without 
sufficient knowledge of its local panels, the public will be unable to make an 
informed choice at the time of PCC elections (Ibid). This research sought to get a 
better understanding of the issues affecting panel visibility. 
 
The Local Government Association (2015) noted that panel chairs have expressed 
concern about the apparent zeal of some PCCs to court media attention, 
particularly in respect of their own reputation management. Such over-exposure 
can damage the relationship between the police and the public and this is a 
difficult balance to achieve. Clearly, the public profile of a commissioner is bound 
to have some bearing on the profile of that panel, something examined by this 
research.  
  
Another issue identified by the LGA (2014) is that many PCCs are active on social 
media. However, their panels are more reluctant, particularly given their limited 
resources, to follow suit. A similar concern was raised by the House of Lords 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (2015), where it was recognised that 
panels may not be always able to maintain an online presence and engage in 
social media. This may present a challenge for panels and it was important for this 
study to get a clearer understanding of current practice.  
 Research	findings	
 
Table	12	Public	visibility	of	Police	and	Crime	Panels 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Visible 1 
(2%) 
  1 
(10%) 
  
Not 
visible 
49 
(96%) 
12 (100%) 21 (100%) 8 
(80%) 
7 (100%) 1 (100%) 
Ask panel 1 
(2%) 
  1 
(10%) 
  
As will be seen from Table 12, the overwhelming majority (49 out of 51 or 96%) of 
all respondents believe that panels are invisible to the wider public. Of the 
remaining two, both of whom were PCCs, one thought panels had sufficient 
visibility and the other, as in many of her responses, suggested that the question 
would be better answered by the panel. Interestingly, neither of these two PCCs 
consented to being interviewed and both chose, instead, to complete 
questionnaires. This restricted the researcher’s ability to conduct more in-depth 
questioning. 
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What is clear from all the responses, some of which are quoted here, is that 
panels are low profile, something which frustrates some members. Public apathy, 
disquiet about the mix of policing and politics, confusion about the role of the 
panel, commissioner notoriety and the better use of IT and social media are all 
given as key factors in respect of panel visibility. 
As will be noted in the first two quotations, members feel there is both public 
apathy towards panels, as well as a firm belief that policing and politics should be 
kept separate. 
“The panel is low profile. No one knows what it is. No one is really 
interested or cares about its role”. PCP1 
“Low profile. I think that people, generally, just don’t know that we exist and 
most of them would wish that we didn’t, to be honest. The same applies to the role 
of the commissioner. Most people think that policing and politics should be kept 
quite separate.” PCP2 
 
Confusion about the panel’s role is also a relevant factor. In the first quotation 
below, the respondent suggests there first needs to be a clear and accepted role 
definition, which is understood by the public. In the second quotation, the panel 
chair questions the need for a panel profile. 
 
“Low profile but needs to be high profile only if you can explain to the public 
what our role genuinely is and that comes back to responsibility and 
accountability.” PCP9 
 
“I think it is probably low profile. I am not quite sure why we need a profile, 
actually. We are a scrutiny body and are there to provide checks and balances. I 
don’t think local people need us to have a profile.” PCP8 
 
The profile of a panel is largely determined by the conduct of its commissioner, 
particularly where there has been national media interest. This point is made 
strongly by a commissioner in the first quotation and a panel clerk in the second. 
 
“I would say it’s pretty low profile because there is nothing very contentious. 
It would only be high-profile if there was something contentious. This is no change 
from the police authority……This business of profile is a red herring, largely. It only 
becomes high-profile when there are high-profile reasons.” PCC3 
 
“We only get the press along on those occasions when the commissioner 
has attracted national attention, like the recent whistle-blower incident.” Clerk1 
 
The importance of social media is acknowledged by the final two respondents, 
although both recognise that not all panel members support the idea. 
 
“I think we could do better on the Public engagement front. I know that I 
need to do a bit more work with Twitter and Facebook because we need to 
engage better with social media.” Clerk3 
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“I don’t think people even know we exist. I did suggest that the panel 
considered having its own Facebook page in which we sought the views of the 
public but there was no enthusiasm for that idea. I have no idea what their 
reluctance was because we didn’t discuss it.” PCP12 
 
The researcher, who attended panel meetings in Thames Valley, Avon and 
Somerset, South Wales, Merseyside and South Yorkshire, saw no media 
presence at any of them, although at one meeting in South Yorkshire, he observed 
a small group of residents participating in the proceedings, something they have 
been doing since the introduction of the panel. 
 Why	have	these	findings	been	identified	and	what	problems	do	they	highlight?	
The near unanimity of all respondents in this research confirms that low panel 
visibility is widespread, and this is consistent with findings from earlier studies 
(CfPS, 2014; LGA, 2014; Tone from the Top, 2015).  
A consequence of poor visibility is lack of public engagement but it may also be 
that popular disapproval of the new governance model has tempered the 
enthusiasm of panels to promote their work to the wider public. Both public apathy 
and general disquiet about the current model are identified as relevant factors in 
this study. It seems axiomatic that without adequate knowledge, information and 
effective communication channels, the public will be unable to interact effectively 
with its panels. This is bound to impact panel effectiveness, not least because it 
weakens the authority of those panels to scrutinise their PCCs.  
The public profile of a commissioner would also seem to have a significant impact 
on panel visibility, something also identified by the LGA, (2014) and Tone from the 
Top (2015). Respondents in this research cited the examples of South Yorkshire 
and Avon and Somerset, where the profiles of the two panels increased 
dramatically, following the sustained national media attention given to the two 
commissioners. Although panel visibility was quite considerable in these two 
examples, it was a natural consequence, given the media focus their 
commissioners had attracted. There is no evidence in this research to suggest that 
panels are either willing, or able, to be proactive in their own marketing. This may, 
in part, be attributed to inadequate skills and resources but it might also be a result 
of a more general uncertainty by panel members of their role in the governance 
model. 
Another finding, also identified by the LGA (2014), is the failure to utilise social 
media effectively. Again, this may be a consequence of poor resourcing, 
particularly in respect of marketing and IT expertise. It may also stem from a 
general reluctance on the part of panels to engage in such activity. Given the 
frequency and confidence with which PCCs resort to social media, panels need to 
develop their own expertise and authority, rather than always being seen to react 
to posts from their commissioners. This is an area requiring attention (LGA, 2014), 
starting with social media protocols being established between PCCs and panels. 
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Summary	
This research supports the findings of earlier studies that panels, like police 
authorities before them, suffer from low visibility with the public. This not only 
deprives them of key information from many communities, it weakens their 
authority to undertake their scrutiny role. 
Panel visibility, the evidence suggests, is affected considerably by the public 
profile of its commissioner. Where commissioners have attracted national media 
scrutiny, their panels invariably get caught up in the media spotlight, as was the 
case in both South Yorkshire and Avon and Somerset. There is no evidence that 
panels embark on proactive marketing and this may result from both poor 
resourcing and a general reluctance to pursue such activity. 
Unlike PCCs, who are adequately resourced with relevant professional expertise, 
panels are under-funded and have neither the time nor skills to compete with their 
commissioners. Many PCCs have become adept in the use of social media and, 
although there is some recognition on the part of panels that more must be done, 
there remains some resistance to marketing themselves in this way. This may be 
an inevitable consequence of the pre-eminence of commissioners in the 
governance model but the imbalance might be mitigated by the introduction of 
agreed social media protocols at an early phase of the PCC/PCP relationship. 
 
Findings	and	analysis	
 60 
Chapter	5		
Scrutiny		Findings	and	analysis	–	What	do	panel	members	think	about	their	role,	legal	powers,	complaint	handling	ability	and	the	tension	between	support	and	scrutiny?	
 
Scrutiny, one of the key panel roles, is at the heart of this research. If scrutiny is 
impaired, a panel will be unable to fulfil its statutory function (Bailey, 2015). This 
chapter explores the key elements that together determine a panel’s ability to 
scrutinise its commissioner.  These questions include how the key stakeholders 
perceive the panel role, an examination of panel powers, including their 
effectiveness in handling complaints against the PCC and, finally, an evaluation of 
the tension between support and scrutiny. 	PCP	role	Perception	
 
Evidence from recent literature points to considerable role ambiguity, which may 
undermine the work of panels. Prior to the implementation of the Police Reform 
and Social Responsibility Act 2011, there was widespread criticism about the lack 
of real power for PCPs to hold their PCCs to account (HASC, 2010). Ironically, 
there was originally no intention to create such bodies and PCPs came into being 
because of Coalition pressure from the Liberal Democrats (Loveday, Lewis, Bailey 
and Watts, 2014; Reiner, 2013). It was never the intention of the incumbent 
Policing Minister to create such a body since it might challenge the notion of direct 
election and also lead, he feared, to the possible recreation of the former police 
authorities (Loveday, 2017). 
 
Despite this criticism, the legislation was passed. The Police Reform and Social 
Responsibility Act 2011 details several statutory functions, which are aimed at 
providing checks and balances. However, the Local Government Association 
(2012a, p. 9) describes most of these as ‘set piece events’ or specific tasks in a 
formal setting. Section 28(6) of the Act requires the Panel to ‘review or ‘scrutinise’ 
the PCC in the exercise of his/her statutory functions including, for example, the 
dismissal of a Chief Constable.  
 
However, the PCC is not bound by the Panel’s decisions. Rather, the legislation 
states simply that PCCs ‘must have regard for’ the reports of the Panel. 
Consequently, the Panel relies solely on its powers of persuasion, which is 
perhaps insufficient for its scrutiny role. Section 28(2) of the Act requires Panels to 
be supportive of their PCCs in the effective exercise of their functions. This clearly 
creates an inherent role conflict, where administrative bodies are asked to be 
critical friends (Leach and Copus, 2004; Coulson and Whiteman, 2012).  
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Role ambiguity has also been identified by the Centre for Public Scrutiny, which 
has called for the Home Office to provide much greater clarity to both PCCs and 
PCPs on their mutual responsibility to ensure accountability, transparency, and 
good governance (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2014). Chambers (2014) similarly 
argues that the ambiguity of legislative guidelines is a probable cause of 
ineffectual local scrutiny.  
 
The evidence from local government suggests that the scrutiny function, as an 
institutional mechanism of public accountability, has met with limited success. 
Lister, (2014), suggests that recurring themes from the literature point to a lack of 
understanding of the role, weak leadership, poor management, ineffectual 
processes of inquiry, low profile, and perceptions of limited impact (Snape and 
Taylor, 2001; Stoker et al., 2004; Coulson, 2011). 
 
Role clarity was identified as an important issue in the Report of the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life (Tone from the Top, 2015), which drew attention to the 
debate about the meanings of scrutiny and accountability. Whilst the LGA and the 
Centre for Public Scrutiny regard the terms as interchangeable, many PCCs argue 
that they are accountable only to the public and not to PCPs. The committee took 
the view that independent scrutiny is integral to accountability. 
 
Given the acknowledged absence of PCP role clarity, the researcher sought to 
examine the perceptions of all the participants in this study. 
 Research	findings	
 
Table	13	Role	perception 
 All Independent 
Panel 
members 
Councillor 
panel 
members 
Panel 
clerks 
PCCs Other 
stake-
holder 
Understand 
role 
29 
(56%) 
6 (50%) 11 (52%) 5 (71%) 6 (60%) 1 
(100%) 
Don’t 
understand 
19 
(38%) 
6 (50%) 9 (42%) 2 (28%) 2 (20%) 0 
Difficult to 
assess 
2 (4%) 0 1 (2%) 0 1 (10%) 0 
Ask panel 1 (2%) 0 0 0 1 (10%) 0 
 
Unsurprisingly, there were mixed views from the research participants. As will be 
seen from Table 13, 56% overall declared that panel members understood their 
role, while 38% took the opposite view. There was a more even spread between 
independent panel members (50% understood and 50% did not) and councillor 
members (52% understood and 42% did not). The panel clerks appeared more 
certain in their case (71% thought their members understood and 28% thought 
they didn’t). As far as the PCCs are concerned, 60% thought panel members 
understood, while 20% thought they didn’t. 
 
Findings	and	analysis	
 62 
Dealing first with those who believed panel members understood their role, the 
comments are presented in the order of independents, councillor members, panel 
clerks and PCCs.  
 
Two of the independent panel members thought there was now a clear 
understanding of the difference between the words ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’. 
Reference was also made to the challenges of working with PCCs and the need 
for collaborative working: 
 
“The panel does have a clear understanding of its role. It is now very clear 
that we are not monitoring the chief constable. We do stray, though, by asking 
operational questions of the chief constable when he is present. Here, we have 
two alpha males in the form of the chief constable and the PCC and that has a 
bearing on their relationship. There has to be a mediation of their relationship in 
order for it to be productive. The ability of the chief constable to manipulate the 
PCC should not be underestimated. We now have more of the partnership working 
between the PCP and the PCC.” PCP4 
 
“I think the panel does have a good understanding of its role. We were 
extremely clear as to what we wanted to achieve on the panel. However, 
communicating that to the local commissioner was difficult at first but I think we 
now have a very good relationship in terms of each other’s expectations. The good 
workings of our panel were almost entirely due to the strong leadership of our first 
panel chair. He was a good leader and a highly effective communicator.” PCP24 
 
The views of two councillor members, one Conservative and one Labour, suggest 
the level of understanding is not as clear as might be expected. In the first 
response, there is perhaps an excessive emphasis on the need to support 
commissioners whilst, in the second, there is recognition that there is still much 
learning to be achieved on the part of both the PCC and panel members. There is, 
in the first, an explicit disapproval of the new governance model and, given this is 
from a panel chair, it can only be assumed that the level of scrutiny in that panel is 
far from robust. 
 
“We do discuss specific issues at considerable length. We do this mainly by 
working through the problems we face. I’ve tried to create my own definition of 
success, which for me is having a first class police force and a first class 
Commissioner. We’re not here to trip anyone up and neither are we here to create 
failure. We’re here to support the Commissioner and if we can support her to be a 
first class commissioner, we’ll end up with a first class police force. I think support 
takes a priority over everything. I am not wedded to the idea of police 
commissioners at all. As far as I am concerned, the chief constable runs policing. 
Everything we do must be to make his life easier.” PCP8 
 
“It is evolving and learning on both sides. You would almost like them to be 
appointed for four years but, as local government works on an annual cycle, that is 
not possible.” PCP13 
 
The next comments are from two panel clerks. In the first, concerns were raised 
about panels being an after-thought, with insufficient time given to think clearly 
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about the proposed role. This same clerk also highlighted the early relationship 
issues between the PCP and the PCC, particularly around the commissioner’s 
assertion that she was accountable only to the electorate. The second clerk, in 
commenting about some of her early experiences, believed there was now a better 
understanding by panel members of their role and that there is more of a balance 
between support and scrutiny: 
 
“Panels were an afterthought in the original legislation and not sufficient 
time or attention was given to how they would fit in with the overall model. Some 
members think that the role itself is not worth doing. One of the strong messages 
that came back from the commissioner’s office in the early days was that it was 
not the job of the panel to hold her to account. Her view was that it was the 
electorate that held her to the account. Working in that kind of context and that 
environment, where the understanding from the person you are expected to have 
a relationship with has that approach to it, implies that the panel has no real role to 
play. Through ongoing meetings with panel members, we always do our best to 
ensure our members understand their role.” Clerk5 
 
“We do have a clear understanding of the role. I think our members would 
err on the side of scrutiny rather than support. They take their support role 
seriously and that has been a little bit of a battle we’ve had with some members 
champing at the bit to support the Commissioner but without compromising the 
scrutiny element of their job. There has been a lot of attention there. We have now 
kind of left the support a little bit more but they are kind of supportive of the 
Commissioner, particularly where he wants to raise issues nationally.” Clerk6 
 
A majority (60%) of the commissioners interviewed believed that panels now had a 
better understanding of their role. Comments from three of them are reproduced 
below. The first feels there has been dual learning and that the panel has learned 
in tandem with him. He feels, however, that the panel is not reflecting accurately 
the views of the communities they serve, which he sees as a problem. The second 
PCC, in agreeing there is a better understanding of the panel role by its members, 
takes issue with them on their right to hold him to account. The third PCC argues 
for the need of collaboration between him and the panel, something he currently 
encourages. They are all quoted in full to ensure none of the context is lost. 
 
“I think some of the lack of understanding in the early days led to some 
unacceptable behaviours in terms of blunt party politics. I have been particularly 
lucky with the chairman, who is a tough disciplinarian but he has also been a 
critical friend. I have had to say to him that if I send him any papers prior to the 
panel meeting, they are immediately public knowledge. His panel is worse than the 
police, it leaks like a sieve. Because of this, I will only send papers to panel 
members on the day of the meeting. I will not have my papers chopped and 
changed by the BBC before I have a chance to explain them to the board. The 
discipline of the panel is now much better and they do understand their role. The 
party politics around the table has diminished. I think they now have a more 
collective sense of responsibility. For me, I need the police and crime panel as a 
lever of endorsement of some of the things I am doing. I have seen them exercise 
both scrutiny and support but whether the panel does what I think it should do, 
which is to reflect the views of the people they represent, I am not sure that works 
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particularly well, yet. My view is that they act rather like isolated members that 
neither called on the views of the local population or transmit them back again 
afterwards.” PCC1 
 
“Yes, I think they have a fair understanding of holding me to account but it 
is, of course, not their job to tell me what to do. Some of the members are from the 
former police authority and they rather forgot that they still were not the police 
authority. I sorted that out fairly early on. It is not their job to tell me what to do. 
You may disagree with them and to be held to account for something which you 
disagree with them on is not reasonable.” PCC3 
 
“The panel is the only reference group I have got. I have a good relationship 
with the force but we do fall out occasionally. It leads to accusations that I am a bit 
too close to the Chief. The only place I have got to report to is the panel. I’ve put a 
lot of store in working with the panel because I think it is important that the panel 
fulfils its functions and here we’re quite lucky in that over the years they have 
become sharper, ask more difficult questions. Part of the problem the panel has 
got, is that the chief generally comes with me and they want to talk with the chief 
rather than me. We have to remind them that it is me who is scrutinising him and 
not them. He has come to give support. It’s been kind of edgy at times but I think 
they have got there. We have a good clerk who I know because I come from a 
local authority background and he is a good bridge between us and the panel. 
There has been learning on both sides and, as I say, I have made it a priority from 
day one to get on with the panel. That doesn’t mean that sometimes they don’t ask 
difficult questions, they do.” PCC7 
 
In respect of those who felt that panel members did not understand their role, first 
are the thoughts of three independents, followed by the views of councillor 
members, panel clerks and PCCs.  
 
The independent members quoted here express concern about the lack of scrutiny 
and their frustration about their impotence in holding their PCCs to account.  The 
first of these is quoted in full, to convey accurately his sense of complete 
frustration, as well as his lack of confidence in the current model. 
 
PCP1 “The panel does not have a clear understanding of its role. We have found 
ourselves quite often in a position of, what can we do? Are we in the right place?  
Are we able to ask that question?” 
  
Researcher:  “What did you do? Did you seek advice?” 
 
PCP1 “Yes, we had a QC come along a couple of times to give us a legal 
perspective but it all boiled down to, ‘what is the wider remit of that police and 
crime panel?’ The Commissioner went away and said one thing. We then had to 
call her back in and explain to her that she had misrepresented us. We then had to 
state publicly that our view had been misrepresented. I just feel that the legislation 
is so fluid that it doesn’t give us any certainty about our role. We have struggled to 
properly understand our role and responsibility. We know we’re supposed to be 
there to scrutinise and support the Commissioner. We support her on the one 
hand but how do you effectively scrutinise her on the other. I do find that we are 
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restricted in the number of opportunities to scrutinise her. I have always 
understood that in my role as an independent member, it is my duty to hold the 
Commissioner to account on a fairly regular basis. It shouldn’t be just a case of 
approving the commissioner’s decisions. If it is that, then I am sorry because I 
have better things to do. It feels like the legislation for PCPs was written on the 
back of the cigarette packet. That doesn’t help us when we’ve had some really 
serious issues to address as a police and crime panel. It always seems that we 
never know what to do in such serious cases. We all, even the clerk and council 
officers, scratch heads and ask what can we do? I know we have written to The 
Home Office, which I suspect was wasted effort. We need much greater clarity 
about what we can and can’t do.”  
 
Similar views were expressed by another independent, who felt that the role 
perception of her fellow members had been influenced, perhaps unreasonably, by 
the panel chair, who had unduly emphasised the support role of the panel. She 
considered that there was little effective scrutiny on her panel. She noted that her 
panel colleagues did not understand that their role was to hold the PCC to 
account. (PCP12) 
 
Another independent member openly acknowledged that his panel had not once 
discussed its role and nor had it provided any training or development to prepare 
members for their work on the panel. This member also felt that independents 
were somewhat excluded from the general decision-making process. 
 
“It feels that the two independent members of the panel are strangers to the 
broader family of members. They are all elected members and know one another, 
whereas we don’t have that same level of familiarity. Some of the business 
obviously gets done before the two independent members get there. I think there 
needs to be a bit more consciousness on the part of elected members to involve 
the independent members in the decision-making processes.” PCP33 
 
There were particularly scathing comments from two councillor members. In the 
first, there is an admission that panels, because of lack of role clarity, contrive to 
‘muddle through’. The damaging influence of political loyalties is raised by the 
other, who thought there was no effective scrutiny on his panel.  
 
“I wouldn’t think it does, actually. I will be awfully honest with you (chuckle). 
It is still relatively new but I don’t believe the guidelines are very clear at all. We 
don’t necessarily make it up as we go but we muddle through.” PCP2 
 
Loud laugh. “No. I think, candidly, they see their political loyalties as 
trumping any scrutiny. It is as basic as that. They are happy to undertake some 
scrutiny exercises into areas that the commissioner is happy to see them explore 
but I don’t see anything being done by the panel that hasn’t been cleared by him.” 
PCP17 
 
The two dissenting panel clerks appeared somewhat philosophical about the 
current level of understanding by their members: 
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“To be fair, they have been tied up with the complaint function but I still hear 
them saying, as individuals, ‘I’m not sure what we’re here to do’. If they need 
clarification on anything, they come to me.” Clerk1 
 
“No, but it is getting better. I just hope that we can keep hold of our existing 
panel members, as that would be very beneficial.” Clerk4 
 
There were critical views from two of the PCCs. The first challenged the right of 
the panel to hold her to account. She also was both critical of, and frustrated by, 
her panel’s failure to understand its role.  
 
PCC2  “The panel doesn’t hold me to account. Their role is to review and 
support. They can ask commissioners to come along and say why they have made 
various decisions, they can ask for reports on various things but that isn’t holding 
to account. That is asking you to explain your actions, which I do. As for the 
support bit, I have seen no support at all. There are reasons for that.”  
 
Researcher “As we approach the elections, most panels have now realised their 
remit is not that of the police authority. Are you saying that is not the case here?”  
 
PCC2  “Take for instance, papers. They tell me what they want a paper on. 
Fine. How we work it is that they decide what they want. I don’t care. It doesn’t 
matter. They may want something, say, on child sexual exploitation. That’s fine. 
But what they want is for me to be held to account for the way the force is 
delivering on Child exploitation. Now, that is not their job. My job is to hold the 
force to account. They should be asking me how are you doing it? That is not what 
they want. That is not what they do. I have been trying, trying, trying to say to them 
what you mean it is what are you doing to hold the chief constable to account? Or, 
what are you doing to help the force to deliver? They just don’t understand that. 
Because, in the old police authority that is what they would be doing.”  
 
The second commissioner, whilst also claiming that his panel misunderstands their 
role, suggests that the absence of a stable panel chair has not helped. Again, it is 
quoted in full to ensure none of its meaning or context is lost.  
 
“Well, I have seen a panel which has had five different chairs in the 12 
months plus that I have been here. They have been in turmoil. They haven’t been 
well resourced by the local authority that resources them. That is been very 
difficult, as I have never been clear as to who is going to be the chair at the next 
meeting, or who the panel members are. We think they are now in a more stable 
position. Having said that, the chair they thought was going to be the stable chair 
has had cancer has had to withdraw. So, we have a new chair. Going forward, we 
think that it is going to be more stable now. The panel I first encountered had no 
clue as to what their role was. On one occasion, they asked for the chief constable 
to accompany me and they wanted to hold to the chief constable to account, which 
is my role. So, they were obviously in a state of confusion there. Quite 
consciously, as an office here, we have tried to help them without unduly 
interfering or undermining their independence. They did need some help. Where 
else does it come from if it is not getting it from the local authority? We can now 
step back a little from that as they have become more organised.” PCC6 
Findings	and	analysis	
 67 
 
During observations at panel meetings, the researcher heard questions from panel 
members. These were clearly operational matters relating to their wards and did 
not require strategic level answers from the commissioner. When effective 
questions were posed, they had frequently been provided by panel clerks at pre-
briefing meetings. Indeed, evidence from this research suggests that it is normal 
practice for panel clerks to supply members with appropriate questions, in order 
for them to scrutinise their commissioners. This was made explicit in the 
comments from a Labour councillor member, who also claimed that panel 
questions were frequently supplied by the PCC’s staff!  
 
“Well, I question what we do or what we are trying to achieve at pre-
meeting briefings. Only today, we were talking about the apparent lack of clarity 
around new members as to what we’re trying to achieve. Being in a minority of 
perhaps three Labour members, some of whom don’t attend regularly, you feel 
that it is a bit of a done deal. Scrutiny is about holding to account but in the 
supportive role, it seems to be more about that in my view. I think that is 
demonstrated by the officers having to feed questions. The questions today were 
given to them by the panel staff rather than the Commissioner’s staff.” PCP16 
 
Further evidence came from another councillor member, who thought the practice 
of supplying questions arose because of insufficient resourcing. (PCP17)  
 
It appears to be the case that funding constraints and inadequate resources will 
have an impact on panels to undertake proactive scrutiny. Yet, it may also suggest 
that panel members are not sufficiently aware of their role. The impact of funding 
constraints is explored in some depth in a later section. 
 
The influence of party politics was alluded to by a Labour councillor member, when 
he asserted that it has prevented any real scrutiny of his PCC. His colourful 
comments also included an allegation of superficiality on the part of the 
commissioner. A lack of resources, he felt, was also a significant obstacle to 
effective scrutiny. 
 
“Basically, I see the police and crime panel here as a group of Tory 
councillors, who are there to provide a circle of defensive carriages, with the one 
exception of the commissioner’s claim for expenses in the early days but since 
then, there hasn’t been any real scrutiny of his activities. There just isn’t the 
resource to do it. None of us will -  I am not willing to recommend to my colleagues 
to contribute to such a thing, which is basically a protection organisation for the 
existing commissioner. Other people do not see the discussion that takes place at 
pre-meetings and any attempt to make a political point is jumped upon. The 
Commissioner has always been superficial. He was superficial on the old police 
authority. The whole basis of the deal that was done between him and his deputy 
commissioner was that the deputy would be able to buy off the Tories in that 
particular part of the force area.” PCP17 
 
Political influence is covered in more detail in a later section. 
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Possible	reasons	for	lack	of	role	clarity	and	the	problems	this	causes	
 
Role clarity is demonstrably important if PCPs are to be effective and the evidence 
from this research suggests that although a small majority of these participants 
believe members do have a clear understanding of their purpose, some of their 
comments suggest this is not the case at all. There are several reasons why this is 
so and these relate to legislative uncertainty, inadequate training, insufficient 
funding, high turnover of panel members, political influence, the enduring legacy of 
police authorities, together with poor panel management. 
 
As noted earlier, there remains much confusion about the role of panels, 
particularly in relation to the legislation which created them. There is considerable 
ambiguity about their dual requirement to support and scrutinise PCCs. Many of 
the commissioners have asserted they are accountable only to the electorate and 
not to panels. A more detailed examination of the tension between support and 
scrutiny will follow in a subsequent section. 
 
Inadequate training may be a part of the problem. Unless there is regular and 
effective training for panel members, they can hardly be expected to be 
knowledgeable, confident and competent in performing their role.  
 
Poor funding and insufficient resources have a significant impact on training, 
effective briefings, preparation time and officer commitment. This is the subject of 
detailed discussion later. 
 
High turnover of panel members, as was noted earlier, has a damaging effect of 
the performance of panels. The constant churn of members, some of whom may 
be ill-suited to their role, is bound to limit the overall confidence and authority of 
panels, especially in respect of understanding their remit. 
 
The impact of political influence, which is analysed in a subsequent section, may 
also have some bearing on the way in which members perceive their role. As 
noted later, most participants in this research claimed that politics played no part in 
their activities. Yet, nearly all acknowledged its potential to do so. However, the 
excoriation from the Labour councillor in this section suggests that its effects can 
be potentially very damaging in respect of effective scrutiny by the panel.  
 
The legacy of police authorities remains in some areas, although it is arguably less 
intrusive than it was at the outset. Its influence relates more with the mind-set of 
the panel member, in that it inclines them more towards holding the police, rather 
than the PCC, to account. 
 
Panel chairs have a pivotal role in the management and the overall effectiveness 
of panels. A panel chair quoted in this section stated that he disagreed with the 
new governance model and that he saw his job, and that of the panel, to support 
the chief constable. This appears to be quite remarkable, not least because it 
suggests the panel is clearly not fulfilling its identified statutory role.  
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	Summary	
 
This research has demonstrated that confusion and uncertainty about the role of 
PCPs is a problem that requires attention. Not only is the legislation unclear, 
perhaps deliberately so, there are several significant structural issues around 
funding/resourcing, training, panel churn and tenure, political influence and panel 
management that also need to be addressed. Even among those participants 
claiming they understand the role, it seems clear from the evidence, that is not the 
case.  As a first step, much greater clarity is required, possibly through a revision 
of the legislation, followed by improvements in the areas highlighted within this 
research thesis. 
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Do	panels	have	sufficient	powers?	If	not,	what	additional	powers	are	needed?		
Police and Crime Panels were proposed by the government at a late stage in the 
passage of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill, in response to 
concerns about the lack of accountability for the decisions and actions of 
commissioners (Reiner, 2013). As has been noted by the Home Affairs Select 
Committee (HASC, 2013) the government’s intention was for this to be a ‘light 
touch’ scrutiny and this was reflected in their funding formula for panels. However, 
the low turn-out for PCC elections, combined with the absence of effective 
opposition between elections, means that there is a growing expectation that 
panels should fulfil this role. In his study of the Surrey PCP, Bailey (2015), found 
that the key issue to emerge was the absence of effective scrutiny, something 
acknowledged by both the PCC and the PCP. Although the PCC believed the PCP 
had too many powers, the panel thought it needed more powers to fulfil its scrutiny 
role. The evidence from the formal minutes supports the PCP’s claim that it was 
powerless to enforce any of its recommendations. Similar concerns have been 
expressed by other commentators (Loveday, Lewis, Bailey and Watts, 2014; 
Chambers, 2014). This research sought to clarify the views of panel members, 
PCCs, panel clerks and other relevant stakeholders in order to comment critically 
on the effectiveness of current panel powers.  
	Research	findings	
	
Table	14	Do	panels	have	sufficient	powers? 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holders 
Yes 17 
(33%) 
3 (25%) 4 (19%) 5 (50%) 4 
(57%) 
1 (100%) 
No 30 
(58%) 
9 (75%) 16 (76%) 3 (30%) 2 
(28%) 
 
Difficult 
to 
assess 
2 (4%)  1 (4%)  1 
(14%) 
 
Other 1 (2%)   1 (10%)   
Ask the 
panel 
1 (2%)   1 (10%)   
 
 
As will be seen in Table 14, an overall majority (58%) of research participants felt 
the panel had insufficient powers to make them efficient in their role. This majority 
increased significantly with independent panel members (75%) and councillor 
members (76%) although, in the case of PCCs (30%), and panel clerks (28%), this 
picture was reversed. What also becomes clear is that even among those who 
believed panels had sufficient powers, there remains some uncertainty and 
equivocation about what the power balance between PCC and PCP should be. 
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Some key themes emerged from the responses to this question and these are 
identified below. It seems clear that panel members, both independents (75%) and 
councillors (76%), believed their formal powers were insufficient for their role. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, only 30% of PCCs took this view. A majority of panel 
clerks (57%) thought the current powers were appropriate. As will be seen from 
the responses, there were many qualifications in these responses and they require 
careful analysis. 
 
First, there will be an examination of the responses from those who argued that 
panels had insufficient powers. This will begin with the independent panel 
members, followed by the councillor members, PCCs and panel clerks. There will 
then be a discussion about the responses from those believing PCPs had 
adequate powers. The views of those who found this question difficult to assess 
will then be considered and, finally, there will be some critical commentary on the 
suggestions for additional panel powers. 
 
The independent panel members quoted below all felt the panel was toothless and 
that, in particular, it lacked the ability to conduct meaningful investigations into the 
conduct of the commissioner. One of them, in voicing his frustration, claimed that 
panel business had become bureaucratic and was little more than a box-ticking 
exercise, where he and the other panel members just waited for the next meeting. 
This same member was angry that neither he nor his panel could censure their 
PCC, following her public dispute with the chief constable. It is quoted in full below: 
 
“The panel does not have sufficient powers to fulfil its role. We had a good 
example with the former chief constable. We had no investigatory powers into the 
way the commissioner had handled that issue. We were therefore unable to 
request copies of the email traffic between the commissioner and the chief 
constable. Sight of those emails would have given us an informed perspective. We 
would have liked to have interviewed the key players based on the email traffic. 
This has been really frustrating for the panel. I feel that the commissioner has 
been let off the hook by the panel. There has been a whole manner of things that 
we should have been addressing in the handling of this case and others before it, 
which has meant we have had five chief constables in a four-year period. They 
had only been five Chief constables in the entire history of our force prior to the 
election of the Commissioner. Our obligation, as the police and crime panel, is to 
look into the commissioner’s handling of these issues and hold her to account. We 
have been denied the opportunity to do this. We have not held the commissioner 
to account. We have not asked her any searching questions. To me, this has been 
fundamental failure of this panel. The chair of the panel ought to have pushed on 
our behalf. Without these essential powers we have been unable to hold the 
commissioner to account. The commissioner turns up for meetings and we have to 
be there and I know it is a waste of time because the panel is toothless. It 
becomes a bureaucratic exercise where we go along, tick the boxes await the next 
meeting.” PCP1 
 
Another alluded to the fact that panels were a last minute after-thought by the 
legislators, with little or no attention given to how panel members could fulfil their 
role with just four meetings a year. He, like most of the independent panel 
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members, thought panels should have more power to scrutinise his commissioner, 
rather than having to wait three months between each panel meeting. (PCP18) 
 
A panel’s ability to reject a commissioner’s precept proposal was seen by another 
independent member to be pointless, given that the panel would be bound to 
accept the second submission, even though it had minimal alterations. The 
legislation empowers a panel, subject to a two thirds majority, to reject a PCC’s 
first precept proposal. However, no such power exists for a second precept 
proposal, which this respondent found frustrating. She thought panels almost had 
no choice, other than to accept what the commissioner was proposing.  
 
“No. What I find most frustrating is that we can reject a precept request but 
the consequences of that rejection are such that the commissioner could come 
back with it minimally different and then we have no choice but to accept that. That 
feels entirely pointless. Then, there is a whole issue that the commissioner is 
required to undertake a referendum if he wants to raise the precept above 2%. We 
know how much that referendum would cost and that the Commissioner would be 
most unlikely to ask for one. My perspective is that we are never going to get 
shifted from what he wants. He won’t ask for too much because he wouldn’t want 
to spend the money required for a referendum and the panel has that pragmatic 
realism that says that even if we send him away with a rejection, he’s just going to 
return with a .1% difference. We have no actual power that I can see.” PCP12 
 
Similar concerns were expressed by councillor members, who noted that panels, 
at best, functioned merely as advisory bodies, without any real authority to 
sanction PCCs. One of them, who felt panels were impotent, made the point that 
unless PCPs are given more executive powers, the only way in which 
commissioners can be held to account is through the ballot box every four years.  
 
“I think the power is with the commissioner and our role is sometimes to 
simply note the progress. The police and crime panel have no powers. So, we 
need sanctions, we need funding, we need a change in legislation and we need 
some teeth to do exactly what is needed. More fundamental than that, I think 
somebody has got to make a decision of what exactly they want the police and 
crime panel to do. Are we just going to be an advisory / scrutiny panel or are we 
going to have any powers to make any meaningful decisions? Because, at the 
moment, we simply don’t. If you look at the role of the commissioner, the 
commissioner goes for election every four years, and in that four-year period, the 
only way the public can hold him to account is through the PCP. And as 
independent and locally elected members of that body, that is the only mechanism 
during that four years to hold the commissioner to account. We must ask 
ourselves two very key questions here. Capability and capacity. We are certainly 
capable of holding the commissioner to account but do we have the capacity and 
that is the issue here. Capacity, in terms of legislation, capacity in terms of time 
and unless you address those two issues, you will never have the answer. That is 
the anomaly here.” PCP18 
 
In the second example, the respondent commented, perhaps somewhat cynically, 
that panels were never intended to wield any power over PCCs. Rather, they were 
simply a fig leaf added at a late stage. He also noted that, as PCCs were elected 
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officials, it might be thought that panels should not be able to challenge the will of 
the electorate. He went on to argue that given panels were never intended to have 
any real power, it was easier to reconcile the fact that funding would never be a 
problem. 
 
“Well, it doesn’t because it wasn’t intended to be the case. Police and crime 
panels were a fig leaf added at a late stage. The fact is, the police and crime 
commissioner is an elected official with a mandate and it might be said, ‘who do 
you think you are to second-guess that?’. The role of the police and crime panel 
has always been and add-on and it’s little more than a token to local government. 
This goes back to the point about resourcing. Why resource something that was 
never intended to be effective?” PCP17 
 
Just two of the panel clerks thought PCPs needed greater powers in their key role 
of holding commissioners to account. In the first response, the clerk expressed her 
concern about the panel’s impotence in respect of complaint handling. The other 
clerk, in drawing attention to the considerable power invested in the commissioner, 
believed panels needed much more authority in respect of scrutiny, to the extent of 
formally requiring PCCs to publish forward plans, so that decisions could be called 
in for review before they were acted upon. 
 
“I think that has got to be a ‘no’, really. I particularly found the complaints 
process quite difficult and they are reviewing that at the moment. All we have is 
the budget veto. We are very limited in what we can do.” Clerk3 
 
“As far as the commissioner is concerned, there is a lot of power vested in 
one individual and that is a scenario which demands even greater scrutiny. What I 
find frustrating is that the requirement to publish decisions was found remarkable 
by our commissioner. Personally, I do not think that is enough. There should be a 
formal requirement for the commissioner to publish a forward plan. That should be 
a statutory obligation. I would imagine that the commissioner has a work 
programme and that she will have some idea of the timetable for decisions to be 
made. A commissioner should be formally expected to make public their decisions. 
As far as the powers of the panel are concerned, there should be an obligation for 
the commissioner to give advance notice of decisions. I also think they should 
have the power to call in those decisions in before they are implemented.” Clerk5 
 
One of the PCCs argued for more panel powers, and suggested that the current 
arrangements could be seen as a ‘democratic deficit’. He argued instead for more 
powers and resources for panels. When asked if his panel had sufficient powers, 
he responded in a conciliatory manner: 
 
“No. The current powers are pretty limited to delay the budget, to make 
comments about the police and crime plan and to endorse the appointment or 
dismissal of chief constable. Those are pretty minimal powers and one of the 
things we could talk quite a lot to the panel about is that, almost by definition, I 
report to them retrospectively, when I have made the decision. I do try to talk to 
them about things that are coming up in the future so they feel they have a say in 
that. I guess one way of ameliorating what I perceive as a democratic deficit is to 
give the panel more power and more resources. Some of my colleagues don’t take 
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that view. Others take the view that their mandate is to the wider electorate and 
that is right and I understand that but I do think there is a bit of a middle ground by 
giving the panel a bit more power. That will make it a bit more comfortable for 
everybody.” PCC7 
 
One of the most striking issues to emerge from the comments of those who 
consider panels already have sufficient power is that they are also more equivocal. 
The experience of the two independent members below suggests that where there 
are good relationships between commissioners and their panels, there is far less 
opportunity for misunderstanding and frustration. Yet, the potential for division is 
still acknowledged. 
 
“As for required level of power for the panel to perform its function, that has 
been a bone of contention since day one. It seems to be that we can make 
recommendations but the Commissioner does not need to follow them. The panel 
does have the power of veto for high-level appointments made by the 
Commissioner. It has never been discussed openly because we have developed 
such a good relationship with the commissioner. Our PCC seems to take on board 
our observations and recommendations. We have therefore never been in a 
position where we have felt the need to discuss our ability to scrutinise the 
commissioner. We’re lucky in that we have developed a good relationship with our 
PCC but I can understand the potential for problems. There doesn’t seem to be 
any feedback for panel members to raise concerns to local government about the 
lack of power to implement recommendations made to the PCC. We have always 
felt that we did not wish to hinder the commissioner in her role. It’s a very fine 
balancing act between giving us too much power and not having enough power. 
Again, I come back to the point, that when we’ve had a strong view or 
recommendation, our commissioner has always listened. However, we have an 
election coming up and there may well be a new Commissioner and so things 
could change. Please ask me the same question again in 12 months!” PCP24 
 
“I think our panel has sufficient powers to fulfil its role. We have not been 
faced with challenges that other panels have had. There has never been any 
occasion when the panel has refused to accept the views of the two independent 
members. Some of the elected members are strong and will challenge robustly, 
whereas others just turn up and, whatever their Chief Executive writes down for 
them, they end up saying. Some of the elected members are very much led by 
their chief executives because the chief executives are also present at the panel 
meetings. So, in my view, who amongst them does the independent thinking?” 
PCP33 
 
There was a similar equivocation from the councillor panel members. In the first 
example, a Conservative panel chair, while acknowledging an absence of power, 
felt that his panel’s scrutiny of the PCC was effective because it was publicised. 
His response might be viewed with care, as he had earlier made explicit his 
disdain for the new governance arrangements.  In the second example, the power 
of influence is also seen as an effective tool by the councillor, although she 
thought that an election every four years fell short of holding the commissioner to 
account. 
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“Well, I think it does, actually. We have had much discussion about this. We 
don’t have any particular power but nor do I think we could exercise it. Our main 
power is to scrutinise her actions in a public. We do that, we web cast that. That is 
quite powerful weapon because she has to explain to us why she has made 
particular decisions.” PCP8 
 
“In its present form, yes, there is enough power. However, I think the role 
should be revisited and that would be the time to determine the power required for 
that new role. Ultimately, we just have power of influence. On reflection, having an 
election every four years is not sufficient to hold the commissioner to account.” 
PCP25 
 
The panel clerks who argued that panels had sufficient power, also highlighted the 
power of influence through their public scrutiny of PCCs, along with the need for 
greater understanding by panel members of their role. In the first example, the 
clerk made a specific point about the difficulty of complaint handling (a topic 
covered in a later section). This was a matter she thought needed clarification, 
since the present arrangements did not work. 
 
  “I think it has the powers it needs to scrutinise and support the 
commissioner. We have long made the case about complaints. We have made 
submissions to the House of Lords Committee on Standards in Public Life. That is 
an area where the powers have to change, either to reduce to nothing and go 
somewhere else or expand the powers.” Clerk2 
 
“Yes, this is a difficult one. At one point, I would have probably said, No, I 
don’t think it does. But I think the longer I have worked with the panel, I have 
changed my mind and think it probably does. The panel cannot, obviously, make 
the Commissioner take any particular action. However, they can make 
recommendations and they can make their voice heard. Then, it is for the 
electorate to make decisions about it. We do a regular press release after our 
meetings and so that can be picked up by the media. The Commissioner knows 
that and he can see that we are constantly keeping him on his toes. We saw in 
South Yorkshire that it was the power of the public that eventually forced Sean 
Wright to stand down.” Clerk7 
 
There were also some very robust views from the PCCs. In the first example, the 
outgoing Conservative commissioner believed that any changes to the current 
model would interfere with the democratic balance. He also argued that panels are 
underfunded and under-resourced, which meant they are unable to conduct 
effective proactive scrutiny. While he disagreed with a proposal that panels should 
be able to appeal against decisions made by a PCC, he felt that in exceptional 
circumstances, where the panel had lost confidence in their commissioner, it 
should be possible to refer that disquiet to the Home Secretary. He further 
expressed concerns about the process for selecting suitable candidates, 
something he felt had received insufficient attention by the legislators. He was 
similarly, and emphatically, critical of the party-political nature of the present 
model.  
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“Yes, I think it does. I think those powers need to be limited at a certain 
point. I think it is difficult that they can veto the precept and the appointment of the 
Chief Constable, but only once. If you accept, as I do, that you cannot allow the 
panel to mandate, because then they become the decider and the model changes. 
It is frustrating for them but I think we’re stuck with this model. I think what I would 
say, and I don’t have sight of it, is that their budget may restrict them from 
conducting as much scrutiny as they would like. The model means that the PCC 
has the ultimate decision. I don’t think the panel should be able to go off to 
somebody to appeal and then have that external body compel the PCC to change 
his decision. It may be that a panel, with reasonable justification for losing 
confidence in their PCC, could refer their disquiet to someone like the Home 
Secretary, who would then be able to either remove or question the 
Commissioner. That would, of course, pose a risk of political influence, particularly 
where the commissioner and the Home Secretary are from the same political 
party. 
 
The risk is that the wrong person is identified to stand as a candidate for the 
commissioner role. The selection process is politically based and will have themes 
that may not be entirely objective to the ambition of finding the right person for the 
job. I believe deeply in the role of the police and crime commissioner but I think it 
was set up without enough attention. It was set up as if you were appointing an 
MP.  
 
The inclusion of party politics of something that cries out for objectivity and 
impartiality is a fundamental difficulty for me. I am a member of a conservative 
group but they know me very well. I am a thorn in their side because I will not tow 
the line. Only two weeks ago, I had cause to criticise publicly the Home Secretary, 
Theresa May. Although I have enormous respect for her, I was amazed that on the 
one hand she had praised a Labour PCC, Vera Baird, but then suddenly released 
a press statement saying that the only safe PCC was a conservative PCC. I was 
infuriated by that. I will surely be going on the Sunday politics show on television 
where I will be criticising the growing politicisation of policing.” PCC1 
 
In the second quotation, the PCC was keen to point out that the panel should not 
be attempting to act like the former police authority which, for him, was a problem. 
 
 “They want to be the police authority. The panels have a public voice, which 
should be sufficient. They do have the powers on disciplinary matters if I have 
broken the law or done something like that. If you’re not careful, though, it 
becomes a matter of opinion of the person who speaks loudest on the police and 
crime panel.” PCC3 
 
Another commissioner felt the balance of powers was appropriate, as long as 
members were sufficiently knowledgeable, confident and intelligent to ask the right 
questions. (PCC6) 
 
In the final example, the PCC took exception to the very existence of panels. As 
will be seen, she believed that commissioners were answerable to the electorate 
alone. This commissioner stepped down from her post in May, 2016. 
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 “The panel has no powers and neither should it have any powers. I don’t 
think panels have a role. I am answerable to the electorate. I’m answerable to the 
people collectively. I should not be answerable to appointed members, who are 
appointed by their political party as some form of cabal.” PCC2 
 
There was forthright criticism from one participant (OS1), who claimed that to give 
more powers to the panels would undermine the balance to such an extent that it 
would render the model unworkable. Like many other respondents, he noted that 
panels were never intended to be part of the governance arrangements. He 
argued that: 
 
Two respondents (a councillor panel member and a panel clerk) found the 
question of additional powers difficult to assess. As will be seen in the first 
example, the respondent felt that, with the exception of complaint handling and the 
involvement of the IPCC, the panel had sufficient power. She acknowledged she 
might have been a lone voice on her panel with that view.  
 
“I think this is hard to judge because it depends on how you interpret that 
role. I personally have felt that we had enough power. I don’t think most of the 
panel members would agree with me. I think the other members would like to be 
able to impose some sort of discipline on the Commissioner and to be able to veto 
some of her decisions, perhaps. We have had major issues with the IPCC and the 
panel was very unhappy with them. In the context of that, I would say the panel is 
lacking in power but any additional powers would have to be exercised very 
carefully.” PCP3 
 
The other quotation is from the panel clerk of the same panel, where clashes 
between the PCC and chief constable had attracted national attention. In 
acknowledging the frustration felt by her panel members about their inability to 
censure the PCC, the panel clerk admitted that the only power her panel had was 
to issue a press release outlining its reasons for having no confidence in the 
commissioner.  
 
Clerk1  “ I seem to remember that after the first 12 to 18 months they were 
asking if they wanted any additional powers and they said they didn’t. I think they 
were consulted because there was a review at the time being done by the Centre 
for Public Scrutiny. They found themselves to be a toothless tiger in respect of 
investigating complaints. I think they would’ve wished to have gone further in that 
respect.”  
 
Researcher  “I picked up really strong concerns from some of the panel members 
I interviewed about their inability to censure the Commissioner.” 
 
Clerk1  “The strongest thing they could have done would have been to issue 
a press release saying they had no confidence in the commissioner and that she 
had been guilty of a serious error of judgement. They did as much as they possibly 
could in the circumstances.”  
 
Researcher  “I understand from one of the independent members I interviewed 
that he believed different things were being said by the chief constable and the 
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PCC and that he felt the panel was unable to discharge its duty in an effective 
way. He told me that he had sent an email to other panel members and that no 
one had got back to him.” 
 
Clerk1  “He did. What happened was, they looked at her conduct in the 
context of the whistle-blower complaint. They found her guilty of a serious error of 
judgement and issued a two-page press release. It was on all the local news 
channels. What PCP1 wanted, and what we couldn’t do, was to revisit the case 
after the chief constable had resigned. We opened the complaint and looked at it 
again but had no power. What didn’t help was that in separate press releases, 
members kept saying that we were going to look at this again. I was really worried 
at the time because I knew we would be unable to reinvestigate.”  
 
There was one response in the ‘other’ category and this came from an 
independent panel member, who thought the answer had more to do with the lack 
of resources, rather than inadequate powers. For her, panels need authority and 
this could only be achieved through proper funding. 
 
 “What they need is authority, and authority is more about information and 
capacity. There is the issue between the role of the Commissioner and the role of 
the chief constable and I don’t think that is about more powers. I think there are 
bits of the role that could strengthened in terms of authority.” PCP12 
 Additional	powers	
 
As will be seen in the responses below, there is a palpable sense of frustration 
from the panel members about their inability to enforce sanctions where they are 
felt to be needed.  
 
In the first response, a panel member from a police area where there has been 
tension between the PCC and PCP, felt that panels should be consulted before 
commissioners make public their decisions. In his case, the PCC had gone public 
with the name of the new chief constable without first consulting the panel. He and 
his panel colleagues were unable to sanction their PCC.  
 
“We are unclear about the actual powers we have got. The only power we 
have actually got is to veto the budget and we can also veto the appointment of 
the Chief Constable. The whole thing is pretty woolly. Our new chief constable was 
appointed and announced in the press the week before we had our panel meeting. 
This meant we were unable to ratify the appointment. I complained bitterly at the 
time because it made us, as panel members, question our purpose. As it 
happened, myself, the chair and one other panel member had sat on the 
appointments panel and, of the four candidates, I thought we had selected the 
right one but I did think it a bit odd that the panel had not been consulted formally 
before the announcement was made. I would hope that we will now put in place 
something to make sure this omission doesn’t happen again. The record here with 
chief constables isn’t very good and so it may well happen again very quickly. I 
think we should have been able to censure the commissioner over this.” PCP2 
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In the second example, the respondent argues for an ability, in exceptional 
circumstances, to refer concerns about the PCC to a higher authority. 
 
“The panel needs to have the means whereby it can, in exceptional 
circumstances, refer its disquiet to an intermediary authority for further 
investigation. There doesn’t seem to be any capacity to refer issues elsewhere. At 
present, the only thing we could do is to bring an issue into the public domain and 
that has its own problems in respect of creating misunderstandings about what is 
going on.” PCP3 
 
Another panel member believed panels should be able to require their 
commissioners to resign.  
 
“I think we need more clout, particularly in a situation where there was a 
vote of no confidence. We should have the power to require the commissioner to 
resign.” PCP6 
 
In the fourth response, the respondent felt that panels, in order to be better able to 
constructively challenge PCCs, should be empowered to pose operational 
questions to the police.  
 
“There is a fearful tendency with the police to say, no, that is an operational 
matter. I think, as a panel, we should have more opportunity to get behind some of 
those operational matters and find out why it is going wrong. It is a similar situation 
with health authorities. We need to be able to ask the Commissioner why she had 
not asked those particular questions.” PCP8 
 
Two independent members argued that panels needed to be better able to 
investigate complaints against PCCs. 
 
“While we have responsibility for overseeing complaints made by the public 
against the PCC, we do not have any authority in dealing with those complaints to 
correct them or to investigate them. You can’t even uphold the complaint – all you 
can say is we will write a letter and you have to be very careful with the letter 
saying maybe you should think about how your practices and procedures are for 
the future to avoid these types of complaints coming through.” PCP9  
 
“I would like to have an input that reflected my particular background and 
professional skills. I have absolutely no power to make any difference. I find that 
very frustrating because I would like to question the commissioner and the police 
about their policies. I think our powers of scrutiny should be enhanced so that we 
could influence the commissioner more effectively.” PCP14 
 
Another independent argued for additional sanctions, more resources and some 
investigatory authority, including the power of suspension. (PCP18)  
 
One of the PCCs asserted that panels should have the power to veto budgets, as 
well as being given the authority to require all decisions to be endorsed by panels 
prior to them being taken. 
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“I would like them to have the power to block the budget. I would like to see 
them have the power to endorse my decisions before they are made. By giving 
them more power, it means more self-preservation for me. One of the things there 
has been fascinating about the job is that I will go to a meeting, I get in the car 
afterwards, and I say to myself, yes, I’m going to do that. But then I reprimand 
myself for thinking that is not appropriate justification for taking the action. I just 
struggle with this quite a bit. I was a Minister for quite a long time and in many 
ways I feel that I now have broader powers than I did as a minister. The panel is 
unable to draw me before a select committee in the way that the House of 
Commons can.” PCC7 
 Why	is	the	question	of	powers	for	PCPs	such	a	contentious	issue	and	what	are	the	consequences	for	failing	to	address	it?	
 
At the heart of this particular discussion is the debate around the original purpose 
of panels. Clearly, as has now been widely evidenced, the governance model 
initially proposed by the government did not incorporate panels. This was an 
intentional omission, since the government’s view was that PCC accountability 
would be achieved through elections every four years.  When panels were 
subsequently added, following increasing concern from both academics and 
practitioners, their anticipated remit was ‘light touch’.  
 
However, this approach has not worked and major anxieties remain about panel 
effectiveness, some of which derive from perceived panel impotence (HASC, 
2013). As noted, comments from some of the respondents in this study support 
that view and there is little surprise why many commentators believe that panels, 
without sufficient powers and inadequate funding, have been unable to hold 
commissioners to account. Where relationships between panels and their 
commissioners are good, the potential for friction and misunderstanding can be 
reduced, mainly through sharing of forward planning and collaboration. However, 
where such good relationships do not exist, and the panels take issue with the 
actions or decisions of their commissioners, they have no authority to impose their 
will, other than the power of influence (Bailey, 2015). Complaint handling, as will 
be seen in a later section, is a particular area of concern for both panel members 
and panel clerks, although the role of the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) in this process is seen as problematic and unhelpful. Similar 
concerns about the IPCC were expressed by some panel members participating in 
this research.  
 
This research has revealed a dichotomy between panel members, who feel the 
present model does not give them adequate powers and PCCs, who argue that 
the current system works well and that it should not be amended. This is 
discussed in much more depth in a subsequent section.  
 
Unless there is a formal review, and clarification of, panel powers, panel 
uncertainty and frustration will not abate. Greater clarity and certainty, combined 
with better training and resourcing, will enable panels to be considerably more 
effective in their scrutiny role. 
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Summary		
PCPs were never intended to be an integral part of the new governance model 
(Reiner, 2013) and, when the government reluctantly agreed to add them, their 
powers were deliberately constrained. The accountability of chief constables was 
central to the model, with little real thought given to how PCCs might, in turn, be 
scrutinised effectively (Loveday, 2017). This ‘light touch’ approach implied that 
funding requirements would be minimal, which meant there would be no need for 
additional resources to help with proactive scrutiny. Some respondents were very 
critical of the legislation, one saw it as nothing more than a fig leaf and as a token 
to local government. Funding remains a very contentious issue and it is the subject 
of a separate analysis later.  
 
A significant majority of panel members in this study believed panels were 
toothless, bureaucratic and ineffective with, at best, an advisory role, and argued 
for additional powers. However, not unsurprisingly, most of the PCCs thought no 
additional powers were needed. One of them challenged the existence of panels, 
claiming that she was accountable only to the public who directly elected her. One 
respondent, a chief executive of one of the PCC’s teams, argued strenuously 
against giving panels more powers, believing that would make the current model 
unworkable. He thought that could lead to a situation where the PCC had to divert 
his time away from his business just to comply with panel demands. 
 
Consistent themes emerged from this study. Complaint handling, which is covered 
elsewhere, was highlighted by many respondents, on both sides of the argument, 
as problematic. This was especially in respect of conducting formal investigations. 
The IPCC was regarded as very unhelpful and bureaucratic. Panels, as they are 
currently comprised, do not have the time, resources or expertise to manage 
investigations. 
 
The four-yearly election cycle for PCCs was seen by most panel members as an 
unacceptable mechanism for public accountability. Panels, with the requisite 
funding, support and resources, should undertake that role between elections. 
However, given that some panels have just four meetings a year, this was also 
seen as an obstacle to effective scrutiny. 
 
Many of the panel members argued for effective sanctions, particularly in respect 
of referring their disquiet about a commissioner’s conduct to a higher authority, 
such as the Home Secretary. This was supported by one of the PCCs. Another 
PCC thought, given their lack of real powers, panels were suffering from a 
democratic deficit and that they should be given both more powers and also more 
resources. 
 
One of the PCCs argued that the real issue was about the intelligence and ability 
of the panel members, rather than any deficiency of powers on their part. From his 
observations at panel meetings, the researcher witnessed some very poor 
questions from members. While, as noted earlier, it is possible to recruit intelligent 
and able independent panel members, the same cannot be said for councillor 
members. These are allocated to the panels by their own local authorities. While 
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this PCC has a strong point, it does not detract, it might be thought, from the need 
for more panel powers and resources. 
 
Several respondents acknowledged the need for good working relationships 
between panels and their PCCs. Where commissioners also shared their future 
programmes of work with panel members, much friction could be avoided. One of 
the panel clerks felt that there should be a formal requirement placed on PCCs to 
publish their planning programmes so that members could be engaged at an early 
stage. 
 
It seems clear from this research that panels see themselves largely as ineffectual. 
This is principally because of inadequate powers but also the result of poor 
funding and resources. A full review of the model is required now so that the 
powers of panels can be properly assessed. This may mean fresh legislation and 
an amended governance model. 
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The	tension	between	support	and	scrutiny	and	should	there	be	more	emphasis	on	scrutiny?		
The Home Affairs Select Committee, in recognising the importance of panels as 
‘critical friends’ of their commissioners, also acknowledged that many panels have 
struggled to understand both their role and powers (HASC, 2013; Bailey, 2015). 
This is problematic because of the confusion around the terms, support and 
scrutiny, which have been considered to have different, even antagonistic, 
meanings. (Lister, 2014; Bailey, 2015). The role of critical friend implies that 
constructive scrutiny is an integral part of the support given to PCCs by their 
panels. However, much of the friction between commissioners and their panels 
has been generated by their different understanding of these terms. While panel 
members see scrutiny as an important part of their remit, many PCCs argue that 
panels are principally there to support them, rather than hold them to account. 
(Tone from the Top, page 59)  
 
It was important for this study to determine the extent to which tension existed 
between support and scrutiny and to understand what the consequences might be 
for the panels in their scrutiny role. Additionally, the research examined the views 
of all respondents on whether a scrutiny role should have greater prominence. 
 Research	findings	
 
Table	15	Is	there	tension	between	support	and	scrutiny? 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Yes 37 
(72%) 
9 (75%) 14 (66%) 7 (70%) 6 (85%) 1 (100%) 
No 13 
(25%) 
3 (25%) 7 (33%) 2 (20%) 1 (15%)  
Ask 
Panel 
1 
(2%) 
  1 (10%)   
 
As will be seen in Table 15, a significant majority of respondents (72%) considered 
that the dual role of support and scrutiny involved a level of tension. In the case of 
the panel clerks, where six out of the seven claimed tension was apparent, the 
majority was even higher (85%). A similar majority of PCCs took the same view 
(70%) 
 
The independent panel members, where the majority was 75%, gave some 
interesting answers to this question. Three examples are cited. In the first 
response, where the panel was very critical of its commissioner, the respondent 
describes how relationships deteriorated rapidly following the panel’s public 
censure of her. The second just acknowledged the existence of tension but, in the 
third response, the respondent offered an interesting perspective on why some 
panel members and commissioners get confused over the terms being used. He 
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noted, perhaps with a degree of cynicism, that some PCCs could use this 
confusion as a means of helping with their re-election. 
 
“There is a tension between supporting and scrutinizing the PCC. The 
commissioner’s attitude towards the panel changed markedly during the ….. affair. 
Before, the relationship was quite light and breezy and we were living in Telly 
Tubby Land but that all came to an end during that case.  Relationships became 
quite strained and I could sense the tension when the Commissioner came into the 
room.” PCP1 
 
“There can be a tension between scrutiny and support. More emphasis 
should be given to the scrutinising role.” PCP4 
 
“A lot of people get this confused because if you just accept what the PCC 
says that is taken as support; if you seek clarity of what they’re doing and why 
they’re doing it, sometimes that’s seen as over-scrutiny and you’re impinging on 
their role. That’s my question – is it a challenge, or do they not really understand? 
A lot of this is down to the way that individual PCCs see their role and more 
importantly now, in my opinion, as to how they can get re-elected.  A complaint 
came in recently and I said the level of detail in this complaint is not what it seems, 
it’s there for an alternative reason and we have to be mindful of that.” PCP9 
 
There was also a significant majority of councillor members (66%) who thought 
tension existed between support and scrutiny. As will be seen from the three 
examples below, concerns were raised about the ambiguity of their role, as well as 
the capacity of some members to understand and fulfil their role. In the second 
quotation, the respondent highlights the difference between the panel chair, who is 
supportive of the PCC, and his members, who are more critical. As was noted 
earlier, this panel chair is unhappy with the present governance model and, like his 
PCC, was a member of the former police authority. In the final quotation, the 
respondent expresses concern about trying to reconcile support with scrutiny, 
which he sees as incompatible.  
 
“Yes, it is incredibly difficult to both and it is not very clear about what sort of 
support is wanted or required. I don’t really know what that support means.” PCP3 
 
 “Despite the fact that our PCC is independent, although her ‘independence’ 
is interesting because the people who ran her campaign are Liberal Democrats. I 
would say that our chairman is quite supportive of the Commissioner. I don’t think 
the rest of them are that supportive. To be candid, their intellectual equipment 
does not enable them to scrutinise in the most effective way. There is no problem 
between being supportive and critical at the same time. We are there as her 
critical friend. There is a degree of tension.” PCP7 
 
“You have to describe what the group is for. Are you there in a support role 
to advise, or are you there basically to hold the PCC to account? Try to do both at 
once is clearly difficult. It should be one or the other. To be honest, I wouldn’t mind 
if the group was simply there in an advisory purpose you would then know what it 
was, as doing two things at once is clearly very difficult.” PCP11 
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Consistent with the other groups, a large majority (70%) of PCCs also believed 
there was some tension between support and scrutiny. In the examples below, the 
first commissioner, in acknowledging that some tension is healthy, makes clear 
that panels have a duty to support PCCs. In the second quotation, the PCC 
implies that his panel may have a different interpretation of support from the one 
he uses. He believes his panel sees scrutiny as their main vehicle for support, 
something which he finds difficult to reconcile. 
 
“I think there is, inevitably, a bit of a tension and it is probably a healthy one.  
Two chairs of other police and crime panels visited our panel. It was quite clear 
that one of these two was more interested in getting at his PCC.  I found that 
chairman very difficult to deal with because he had no intention of supporting his 
commissioner. His only intention was to criticise as much as he could, which was 
not the point of the job.” PCC3 
 
“I suspect they think the scrutiny part of that role is the way they give me 
support! I am trying not to be unfair to them. I am not aware of support in quite that 
way other than through the scrutiny they give. The panel do understand the 
particular financial pressures and the legal pressures that have come on someone 
like myself and so in that sense, they are supportive.” PCC6 
 
The panel clerks also (70%) believed that there was tension between support and 
scrutiny. In the first example below, the panel clerk stated clearly that when 
questions were asked of the commissioner, there were tensions, implying that 
tension only comes when PCCs are scrutinised. In the second example, the clerk 
described an improving relationship between the panel and the commissioner, 
during which both sides have recognised the value of critical friendship. In the final 
response, the clerk made the point that challenge and support were 
complementary and not antagonistic. 
 
“There hasn’t been that much opportunity to have that conflict between 
support and scrutiny but, in the last few months, we have started to ask things. So, 
yes, there is a tension. We are in the process of forming a strategic alliance with 
another police and crime panel. We are looking to do joint work. If the two police 
forces are coming together to do that, it makes sense that we also form an alliance 
with their PCP. Our first briefing is on 8 April. I need to be able to devote some 
time to finding out what this strategic alliance is.” Clerk1 
 
“There is always going to be a tension. When we first started, the 
Commissioner was very reluctant to take on board any of our recommendations 
but I’m pleased to say that has changed. I think she is beginning to realise 
importance of the panel as a critical friend.” Clerk4 
 
“They should be two sides of the same coin. Challenge and support are 
complementary” Clerk5 
 
The views of the small minority (25%) of respondents who thought tensions did not 
exist are noteworthy in the sense that there is a recognition of the potential for 
relationships to be strained. The two examples cited below are both from male 
panel chairs. In the first, the respondent argued that support and scrutiny were 
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compatible and, in the second, there was an implication that some of his members 
have got the balance wrong. It should be noted that these two panel chairs were 
lone voices on their panels in respect of this question, as all their panel members 
(in this study) took the opposite view. The role and importance of panel chairs is 
the subject of a later discussion. 
 
“I don’t see any tension. It is just a recognition. The two are compatible. I 
don’t have any difficulty with it. There may come a time when there is a tension 
and we are alert to that.” PCP10 
 
“Yes, I think there could be. I think we manage to avoid it, quite honestly. I 
have sometimes to explain to members that we are there to support the 
Commissioner, however irritating some members might find that.” PCP8 
 Should	more	emphasis	be	given	to	scrutiny?	
 
Table	16	Should	more	emphasis	be	given	to	scrutiny? 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Yes 36 
(70%) 
11 (91%) 18 (85%) 2 (20%) 5 (71%)  
No 14 
(27%) 
1 (9%) 3 (14%) 7 (70%) 2 (28%) 1 (100%) 
Ask 
Panel 
1 
(2%) 
  1 (10%)   
 
As will be seen in Table 16, an overall majority of all respondents (70%) were of 
the view that more emphasis should be given by panels to their scrutiny role. This 
majority increased significantly with independent panel members (91%) and 
councillor panel members (85%). Panel clerks (71%) similarly thought more 
emphasis on scrutiny was needed. The only exception, unsurprisingly, was PCCs, 
where just 20% thought more scrutiny was appropriate. The views of three 
independent panel members, one panel clerk and one PCC, who all believed more 
scrutiny was needed, are quoted below. In the first example, the respondent 
expresses his frustration about the time delays in getting answers to his questions 
which, in his view, is not scrutiny.  
 
“More emphasis should be given the role of scrutiny by the panel. I regularly 
ask questions in relation to the commissioner’s plans and I can sometimes be 
waiting for months before I get an answer. That is not effective scrutiny. In my 
view, the panel should be setting deadlines for a response.” PCP1 
 
Another independent member, in the second quotation, blames inadequate 
funding for the lack of effective scrutiny. This is covered in much more detail in a 
later section.  
 
“There can be a tension between scrutiny and support. More emphasis 
should be given to the scrutinising role. I have no way or platform to represent the 
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people here. Proactive scrutiny is affected by funding constraints. We have no 
money to spend. The officers supporting the panel have just been made 
redundant. All we have now is the democratic minute taker coming to meetings. 
We have no one to do any groundwork on our behalf. We don’t have any direct 
relationship with the clerk to panel. We don’t have a dedicated staff. With the 
recent announcement of redundancies for the officers, I’m not sure how we are 
going to progress. The LGA did offer training for panel members and it may still do 
but I will need to check it out.” PCP4 
 
The third example is from another independent member, who feels that the 
emphasis put on support by commissioners is misplaced, since they already have 
the time, funding and resources in place, without needing support from their panel. 
 
“I don’t see why we are supporting him at all. I don’t understand why he 
needs us to support him. He has a whacking great budget. I don’t understand why 
a PCP’s role is to support him.” PCP12 
 
In the fourth quotation, a panel clerk highlighted the efforts he makes, including the 
provision of appropriate questions for his members to put to the PCC, to help them 
with their scrutiny role. Candidly, he explained that without his briefing papers, 
there would be very little scrutiny taking place. The researcher also observed 
similar practice at pre-panel briefing meetings, where panel clerks provided ready-
made questions for their members. 
 
“We do prepare a briefing paper for members before each meeting and 
prompt them with suggested questions and lines of enquiry. They are not obliged 
to take any of this advice but we do try to encourage them to scrutinise. Scrutiny is 
now getting better. Sometimes panel members can get bogged down with their 
own specific ward issues rather than performing the strategic scrutiny that they are 
there to do. We do as much as we can. Without our briefing papers, not a lot 
would happen, really.” Clerk4 
  
In the final example, a PCC expressed his belief that his panel members needed a 
lot more help if they are to be effective scrutinisers. To compensate for their lack of 
knowledge and support, he has developed a much closer working relationship with 
them, to make their job easier. 
 
  “I think my panel gives me a bit of an easy ride and why do they give me an 
easy ride? In part, because I go out of my way to be helpful. They say I tell them 
too much but, in part, because they are very much part time, they don’t know what 
to ask. They need a lot more support.” PCC7 
 The	views	of	those	arguing	that	the	current	balance	is	about	right	
 
As has already been noted, the PCCs are the only group of respondents in this 
study who feel no further emphasis on scrutiny is required.  In the two examples 
cited below, one from a panel clerk and the other from a PCC, both felt the current 
balance between support and scrutiny was about right. The PCC, though, seemed 
to imply that on his panel he would appreciate more help. 
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“No, I don’t think the panel has ever really made any comments about the 
fact they feel they are doing more of one than the other. Generally, I think the 
panel has the right balance.” Clerk2 
 
“I think that the scrutinising role is alive and well. You might have re-
phrased that question to ask if more emphasis should be given to the supporting 
role. I think the balance in my area is healthy.” PCC1 
 What	are	the	reasons	for	this	tension	between	support	and	scrutiny	and	what	problems	does	it	cause?	
 
There are many probable reasons behind the tension between support and 
scrutiny and these are concerned with the enabling legislation, the differing views 
of the PCCs and panel members, the capacity of panels and poor resourcing. 
 
Dealing first with the legislation, the inclusion of PCPs was due to pressure from 
the Liberal Democrats, who were coalition partners with the Conservatives 
(Reiner, 2013).  Although the minister responsible subsequently agreed to the 
creation of PCPs, he remained opposed to giving them too much power. The 
resulting legislation was, unsurprisingly, ambiguous. Indeed, as Reiner (2013) 
notes, panels were weak, without any real authority to challenge. There has never 
been any real clarity about what is expected from panels in respect of their 
scrutiny role and this uncertainty and confusion impacts on their ability to provide 
effective scrutiny (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2013; Chambers, 2014; Bailey, 2015; 
Davies, 2016).  
 
One of the consequences of poor role definition is that it has allowed the key 
actors in this new model, the commissioners and panel members, to develop their 
own interpretations of how their relationship should work. While the PCCs 
acknowledge the scrutiny role of panels, it seems their view of scrutiny is quite 
different from that of the panel members, something evidenced in this research. As 
has also been noted earlier, some PCCs take the view that they are accountable 
only to the public who elected them. Such a position implies that any power held 
by the panels is secondary to that of the electorate. The panel members, on the 
other hand, see their principal role as that of a critical friend, part of which is 
subjecting their commissioner to robust scrutiny. Where the relationship between 
PCCs and their panels is good, much of the tension can be alleviated. 
 
Another source of the tension between support and scrutiny comes from the 
frustration of some panel members who have struggled, through a lack of 
knowledge or capacity, to understand their role, particularly where they are more 
concerned to ask operational questions of the police, rather than holding the 
commissioner to account. However, this is inevitable, as councillors will raise 
constituents’ issues, despite this not being part of their brief. PCCs invariably take 
exception when this happens, which means levels of tension increase.  
 
Inadequate funding for panels can also cause friction for members who feel 
impotent when it comes to scrutinising their PCCs. Whereas PCCs have 
professional, fully funded staff, with sufficient resources to undertake detailed 
programmes of work, the poor funding levels for PCPs does not allow them to 
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compete, especially in respect of proactive scrutiny. It is an unfair contest. This 
can cause frustration and disquiet on the part of the panel members. The impact of 
poor funding on proactive scrutiny is the subject of a detailed discussion later. 
 
Where levels of tension between support and scrutiny remain high, relationships 
between commissioners and panels can be strained and this may impact the work 
of both. One way of ameliorating this tension is through the development of 
proactive relationships between panels and commissioners, as evidence from this 
research shows that early engagement by panels in work programmes can obviate 
a lot of mistrust. 
 Summary	
 
The evidence from this research clearly supports the view that not only is there 
tension between support and scrutiny, the resulting friction has a negative impact 
on the relationships between commissioners and panel members. Large majorities 
in each group of research participants believed such tension existed and that it 
derived principally from a variety of factors, including ambiguous legislation, poor 
role definition and differing interpretations of the respective remits, the inconsistent 
capacity and/or intelligence of panel members, inadequate panel funding and poor 
leadership of panel chairs.  
 
As has been noted, the legislation which created PCPs was, arguably, deliberately 
opaque and this has resulted in confusion and ambiguity in respect of role 
definition. This, in turn, has created a vacuum within which both panels and PCCs 
have derived their own interpretations of their respective roles, including 
perceptions of support and scrutiny. In consequence, some relationships have 
suffered from increasing levels of tension. 
 
Another contributing factor is the inability of some panel members, through a lack 
of capacity, to comprehend their role in a way that enables them to be effective. 
Evidence from this research suggests that where panel members misunderstand 
their remit, relationships with their commissioners are likely to be affected. 
 
Panel funding is also a key factor in this discussion. This research suggests that 
where panels feel frustrated about their inability to effectively scrutinise their 
PCCs, there is likely to be resulting friction between them and their 
commissioners. Inadequate funding, which is analysed later, does not allow panels 
to match their PCCs in terms of resourcing, expertise, independence and 
confidence. 
 
In addition, there is some evidence from this study to suggest that where panel 
chairs are too heavily biased in favour of supporting their PCCs, other members of 
their panels will feel resentment and frustration. The role of panel chair, which is 
explored in a later section, is pivotal in determining the key commissioner/panel 
relationship. They must accept responsibility for leading their panels in a way that 
promotes relationships based on being critical friends, where effective scrutiny is 
regarded as integral to support.  
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Having seen that there is tension between support and scrutiny, it is interesting to 
discover that a large majority (70%) of all respondents in the study, with the 
notable exception of the PCCs, believe that there should be more emphasis on the 
scrutiny role of the panels. Contrary to the view of panel members, 70% of 
commissioners think the current balance is about right, some suggesting that there 
should be greater emphasis on support. 
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Ease	and	effectiveness	of	complaint	handling 
	
Given that a key part of a panel’s role is to hold its commissioner to account, 
complaint handling is an important element of that scrutiny responsibility.  
 
The Local Government Association (2012) argues that the central features of an 
effective complaint handling procedure are accessibility, communication, 
timeliness, fairness, credibility and accountability. Any limitation on one or more of 
these core components will be bound to have a negative impact on a panel’s 
ability to fulfil its disciplinary function and this research touches upon most of them.   
 
The Home Office guidance in respect of The Elected Local Policing Bodies 
(Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012, provides panels with guidelines 
regarding complaint handling. These are quite revealing, particularly in so far as 
they point to the limited powers of panels. While panels are required to informally 
resolve non-criminal complaints against commissioners, they have no sanctions 
available, other than to require attendance at a hearing and answer questions. The 
ultimate sanction, in the words of the Home Office, is the ballot box every four 
years. As has already been stated earlier, this is a contentious issue and worthy of 
further analysis. 
 
Effective complaint handling requires sufficient resources and the Home Office 
guidance simply states that panels will be resourced to perform their vital scrutiny 
role, without giving more detailed information. It also makes clear that panels can 
delegate the initial handling of complaints to the PCC’s chief executive, which is 
promoted as a way of minimising costs. This, clearly, is another contentious area 
deserving critical appraisal. 
 
The Home Office guidance states that there would be no conflict of interest where 
the PCC’s chief executive handles complaints against his/her employer because 
the ultimate responsibility rests with the panel. In terms of public perception and 
wider credibility, this is highly questionable and needs further examination. 
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Research	findings	
 
 
Table	17	Ease	and	effectiveness	of	complaint	handling 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Simple & 
effective 
30 
(58%) 
6 (50%) 13 (62%) 4 
(40%) 
6 (85%) 1 (100%) 
Difficult & 
ineffective 
18 
(35%) 
6 (50%) 7 (33%) 
(No Tories) 
4 
(40%) 
1 (14%)  
Don’t 
know 
2 
(4%) 
 1 (4%) 1 
(10%) 
  
Ask panel 1 
(2%) 
  1 
(10%) 
  
As will be seen in Table 17, a majority (58%) of respondents considered the 
current processes for handling complaints against commissioners to be simple and 
effective. A larger percentage of panel clerks (85%) feel that the present 
arrangements are working well. However, as is noted in the examples below, 
many of the respondents qualified their answers and their comments should not be 
interpreted as a blanket endorsement of current practice. There remains a 
significant minority (35%) who are critical of the present complaint handling 
framework.  
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion, there were some consistent themes 
identified by the research participants and these are captured below. 
Dealing first with those respondents who believe the current arrangements are 
working well, there is still concern expressed about the limited powers of the 
panel, as well as criticism of the Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC). These issues are both highlighted in the first quotation, which is from a 
panel chair. 
  “Well, we don’t have any powers really. We have to refer things, as you 
know, to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. Our experience of that 
is not good.” PCP8 
In the next example, which is also from a panel chair, there is similar anxiety about 
the lack of powers for panels to conduct investigations into allegations of 
misconduct by commissioners, something which would require a significant 
training investment. 
“I think the processes are clear. We have the benefit of a legal adviser who 
has been extremely good. Not always, though, do the outcomes meet the 
expectations. We have to live with that. The challenge that it presents is the 
complaint relates more to what the police have or have not done, rather than how 
the commissioner has handled it. We’re very limited in our powers. For me, with 
my background as a former police officer, I think that is an area where the panel 
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needs some additional powers so that the commissioner knows we have teeth. 
There is a weakness there that requires a greater degree of investigatory power 
for the panel. However, to bring that about professionally and effectively, there 
would be a training need for the panel members.” PCP10 
In the next two quotations, which are both from panel clerks, there is similar 
concern raised about the lack of powers in respect of complaint handling. The 
second clerk, while acknowledging the unacceptable problems for complainants 
under the present system, highlights the challenges for panels if they were to be 
given more extensive investigatory powers. The final example is from a chief 
executive of a PCC’s office. He is extraordinarily critical of giving panels more 
powers, principally on the grounds it might obstruct the work of the commissioner. 
“Our complaints process is very effective. We have a clear protocol of 
processes that we follow. There are ongoing issues with complaints but I don’t 
want to go into but the process itself is quite limited but the panel has no control 
over that.” Clerk2 
“Yes, it is very difficult because the powers of the panel are very limited as 
to what we can get involved in. From a customer’s point of view, it is awful and I 
can understand their frustration. The whole system is not set up well for them. The 
system is not ideal for the people who are complaining. But, I’m not sure about 
wanting the powers to do more because you would have massive investigations 
and we really don’t have the expertise to handle those. Some complaints are 
triaged with the Commissioner’s office, depending upon their nature. The 
Commissioner’s office are very good at helping us out with information because it 
is usually someone who has complained to them in the first place. We have to rely 
upon the goodwill and information of the police and crime commissioner. The 
legislation doesn’t give us authority to investigate, although I am unclear about the 
difference between scrutinising and investigating.” Clerk7 
 
“To give them more powers as well, would make it a nightmare, as 
commissioners would never be out of the place, spending all their time accounting 
to the panel. This will be at the cost of representing the people who elected the 
commissioners.” OS1 
 Complaint	handling	not	effective	
It is interesting to note that identical themes were raised by respondents in this 
category. In the first two quotations, which are both from independent members, 
strong concerns were raised about the inability of panels to conduct investigations. 
This is illustrated clearly in the second example, where the respondent cites a 
case in which the IPCC instructed his panel to investigate an allegation that might 
include some criminal behaviour. The final two quotations are from PCCs. In the 
first, there is scathing criticism of the IPCC and, in the other, there is a recognition 
that the current arrangements, which involve triaging complaints through his chief 
executive, are not always seen to be fair. He also acknowledges their lack of 
funding and resources to undertake investigatory work. 
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“The processes and procedures for formal enquiry are unclear and 
ineffectual. Had we have had robust powers of investigation, we could have been 
much clearer on our role.” PCP1 
“They are clearly defined but not effective.  They are limited in their 
effectiveness because you can’t investigate, for example. There’s a line – here’s 
an example.  A complaint came in and we thought there was a possible element of 
criminal conduct so we sent it off to the IPCC.  They looked at it and said that 
there is a possibility but not of a sufficient nature for us to deal with it and we will 
send it back to the PCP to deal with it as they see fit. That’s the actual wording of 
the letter that came back.” PCP9 
“The processes are unclear and ineffective. They involve immediate referral 
to the IPCC. One experience that we’ve had was actually a complaint against my 
deputy and the IPCC’s participation in dealing with that was rubbish. The person 
from the IPCC who was put in charge of that investigation was inexperienced, 
inadequately trained and didn’t understand the relationship between the chief 
constable and the Commissioner. She didn’t even understand the concept of the 
‘Two Corporations Sole’ and so it was singularly unproductive and absurd.” PCC4 
“They are just bringing in a new complaints procedure, which they’re having 
a row about. What they are going to do is route in the first place through my chief 
executive, who will do a kind of triaging. There was a discussion last time as to 
whether that was really objective. Also, whether it would be seen to be objective. 
They are stuck on that. The Lib Dem opposed it and the Labour people just fell in 
behind it. I was talking to the new chair about that today and she is completely 
open-minded about the proposed changes. The thing is, they are not resourced to 
do it properly by anyone else. If complaints don’t go through my chief executive, 
where do they go? That’s their problem, I think. My chief executive is a lawyer and 
I think that makes a difference.” PCC6 
 Why	have	these	findings	been	identified	and	what	are	the	possible	problems	they	cause?	
Even though the majority of respondents believed that the overall system for 
managing complaints was simple and effective, some interesting themes emerged 
from these findings. First, the limited investigatory powers of panels were seen by 
most as a handicap, although there was widespread recognition that the 
government had neither intended, nor properly resourced, panels to conduct full-
scale investigations into complaints against commissioners. The Home Office 
guidance alluded to earlier appears to bear this out. As for the problems this 
generates, most panel members appear frustrated at their impotence to apply any 
effective sanctions, which may erode their confidence in the current model. 
Second, some respondents were critical of the practice of ‘triaging’ complaints 
through the PCC’s chief executive, which they thought was neither sufficiently 
objective nor credible with the wider public. The LGA guidance, also referred to 
earlier, makes clear that credibility and fairness are key components of an 
effective complaints system. The most significant problem arising from this 
practice is that the public may have little confidence in its objectivity. 
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Third, the IPCC, which deals with allegations of criminal behaviour, also received 
strong criticism. This arose particularly in respect of its slow, bureaucratic and poor 
handling of complaints, which led to time delays and widespread dissatisfaction by 
all parties. The IPCC has been subjected to widespread criticism, almost from its 
inception, about its inability to handle complaints against the police and it is not 
surprising to discover similar concerns regarding PCCs. The specific LGA 
guidance in respect of accessibility, communication, timeliness and fairness would 
also appear to be compromised by the IPCC’s involvement in this model. 
Fourth, there was recognition that panels were simply unable to undertake 
rigorous investigations into complaints because they had neither the resources nor 
the expertise to carry them out. This is a problem because it means panels, who 
bear responsibility for managing non-criminal complaints, frequently have to rely 
on their PCC’s chief executive to do most of the work, something which 
undermines the integrity of the governance model.   Summary	
As has been shown from the Home Office Guidance, it was never the intention of 
the then coalition government for panels to manage in-depth disciplinary 
investigations. Instead, and to help minimize cost, it was suggested that panels 
should seek the cooperation of their PCC’s chief executive, who would be better 
able to triage all complaints. Given the ‘light touch’ approach envisaged at the time 
and the fact that panels have neither the resources nor necessary expertise to 
manage such complaints, the Home Office Guidance is consistent with current 
practice. However, that guidance seems to fly in the face of the LGA’s key 
principles of effective complaint handling, as these research findings would tend to 
support. 
Although the majority (58%) of respondents in this study believed the processes 
for complaint handling were simple and effective, there were, none-the-less, some 
major concerns expressed about current arrangements. These included a feeling 
of impotence, resulting from limited powers and resources, concerns about the 
objective handling of complaints against PCCs, criticisms of the IPCC and 
inadequate resources and expertise to manage complaints. 
Respondents across the board felt that the current powers, in conjunction with 
limited resources, did not equip them to assume full responsibility for managing 
non-criminal complaints. Many of them thought this was an impediment, since it 
forced them to rely on the PCC’s chief executive to triage complaints, something 
they said could not be seen to be either objective or fair. Some argued that 
legislation was required to enhance their powers, together with additional 
resources and effective training. This would clearly be a major challenge for 
panels, particularly given the many other significant problems that have been 
addressed by this research. It should also be acknowledged, as has been noted 
by one respondent, a more emboldened panel, with full investigatory powers, 
might take up a disproportionate amount of a commissioner’s time and therefore 
interfere with the balance of the government’s preferred model. The weight of 
evidence from this study, however, supports the argument for enhanced 
investigatory powers. This would mean additional resources and rigorous training. 
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The need for objectivity and fairness in handling complaints against PCCs is a 
clear finding from this research. Panel members welcome the support of chief 
executives in triaging complaints. There is a strong feeling that the practice is not 
ideal because it is not seen to be either objective or fair. Even though there was no 
evidence to suggest that the current practice was biased in favour of 
commissioners or that it was in any way unfair, panel members would prefer the 
disciplinary framework to be completely independent of their commissioners. 
The IPCC, which manages criminal complaints against PCCs, is viewed by most 
respondents as problematic, principally on the grounds it is bureaucratic, slow and 
unhelpful. One PCC complained bitterly about the IPCC’s lack of professional 
expertise. This is a major issue for panels when managing complaints since they 
are constrained, and delayed, by the timetable of the IPCC’s investigation, which 
causes them, and their panel clerks, frustration. It also upsets complainants, who 
feel let down by the process.  
Finally, the evidence suggests that the lack of adequate resources has a 
significant impact on complaint handling. Were complaints to be managed 
independently, and perhaps more effectively, panels would need additional 
support staff, appropriate training and more funded time to feel confident in their 
role. The evidence from this study supports that view. 
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Chapter	6		
The	Role	of	Politics	
	
Findings	and	analysis	–	What	is	the	influence	of	party	politics	and	how	effective	are	independent	panel	members?	
There is a recognised potential for undue political interference in panel business, 
particularly where the scrutinised and scrutinisers are from the same political party 
(Bailey, 2015). Evidence from both local government and health bodies similarly 
points to this danger (Lister, 2014; Coleman and Glendenning, 2004; Coulson and 
Whiteman, 2012). This chapter assesses the potential for political influence on the 
current governance model, given that most of the participants are affiliated to 
political parties. It also examines the effectiveness of independent panel members 
and how their contributions are evaluated. The	role	of	politics	
The new governance model is based on democratic legitimacy and all but three of 
the PCCs elected in 2016 are from the established political parties (Loveday, 
2017). Moreover, a significant majority of panel members are also from the same 
political parties, which means politics is inevitably at the heart of the new 
arrangements.  
Given the dominance of political parties in the current governance arrangements, it 
would not be unreasonable to assume there is a risk of political influence in 
respect of Commissioner accountability by panels. Indeed, this was a question 
raised by Lister (2014), following his detailed examination of the literature 
regarding political influence in local government scrutiny.  Party political allegiance 
has also been identified as a significant factor in the scrutiny role of public bodies 
(Leach and Copus, 2004 ; Leach, 2009 ; Sandford, 2013). This is especially acute 
where the scrutinised and the scrutinisers share the same political affiliation. 
Bailey (2015) sought to address this question in his case study of the Surrey 
Police and Crime Panel but was unable to come to any firm conclusion, principally 
because the Conservative Chair had herself selected the limited number of 
members for participation in the research and a full evaluation had not been 
possible. The findings from that study were submitted, as evidence, to the House 
of Lord’s Committee on Standards in Public Life: concerning public accountability 
structures of the police in England and Wales (Loveday, Lewis, Bailey and Watts, 
2014).  
This research attempted to further explore the potential for political influence, 
particularly where the key players were from the same political party. The target 
areas in this study were selected because they provided a full range of political 
relationships. This question became even more relevant, following the PCC 
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elections in 2016, when the number of independent commissioners was reduced 
from nine to three. Research	findings	
	
Table	18	Is	undue	influence	a	problem	where	PCCs	and	PCPs	share	the	same	political	party? 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Yes 23 
(45%) 
7 (58%) 10* (47%) 4** 
(40%) 
2 (28%)  
Potentially 2 
(4%) 
2 (16%)     
No 23 
(45%) 
1 (8%) 11 *** 
(52%) 
5**** 
(50%) 
5 (71%) 1 (100%) 
Difficult to 
assess 
2 
(4%) 
2 (16%)   1 (14%)  
No 
comment 
1 
(2%) 
  1 
(10%) 
  
*Three Tory, six Labour and one Green 
**Three independent and one Tory 
***Ten Labour and one Tory 
****Four Labour and one Tory 
As Table 18 shows, respondents were split on this question, with 45% suggesting 
politics was problematic and 45% saying it was not. There were some variations 
amongst the practitioners, with most (58%) of independent panel members 
claiming politics was a problem, while a majority (71%) of panel clerks took the 
opposite view. However, even though there was an explicit concern about political 
influence, none of the respondents alleged it had played any significant part in the 
deliberations of their panels. The most strident criticisms came from independent 
panel members and the first two quotations illustrate the problems that political 
interference can bring. 
“In my view, there is real potential for problems where the PCC and the 
PCP are from the same political background. You can’t keep politics out of 
policing. Party politics should not be involved in policing but it is impossible to keep 
politics out of it. In an ideal world, the panel should be independent and the 
commissioner should be independent.” PCP1 
 “From the way I have observed people on the panel that I sit on, their 
loyalties are so political. They kind of gather themselves in little groups. Their 
focus is on their own political careers. I can see that if our commissioner were a 
Tory, I couldn’t imagine any of the Tory councillors wanting to p… him off. I think 
there could well be issues.” PCP12 
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These concerns were not restricted to the panel independents, as councillor 
members echoed similar anxieties. The following quotation highlights the problem 
of political loyalties. 
“If you end up with the PCC from one party, with panel members from the 
same party, they will essentially turn up and not ask too many difficult questions. 
They are ‘bums on seats’ because it will then fall mainly to the minority on the 
committee to actually ask the difficult stuff, particularly where politics is involved.  
The consequence of this is if you have a political PCC. It’s not that you can’t 
scrutinise but rather the majority of the difficult questions all fall on the shoulders of 
the minority members.” PCP11 
PCCs similarly expressed their fears about undue political influence. In the first 
quotation, the commissioner (who stepped down last year), describes clearly how 
political affiliation can impair effective panel scrutiny. This same PCC, who 
subsequently resigned from the Conservative party, argued for all roles to be 
independent. A similar allegation is made by another PCC in the second quotation. 
An independent commissioner with a strongly Conservative panel, she did not 
seek re-election in 2016.  The third quotation is from an independent PCC who lost 
his post to the Conservative candidate in 2016. He also acknowledges the danger 
of ineffective challenge when just one political party is involved. 
 “I believe it probably would be because I know from my own experience I 
would always be treated more leniently by Conservatives to excuse my actions 
whatever I do, in a way. I feel I always get a soft treatment from Conservative 
people I meet and I think that is unhealthy. I think an independent PCC and an 
independent PCP would be the best of both worlds.” PCC1 
 “All that happens is that everybody has a go at the Independent 
commissioner. I mean, if I was a Labour Commissioner and the Tories had a go at 
me, I would have the Labour lot sticking up for me and vice versa. Because you 
are independent, as genuinely I am, I am fair game for everybody. As an 
independent, I think if the next Police and Crime Commissioner here is 
Conservative, the vast majority of the panel are Conservative and they would give 
him an easy ride. Because they will have helped to get him there but there is no 
such thing as a free dinner.” PCC2 
“I think it would be a problem yes; and I think it would be a problem for the 
public actually because they wouldn’t be getting the best out of the Police and 
Crime Commissioner, who isn’t, you know, being challenged.” PCC10 
 
The views of practitioners who feel politics is not a problem also make interesting 
reading. Some respondents suggested that, far from constraining robust scrutiny, 
political allegiance can sometimes cause it. This is something illustrated in the first 
quotation from an independent panel member. Similar points were made by 
commissioners in the subsequent three responses: 
 
“I don’t think I seen anything yet that worries me about political interference. 
On the contrary, I have seen some Labour panel members really getting stuck in 
to the Commissioner.” PCP24 
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 “Funnily enough, I don’t really get that impression. If you really want to see 
councils squabbling, you ought to see one where there is a big majority.” PCC3 
 
“I don’t see it would make any difference. Here, where the Labour Party has 
been very dominant, the Labour Party tends to make its own opposition.” PCC6 
 
“I have never had a problem in talking to anybody on the panel. Even when 
it comes to the budget, I’ve never even telephoned Labour Party colleagues 
beforehand to request any particular help. I’ve just left them to get on with things 
independently. Actually, some of my Labour colleagues ask the more difficult 
questions.” PCC7 
 
The views of the panel clerks are especially pertinent and the two quotations that 
follow, both from panel clerks, also dispute the claim that political allegiance can 
get in the way of effective scrutiny. 
  
“It is difficult to say. My experience has been that although they are all from 
the same party here, that has not stopped them being robustly challenging.” 
Clerk5 
 
“I have thought about that because the Chairman is a Conservative and 
most of the panel are Conservatives. The guy (one of our panel members) who is 
running to become the next commissioner is a Conservative and I have wondered 
how that might work if he were elected. But, you would be surprised. I am 
beginning to think it’s not going to be as I would have assumed. The reason is that 
they haven’t necessarily got one another’s backs. Just because they are in the 
same party, it doesn’t mean that they will support another.” Clerk1 
 
The final quotation in this section is from a Labour PCC who expressed 
disparaging views about independent commissioners, especially in respect of their 
‘blandness’. He made the point that, as a politician, he had long-standing, 
principled views, which the public knew and understood. The same could not be 
said for independent candidates. 
 
“No, I think everything is more difficult if you’ve got independents, because 
nobody knows what they stand for, unless they are ex-police officers coming in 
with a grudge. Independents exist and I think the number of them was probably an 
accident of the very odd election we had in 2012. I don’t share the view that having 
a lot of independents is a good thing because an independent doesn’t stand for 
anything. People know what I stand for. They know my track record, concerns and 
political views over the years, which are very much about crime reduction and 
intervening early with young people, so on and so forth. There may be some good 
independents. There will always be the exception rather than the rule. The 
question with an independent is against what frameworks do you challenge?” 
PCC4 
 
During his fieldwork for this study, the researcher attended panel meetings in 
some of the target areas. At one of them, where the PCC and most of the panel 
members were from the Labour Party, he observed challenging questioning from 
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the panel, which clearly required the commissioner to account for his actions. It 
seemed to the researcher to be a highly effective panel meeting, where there was 
no evidence of undue political influence. However, this was exceptional since at all 
the other meetings observed by the researcher, questioning seemed much less 
robust. That may, however, have resulted from other factors unconnected with 
politics. 
  Why	have	these	findings	been	identified	and	what	problems	do	they	highlight?	
The findings from this study suggest opinions on political influence are divided, 
with the notable exceptions of independent panel members and panel clerks. In 
the case of the independent members, 74% of them claimed that political influence 
was, or had the potential to be, a problem. Only one (8%) of them thought it was 
not. This is significant because independent members, as has been shown in this 
study, tend to be better qualified for, and have spent longer in, their role. Without 
any political baggage, it might be thought that independents can be more 
dispassionate on this question. Their claims are supported by 40% of the PCCs, 
with one commissioner reporting he was given an easier time because of his 
political allegiance. This is a major criticism of the current model and something 
which requires closer examination. 
The panel clerks, however, see this differently, with 71% of them saying politics is 
not a problem. Their view is that political affiliation is not a bar to robust challenge, 
something supported by 50% of the PCCs. The commissioners claim that they are 
frequently challenged more by members of their own party, something witnessed 
by the researcher at one panel meeting. At other panel meetings attended by the 
researcher, however, there was little evidence of robust questioning. Some of the 
clerks admitted providing panel members with questions to make sure 
commissioners were challenged. This practice would appear to be relatively 
common and probably has more to do with factors outside politics. Summary	
Evidence from the literature regarding local government scrutiny (Lister, 2014; 
Bailey, 2015) cautions against a system where the scrutinised and the scrutinisers 
are from the same political party. This research sought to examine the extent to 
which party politics has any influence on the panel’s scrutiny role. 
Although the findings in this study were divided (see Table 21), two groups of 
respondents stood out. Most independent panel members were, for example, 
strongly of the view that political influence was, or had the potential to be, a 
problem. The panel clerks, however, disagreed. The independents were supported 
by 40% of the PCCs, one of whom argued he had been given undue leeway by 
panel members from his own party. This is a serious challenge and raises major 
concerns about effective commissioner scrutiny. 
The panel clerks found no evidence of any political impropriety. Instead, they 
asserted that panel members were not in the least inhibited by political affiliation. 
This was supported by 50% of the PCCs, who felt some of their toughest 
questions came from their own party panel members. The researcher observed 
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one such panel meeting, where panel members did not hold back in their 
questions. 
Significantly, however, one PCC believed political influence was a factor, since he 
had been shown undue leniency by his PCP, most members of which were from 
the same political party. The same PCC argued that politics should be taken out of 
the governance model.  
One PCC raised concerns about the role of independents standing as 
commissioners, primarily because the public had no idea of what they stood for. 
His argument was that, as a politician, his views on policing were public and 
known. Independents, however, might claim political neutrality but, in the absence 
of any public record, there was no way of establishing their political leanings.  
Interestingly, the initial fears around the potential for populism in policing, were 
focused more on the PCCs from the political parties, rather than the independents. 
(Lister, 2013; Morgan, 2012). Evidence suggests, however, that independent 
PCCs are not immune to populism (Bailey, 2015).  
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The	effectiveness	and	assessment	of	independent	panel	members	
 
Given the important scrutiny role of PCPs and the fact that independent members 
have been specially selected for their specialist skills and professional expertise, it 
seems appropriate that their performance should be subject to regular appraisal.  
Unless their performance, and that of the panel, is routinely assessed, there is no 
way of identifying the overall effectiveness of the panel. 
 Research	findings	
	
Table	19	Effectiveness	of	independent	panel	members 
 All 
respondents 
PCP 
independents 
PCP 
councillors 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Highly 
effective 
35 (68%) 9 (75%) 13 (65%) 7 (70%) 6 
(85%) 
Not 
effective 
4 (8%) 1 (8%) 1 (5%) 2 (20%) 0 
Difficult to 
assess 
12 (23%) 2 (16%) 6 (30%) 1 (10%) 1 
(15%) 
 
 
As will be seen in Table 19, the majority of all respondents (68%) believe 
independent panel members are highly effective. Perhaps the strongest 
endorsement comes from the panel clerks, with six out of the seven (85%) 
commending them. It is the combination of background skills, professional 
expertise, intelligence and commitment that impresses them most. One of the 
clerks noted that: 
 
“Our two independent members are absolutely fantastic. I don’t know where 
we would be without them. They are extremely effective and committed. They both 
have complementary backgrounds but it’s really more about their commitment and 
intelligence. They are currently two of the key members on a scrutiny review that 
we have been conducting. Three of the elected members should have been on 
that but I think we have only had one elected member turn up, which has been 
very disappointing. It is just much easier to work with two independent members. 
The independent members are the only appointments that we can really ensure fit 
the bill. The first time around, when we had the elected members in place, we tried 
to do a bit of analysis around skills gaps but then to look around appointing 
independent members to fit those gaps. It was quite difficult to do that. The two 
independent members we got was as result of a rigorous interview. As for the 
wider panel, we did draw up a skills set, perhaps not quite a job description, for 
members of the panel and, actually thinking about it now, it is probably worth me 
digging that out again. Democracy does trump that but everybody brings 
something different to the table.” Clerk7 
 
Another panel clerk, in commenting on the significant contribution made by her 
independent members, lamented the inability of panels to undertake rigorous gap 
analysis of all panel members, primarily because they have no control over their 
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councillor members, who are appointed by the constituent councils. She was also 
critical about member tenure, pointing out that most councillors, unlike 
independent members, are only on the panel for one year. (Clerk6) 
 
The independent panel members have also impressed some of the PCCs with 
their competence, energy and engagement. One PCC was particularly struck by 
their political neutrality, something he welcomed: 
 
 “I have been very impressed by our independent members. They are 
noticeable in their engagement. My preference would be to actually increase the 
numbers of independent members with specific skills. I find that they are a very 
healthy element. They lift the conversation away from petty party politics and I like 
them being around. That chimes entirely with my view of the whole thing – 
impartiality, objectivity and absolute distance from party politics. I would love to 
see an independent as chair and I would definitely support the idea.” PCC1 
 
The independence and ability of the independent members was also highlighted 
by another PCC, who thought that their questions were often by far the best. 
(PCC6) 
 
Another PCC welcomed the independent members, arguing that they subjected 
him to more effective challenge because of their wide ranging complementary 
skills. 
 
“In our case, they have been very effective. The panel clearly looked for the 
best people. One individual is a former acting assistant chief constable who, on 
retirement, hasn’t gone into the security industry. He does things like chairing the 
Local Community Health Council. He has done a lot of work on mental health 
issues. So, he is very much embedded in the community but with a knowledge of 
policing in the background. He is one of the most challenging members of the 
panel in a very positive way. The other independent panel member is of mixed 
raced background with a background in race relations and the needs of the 
elderly. Again, very complementary elements of challenge. My inclination, on the 
basis of experience so far, would be to retain the level of local government 
representation but to increase the number of independents and to have a template 
for the profile of independent members, in order to try and get the right balance.” 
PCC4 
 
There were, however, some discordant views from PCCs. The first quotation is 
from a commissioner who felt his independent members were too ‘one 
dimensional’. The second commissioner admitted that he did not know who his 
were. 
 
“There are two. One is co-opted. They are both one dimensional. They are 
both independent members of the police advisory group and that is all they talk 
about is equality. Not that I’m saying it is not important because it is. They’re not 
especially effective. One is the deputy Chair but I think it was just a case that no 
one else wanted it, really.” PCC2 
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“I don’t think they are more effective than anybody else. It’s not up to me to 
select them. It is for those people who volunteer to do it. To be quite honest, I can’t 
remember who they are. It doesn’t really matter to me who is asking the questions. 
It doesn’t really affect me.” PCC3 
 
The councillor panel members were also very complimentary about their 
independent colleagues. A panel chair drew attention to the skills, background 
experience, education, political neutrality and commitment his members brought to 
the panel. (PCP10) 
 
Another councillor member praised the commitment of the independent members, 
commenting on their diligence and effectiveness. She also thought their 
independence meant they wanted to be at panel meetings, unlike their councillor 
colleagues. (PCP14) 
 
The independent panel members in general believe they play an active and 
important part in the workings of the panel. One of them described it like in this 
way: 
 
“The independent members are the backbone of the panel. The other 
independent member is the young woman (auditor) in a wheelchair. She doesn’t 
say much but when she does say something it is always spot-on. I’ve been 
working with her to support her as she is a new addition to the panel” PCP4 
 
Another independent panel member was keen to emphasise the importance of 
providing support networks for all independents. He had created such a network 
for all independent panel members in the north west, something he had lauded to 
the Home Secretary at the time. (PCP33) 
 
Not all independent members had such a sanguine view. The lack of support and 
absence of training, together with a level of complacency, were cited as problems 
by one, who noted that: 
 
“I don’t think the independent members are especially effective at all. There 
are just two of us. I really struggle with the other one because he knows so much 
and I’ve only met him just once. I know he is very involved with the complaints 
subcommittee and my guess would be that is where he spends much of his panel 
time. Strange as it may seem, I have only spoken with him once. He has amazing 
capability and he’s probably the most knowledgeable of all the panel members but 
he is just not there when I am there. I am there but I’m not especially effective 
because I am not getting support from others with difficult questions and also I 
have not had the training and also, in my view, there is not a culture of real 
scrutiny on that panel. We are simply not doing enough. Our Chair and Clerk, to 
an extent, are almost resting on their laurels, as we are all doing.” PCP12 
 
For some, the effectiveness of independent members was difficult to assess. One 
respondent was troubled, philosophically, given the democratic nature of the new 
model, and commented: 
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“It is a bit like the old police authority. If it is a democratic model, then get 
yourself elected. I think there is something slightly discordant about in a very 
conspicuously elected position being questioned by someone who isn’t. It is the 
same for complaints. There is a fundamental difference because if you put yourself 
up to be elected and you are accountable to the people who elected you, why 
would you be scrutinised by people who have just applied to an advert in the 
paper? I think they are highly effective but, as a model, it is kind of flawed. For 
police authorities, it was the same and the independent members did a lot of 
valuable work. The cops were very cautious of those independent members but 
took little notice of the elected members.” OS1 
 
From his observations at panel meetings in Avon and Somerset, Merseyside, 
South Wales, Thames Valley and South Yorkshire, the researcher found that the 
independent members appeared both better engaged with the formal business 
and more authoritative in their questioning. This was particularly the case in South 
Wales, where both independent members impressed with their knowledge, 
authority and focus, something already alluded to in an earlier section, and 
commented upon by the PCC.  
 What	are	the	reasons	for	the	apparent	difference	in	effectiveness	between	independent	and	councillor	panel	members	and	what	are	the	resulting	implications?		
There are five key factors which differentiate independents from elected panel 
members and these are concerned with representativeness, political neutrality, 
professional expertise, commitment to the role and tenure of office. 
 
Independent panel members, as was evidenced in an earlier section, tend to be 
younger, more diverse, better skilled and more representative of the communities 
from which they are drawn. This is important because it enables them to be more 
in touch with the lives of ordinary people 
 
In addition, unlike their councillor colleagues, they are not affiliated to any political 
party and are therefore not hide-bound by party discipline, something alluded to by 
several respondents in this research. It may also mean they can be more strategic 
in their approach to panel activities, without the concerns of re-election, and the 
pressures that brings of focusing more on parochial ward issues. 
 
Independent panel members, unlike the elected members, are appointed through 
a rigorous selection process to meet identified skills gaps. The evidence from this 
research suggests that they are often highly skilled professionals with relevant 
expertise for panel activities. The evidence might suggest they are better able to 
grasp some of the complexities routinely faced in panel business and are therefore 
more authoritative in their deliberations. 
  
The commitment of independents, as was noted earlier, seems to be greater, not 
least because, unlike their councillor colleagues, they have all applied for the role, 
rather than simply being allocated to the panel by their home local authorities. This 
means they have all gone through a tough selection process, during which they 
have demonstrated a real desire to join the panel. The evidence suggests that the 
attendance of independents at panel meetings is much more regular than that of 
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their elected colleagues. This may give them a much greater degree of continuity, 
consistency and authority. 
 
Finally, independent panel members, unlike the councillors, do not have to face 
annual council meetings and the likelihood of replacement. This means their 
tenure of office is much longer on average, which gives them greater knowledge 
and authority. However, unlike their councillor colleagues, they have no direct link 
to their local communities and this might be considered a disadvantage in terms of 
democratic accountability. 
 
There are major problems arising from this apparent anomaly. Independent 
members form a very small element of panels. The bulk of members are elected 
councillors. The evidence from this research suggests that the independents are 
far more effective than their councillor colleagues, which places a burden on those 
independent members. Unless there is a much greater spread of skills and 
expertise across all panels, it is likely that panel effectiveness will be impaired. It is 
difficult to see how this can be improved significantly, given the democratic nature 
of the governance model. 
 Summary	
 
There is strong evidence from all respondents in this research that independent 
panel members are highly effective in their role. This would appear to come from 
their wider knowledge and greater professional expertise, better 
representativeness, political neutrality, greater commitment and longer tenure in 
post. However, the governance model now in use has democracy at its core. This 
means that most panel members are local councillors, who are appointed by their 
local authorities. Councillor members are on average less representative, less 
knowledgeable, bound by political affiliation and have less commitment. They also 
spend less time in post. Given the lack of training available, this poses major 
difficulties for panels. Consideration might, as a result, be given to increasing the 
proportion of independent panel members. 
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Evaluation	of	independent	members’	effectiveness	
 Research	findings	
 
Table	20	Monitoring	of	independent	members’	effectiveness	
 All 
respondents 
PCP 
independents 
PCP 
councillors 
Panel 
clerks 
PCCs 
In 
place 
1 (2%) 0 1 (4%)  0 
Not in 
place 
26 (51%) 10 (83%) 9 (42%) 7 
(100%) 
0 
Don’t 
know 
21 (41%) 2 (17%) 11 (52%) 0 8 (80%) 
Ask 
panel 
1 (2%) 0 0 0 1 (10%) 
No 
answer 
2 (4%) 0 0 0 1 (10%) 
 
As will be seen in Table 20, only one of the research participants (4%) thought the 
effectiveness of the independent members was being measured. Most 
significantly, all seven panel clerks (100%) confirmed there was nothing in place to 
monitor and assess their performance. 
 
The panel clerks all acknowledged the absence of formal assessment. It became 
clear during the research that this is a problem for all panel members and not just 
the independents. The response from one panel clerk suggested an air of 
complacency.  
 
“They generally regulate themselves through the Chairman. He takes a 
leading role in identifying where the panel needs additional help. Panel members 
are quite open in talking to one another about their own development needs. As an 
officer, I certainly wouldn’t seek to manage their performance.” Clerk2 
 
Interestingly, this is completely at odds with the response from one of her 
independent members, which is identified later in this section. 
 
A similar complacency was also revealed in the comments of another panel clerk. 
She was asked if there were procedures in place to assess the performance of the 
independent members. She stated that: 
 
 “We probably have a review of the panel’s effectiveness about once a year. 
I think we are certainly improving on the proactive scrutiny. We have a very good 
relationship with the PCC, which you might say we shouldn’t have. Talking with 
other panel chairman, it seems they have quite a confrontational relationship with 
their PCCs and although we are there to scrutinise him, we’re also there to work 
with him.” Clerk3 
 
Another panel clerk, in acknowledging the absence of formal assessment 
procedures, appears to have missed the point about the need for critical reflection: 
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“No, we tend not to have any procedures. There has never been any major 
issue apart from poor attendance” Clerk4 
 
The independent members would welcome feedback on their panel performance 
and they are also critical of the absence of critical reflection. The comments of two 
of them are recorded here. 
 
“There are no procedures or processes to monitor the effectiveness of 
independent members. Neither are there any procedures or processes to monitor 
the effectiveness of elected members. We have never had any formal sessions to 
discuss performance. All we have is our AGM, which is simply a box ticking 
exercise.” PCP1 
 
“I’m not aware of any evaluation process that enables panel members to 
take stock and reflect on their effectiveness in holding the commissioner to 
account. I have no idea what they think of me. They might think I’m effective but I 
don’t know. Having said that, we do meet up with the chair for pre-panel meetings, 
which is really positive and I really welcome that.” PCP33 
 
Another independent panel member, in contradiction of both her clerk and panel 
chair, was scathing about the lack of critical reflection. The following brief 
exchange, which is quoted in full, conveys her strong sense of frustration and 
disappointment. 
 
PCP12 “I would be very surprised if anybody on the panel told you it was a 
robust scrutiny instrument. People are terribly tight-lipped about that kind of thing. 
Nobody has really spoken to me about my thoughts of how the panel works or 
sought my views on how it could be made to work better.”  
 
Researcher  “Do you think there should be regular sessions during which the 
panel reflects on its performance?” 
 
PCP12 “They might tell you that they do, because we have an AGM and 
because we have these proactive scrutiny sessions in the afternoon, they really 
think they are doing a brilliant thing. The clerk writes all the questions beforehand 
and invites us to pose those questions at the main meeting. Everything, though, 
seems to be very gentle and there is no challenge. No one wants to cause any 
offence, which means that we don’t ask any difficult questions. This is frustrating 
for me because I have no political affiliation. Some of the other panel members are 
very cautious because they are playing a long game. We have real difficulties in 
getting anything scrutinised. Our chair is a very nice guy and easy to chat to but 
his instinct is to be automatically supportive of the Commissioner. He always says 
that we are there to scrutinise, as well as to support but I don’t believe he has the 
balance quite right as the chair. I had originally thought that as a former senior 
police officer, he had the right experience to put to good use as the panel chair but 
we have had none of that from him. I have asked some difficult questions but have 
felt exposed because I don’t have any backup. When my term of office comes to 
an end in July this year, I will not be seeking reappointment. It feels like a 
complete waste of my time. It is just not what it should be. It is too support focused 
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and this is just too filled with politicians. It may be that there is no other way 
around is that in that the PCC should be seen to be scrutinised by locally elected 
representatives. The panel members are not necessarily bad people but they are 
bound, in their own minds at least, by what their party expects them to do on their 
own councils, never mind on the PCP. That dual role thing means that they will be 
anxious about their party and what other members of their local authority think 
about what they are doing on the PCP. This means they are not necessarily doing 
what they think is best in respect of policing. Rather, they are doing what they 
think is best for their political careers. I find this incredibly frustrating.” 
 
It will be seen from her comments, that this independent panel member has been 
disillusioned by what she has encountered. Not only has there been no reflection 
on her contribution, or on the panel’s performance, she feels there has been no 
effective scrutiny of the PCC and that the councillor members are unduly 
influenced by their party allegiance. It was the intention of this panel member to 
step down from her role. 
 Summary		
There are no formal procedures in place in any of the PCPs covered in this 
research to reflect critically on the effectiveness of the independent panel 
members. Neither, as the research has shown, is the performance of councillor 
members subject to assessment. While there was a general acknowledgement 
that monitoring and assessment should be on-going for all panel members, there 
was little enthusiasm shown by the panel clerks for its introduction. There may be 
several reasons for this apparent complacency, and these may centre around a 
lack of adequate funding and resources, a topic which is covered later.  
 
The independent members appear to feel under-valued and, in some cases, 
disillusioned. Not only is this unsatisfactory in terms of undermining panel 
effectiveness, it is unfair on these unpaid, independent members, who have 
offered their professional services for an important public role. 
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Chapter	7		
Effectiveness		Findings	and	analysis	–	Is	the	model	working?	
Given the concerns of the Home Affairs Select Committee and a range of other 
authoritative commentators about panel impotence (Bailey, 2015), this research 
sought the views of the key practitioners about the effectiveness of the current 
arrangements and whether, or not, reform was necessary.  Role	perception	
All 51 respondents in this study are key practitioners in the new governance 
arrangements. Their views as to its effectiveness, particularly in respect of 
commissioner accountability, were thought to be especially pertinent by the 
researcher. Given their close, practical engagement and their wide range of 
backgrounds, skills and knowledge, they will have unique insights not available 
from other sources. 
The views of these practitioners were also considered essential by the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life (Tone from the Top, 2015) and its report highlighted 
the problems of holding PCCs to account. Research	findings	
 
Table	21	Are	PCCs	held	to	account? 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Yes 16 
(31%) 
4 (33%) 4 (19%) 6 
(60%) 
2 (28%)  
No 24 
(47%) 
5 (41%) 14 (66%) 1 
(10%) 
3 (42%) 1 (100%) 
Difficult to 
assess 
10 
(19%) 
3 (33%) 3 (14%) 3 
(30%) 
1 (14%)  
No 
comment 
1 
(2%) 
   1 (14%)  
As will be seen from Table 22, just sixteen (31%) of the fifty one participants in this 
study believed the current model was effective in respect of PCC accountability. 
However, perhaps unsurprisingly, six of the ten PCCs (60%) were confident that 
their panels were holding them to account. More respondents overall (47%) took a 
different view and considered the current arrangements to be ineffective. In 
respect of councillor panel members, this figure rose to 66%. A significant minority 
(19%) found this question difficult to assess, including independent panel 
members (33%) and PCCs (30%). Whilst 2 (28%) of panel clerks thought the 
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system was working, 3 (42%) believed it was not. Another found this difficult to 
assess and one felt unable to comment. 
Dealing first with the responses from those who were confident with the current 
model, one consistent theme emerged and that is the model depends crucially on 
the personality and cooperation of the PCC. This point is made powerfully in the 
first two quotations, both of which are from independent panel members. 
“The panel is now having a significant impact on holding the PCC to 
account because he listens to us. Over time, it has become more of partnership 
working. I shudder to think what would happen if the panel wasn’t here to monitor 
the effectiveness of the PCC. The public would know nothing. You are relying on 
the goodwill and personality of the PCC to make the system work.” PCP4 
“I think it’s significant because of who the PCC is. It could be different with a 
more difficult PCC.  It depends on the attitude of the PCC and the willingness of 
the PCC to accept scrutiny.” PCP9 
Another independent member, however, suggests that the model works well on his 
panel because, with just Labour politicians, there is no place for party squabbling. 
The impact of party politics on the governance model is addressed in more detail 
in a different chapter. 
“I think the panel does have an impact on holding the commissioner to 
account. I think things are fine in Manchester and there haven’t been any issues. 
That may be because they are all Labour party members. It might be different if 
there were Conservatives and Liberal Democrats on the panel.” PCP33 
PCCs are much more confident and, as will be seen from the three quotations 
below. They feel panels have a significant impact in holding them to account. The 
first of these was a Conservative commissioner and the other two, who were re-
elected last year, are both from the Labour Party. All three of them appeared to the 
researcher to have highly effective communication skills and took the view that 
panels were an important reference group and scrutiny body. The Conservative 
PCC, who stood down at the last election, has since resigned from the 
Conservative party. His view was that party politics should have no place in the 
governance model.  
“Significant impact. The panel generates a lot of activity and it feels to me 
like an effective scrutiny.” PCC1 
 
“It has a significant impact in holding me to account. I take very seriously 
what they say and go away and think about it quite a lot.” PCC6 
 
“I think it is significant because, as I say, I know I need the panel. I know 
this is a lonely job and I have to make some unpopular decisions.” PCC7 
The independent panel members were both sceptical and cynical about their 
effectiveness. That frustration is illustrated vividly in the first two quotations, where 
there is also a sense of impotency and pointlessness. 
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“The panel has no impact at all in holding the commissioner to account. We 
have to rely on asking lots of questions. Sometimes, we might get answers, and 
other times we won’t. The PCCs know that they are answerable only to the 
electorate every four years. The Panel is simply there for a box ticking exercise. It 
is nothing more than window dressing.” PCP1 
“I think it is a safety net for the commissioner so that he’s able to say he’s 
reporting to a particular body. Truth be known, it is a reporting tool body. It is just 
words. There is no sanction there. It has not been designed for public scrutiny. 
That is what needs to change. I don’t think they have thought any of this through. It 
was just a political gesture at the time” PCP18 
The third quotation, which is also from an independent panel member, reinforces 
the point that any success depends entirely on the personality and cooperation of 
the PCC, rather than the effectiveness, or authority, of the panel. 
“I think it is very limited. To be fair to him, he does give us quite a lot of 
feedback on things and he seems quite open. That is not necessarily as a result of 
anything the panel is doing to make that happen.” PCP12 
The next three quotations, which are from a panel clerk, a PCC and a chief 
executive of a PCC’s office, all believed panels have limited effect on PCC 
accountability. The views of the PCC and chief executive, who both rejected the 
panel’s authority, were particularly trenchant. 
 “The panel has a limited impact in holding the commissioner to account. 
The current relationship is very cosy. He is a really good commissioner and the 
members of the panel are really good at what they do but, do they really seriously 
do deep probing into his activities? No, they don’t” Clerk6 
“It is limited because they can’t hold me to account. The powers are not 
there.” PCC2 
“They should not be holding him to account and so they should not have 
any impact at all. It is not their job. They have a limited impact on getting him to 
explain himself.” OS1 
Some respondents found this question difficult to assess. One councillor panel 
member, quoted below, felt that his panel’s authority was limited only by a lack of 
time and resources. The second quotation is from a PCC, who appeared more 
concerned to defend his propriety, rather than provide an answer to the question. 
His point was that his good professional behaviour gave his panel no grounds to 
hold him to account. During his interview, this same commissioner went on to 
make some wholly unsubstantiated claims about the rise of violent crime being 
attributable largely to eastern Europeans, for which he admitted he had no 
evidence. 
“The panel has the capability to hold PCC to account but not the capacity. 
Just four meetings a year is not enough.” PCP18 
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“I haven’t had much to be held to account for! The performance is very 
good. What is there to hold me account for? There hasn’t been anything of a major 
cause-celebre to cause them problems.” PCC3 Why	have	the	practitioners	responded	in	this	way	and	what	problems	does	this	pose	for	the	future	of	this	governance	model?	
It might have been predicted that the views of the practitioners taking part in this 
study would be dependent upon their roles and political allegiance. However, the 
only significant confirmation of that prediction was that 60% of the PCCs thought 
their panels held them to account and just 10% did not. The answers from the 
other practitioners, as will be seen from Table 20, were less conclusive. Only 2 
(28%) of the panel clerks thought their commissioners were held to account, while 
3 (42%) did not. Of the remaining two, one declined to comment and the other felt 
unable to decide. The responses from the panel members were also interesting. 
While independent members were more evenly spread with their answers, there 
was a noticeable difference in respect of the councillor members. While just 4 
(19%) said there was sufficient PCC accountability, 14 (66%) took an opposite 
view. Political allegiance did not appear to be relevant in respect of the councillor 
members. 
It seems from the evidence in this study that the PCCs are keen to use panels as 
sounding boards, viewing and valuing that relationship as one of a critical 
friendship. There was, however, no explicit acknowledgement from the 
commissioners that panels wield any real power or authority over their actions. 
Significantly, under the present arrangements, PCCs are the dominant players and 
the success or otherwise of the panels in holding them to account depends almost 
entirely on their personality and cooperation. Where PCCs are proactive, 
collaborative and approachable, panels have an opportunity, at best, to influence 
their actions. Where that is not the case, as was found in Surrey (Bailey, 2015), 
panels would appear to be entirely impotent. 
These views are important as the frustration of some panel members about their 
inability to exercise any real authority is palpable. Some respondents were 
disdainful of the current model and this may have a negative impact on the 
commitment and effectiveness of those panel members. Summary	
Apart from PCCs, the clear majority of practitioners participating in this research 
(47%) think panels do not hold their commissioners to account. This increases to 
66% with councillor members. Politics would not appear to play any significant part 
in these perceptions of effectiveness. 
It seems clear, from both sides of the argument, that the key determinant is the 
personality and cooperation of the commissioner. Where PCCs are proactive and 
collaborative, there is an opportunity for panels to exercise a level of influence. 
However, this does not extend to sanctions where panels wish to censure their 
commissioners. 
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Given the strength of feeling from some of the practitioners in this study, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that some reform is necessary if panels are to command 
the respect and authority they need to be effective.  
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Does	the	present	model	require	improvement?	
Given their experience, authority and unique insights, the views of those charged 
with operating the current model of governance are fundamental to a better 
understanding of its effectiveness. These practitioners alone are best placed to 
comment authoritatively on how the model works in practice. There have been 
surveys conducted to test the perceptions of stakeholders, the most recent of 
which was completed in June 2016 (Grant Thornton), just when the newly elected 
commissioners were about to take office for the second term. This was a 
quantitative study, where questionnaires were sent to PCCs, PCPs and chief 
constables. The only similar finding to emerge from that survey was that 42% of 
PCPs felt their panels were either very, or extremely, successful. Given the 
different methodology and different questions, it is difficult to compare that survey 
with this study.  Research	findings	
 
Table	22	Does	the	present	model	require	improvement? 
 All Independent 
members 
Councillor 
members 
PCCs Panel 
clerks 
Other 
stake-
holder 
Yes 47 
(92%) 
11 (91%) 21 (100%) 7 
(70%) 
7 (100%) 1 (100%) 
No 4 
(8%) 
1 (9%)  3 
(30%) 
  
As will be seen from Table 22, there was an emphatic response from the 
respondents in this study, in that 47 out of 51 (92%) believed some reform of the 
present model was required. With the panel clerks and councillor panel members, 
this rose to 100%. Indeed, even 7 out of the 10 PCCs (70%) thought adjustments 
were necessary. This was the clearest possible statement from key practitioners 
about perceived shortcomings in the current arrangements. While some thought 
minor changes were required, others were far more disparaging. They believed 
more fundamental reform was necessary. 
The key issues highlighted included role clarity, funding, training, panel powers, 
independent members, the need for an intermediary, such as an ombudsman, 
PCC selection process and the lack of thought given to PCPs by the legislators.  
The issues of role clarity, powers and the use of an intermediary are touched upon 
in the first quotation from an independent panel member. The second quotation, 
also from an independent, draws attention to the need for more independents, 
together with the need for more training, particularly on leadership and 
performance evaluation. Another independent member, in the third quotation, 
suggests panels need more power to require cooperation from their 
commissioners. 
“As far as the current model is concerned, I think the introduction of 
Commissioners is the most interesting development in police reform for a long 
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time. In terms of the people holding commissioners to account, the current model 
falls well short of what should be expected. It needs massive improvement, 
particularly in terms of role definition and power for PCPs.  Unless this reform 
happens soon, panels will cease to have any credibility. I also think the panel 
should have an ombudsman to whom it can take complaints or concerns.  There is 
lots that needs to be done and we just need to get on with it as soon as possible. 
We must not allow this to become yet another layer of bureaucracy that serves no 
useful purpose.” PCP1 
 
“The present model needs improvement. Perhaps there should be fewer 
councillors and more independent members. There is no way in which 20 people 
around the table can be effective. The challenge is how you would square this 
democratically. There should be more training and formal induction to the panel. 
There needs to be more training especially focused at how to scrutinise. There 
should also be more on leadership and how to better understand their own 
performance.” PCP4 
 
“It definitely needs improvement. There needs to be something in there that 
requires the commissioner to be more cooperative. It is almost like she rocks up, 
she has done her bit and talks down to the members. It is a power thing with her. 
This goes back right to the beginning, when she kept reminding members that she 
had a democratic mandate for the whole of the county. The panel needs to be 
more dedicated and have the right people in place” PCP5 
Councillor panel members were also very critical and, in the two responses below, 
attention was drawn to the excess of parochial thinking, the difficulties in attending 
all day meetings, whether independent members were truly independent, concern 
about the number of ex police officers and the need for an intermediary body to 
whom panels can refer disputes.  
“One of its weaknesses is there is lots of parochial thinking. All-day 
meetings make it very difficult for anyone in full time employment to attend. 
Anyone with children of young age will find it difficult. The way it operates restricts 
a wider membership. My concern about independent members is how are they 
selected? Very few people I know are genuinely independent. They all have a 
political allegiance. Putting aside their politics, the competence they bring is 
something that is valuable. The problem is, you’ve got people scrutinising the PCC 
and there is probably a disproportionate number of ex-police officers who believe 
they are experts in strategy and budgets. In fact, they may well have been very 
good police officers in whatever role they performed but they are not necessarily 
competent in their panel role.” PCP13 
 
“Because they are elected, it seems there is little that we can do. There 
needs to be some form of intermediary, like an ombudsman, that we can appeal 
to. There needs to be a major review of the model. For me, taking part in the 
system that I don’t agree with, is an interesting position to be in.” PCP2 
The PCCs similarly had much to say about the inadequacies of the present model. 
In the first quotation, a commissioner acknowledged that not all PCCs were suited 
to their role and that more should be done in the initial selection process. In the 
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second quotation, the PCC asserted that while the model had improved 
democratic governance of the police, there remained concerns about the panel 
which, in her view, was dysfunctional. She also complained that panels were a sop 
to the Liberal Democrats and that they were never wanted by the Home Secretary 
or the Policing Minister. Another PCC, in the third quotation, claimed that 
independent PCCs were, in reality, Liberal Democrats. In the fourth, and final PCC 
quotation, there was an explicit acknowledgement that panels needed more 
powers, more value and more resources. 
“I am also aware that there are PCCs who are ill-suited to do the job and 
that comes back to the selection process and everything else.” PCC1 
 
“I think the PCCs have brought democratic accountability to policing. They  
can react to local issues far quicker. As far as the panel is concerned, I think it was 
a sop to keep the Liberal Democrats quiet. Theresa May, I think, somebody said to 
her initially and to Nick Herbert. I think they wanted to keep the panel away from 
holding PCC’s to account. I think the panel does not figure on my radar apart from 
making my life really unpleasant. I hate the meetings because they are rude. They 
take up an awful lot of time and effort beforehand to get stuff together, that half of 
them don’t read, half of them don’t turn up. They have their own political agendas 
when they turn up and they could be a force for good but they are not.” PCC2 
 
 “Labour put in very senior politicians and about eight of them are ex-
government ministers. They are all pretty confident people. Some of the 
independents, of course, stood under false colours and they were not 
independents at all. They were Liberal Democrats, who stood as independents 
because they would not have been voted for. I think they’re going to have to 
rethink a number of things. As for politics, I don’t think that enters into it but I do 
have a concern about an extreme government, like Corbyn’s would be. Then you 
put in PCCs who are extreme and I think that is a danger.”  PCC3 
 
“I would like to see some change. The easy change is to give the panel 
more powers, more value and more resources. You can do that just by amending 
legislation in a very small way.” PCC7 
The panel clerks, as will be seen in the two quotations below, also took the view 
that needed more resources and more power to require cooperation from 
commissioners. 
“I think there needs to be some firmer foundations in respect of the panel’s 
ability to be able to contribute to decisions made by the Commissioner.” Clerk5 
 
“I just think it is really, really time-consuming and bureaucratic and therefore 
under-resourced to be effective.” Clerk6 
The final comments are very critical of PCPs, claiming that not only were they not 
an integral part of the original concept, they were a ‘bureaucratic distraction’.  
“Not confident at all. Dealing first with the panel constitution, it thinks It is a 
scrutiny committee from the local authority and so it behaves as such. That is not 
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a very effective form of governance. Panels were a bolt on to the whole concept. It 
wasn’t a fundamental part of the model anyway. It is unnecessary as a device. It is 
a bureaucratic distraction. What could you replace it with? I would have thought 
that there should be system where the PCC should meet quarterly with council 
leaders. You are then getting the key people who are principal decision-makers in 
local authorities. The key relationship will be between commissioners and local 
authorities.” OS1 
 Why	have	these	findings	been	identified	and	what	problems	do	they	highlight?	
Of all the questions posed in this study, the response to this was unambiguous 
across the board. All practitioner groups made clear that reform of the present 
model was required. The only conclusion to be drawn from this near unanimous 
finding is that the respondents, irrespective of their political affiliation or role, felt 
reform was needed. The problem it presents is also unambiguous. There is an 
urgent need for review of the current arrangements. Failure to recognise this is 
likely to undermine further the credibility of the governance model.  Summary	
The findings in respect of this question were unambiguous. Thus, 92% overall 
stated that some reform of the present system was necessary. With the panel 
clerks and councillor panel members, this rose to 100%. Indeed, 7 out of the 10 
PCCs (70%) also thought some adjustment was needed. The respondents could 
not have been clearer. Further reform is now required. 
Many respondents believed that, as panels were an afterthought, insufficient 
attention had been given by the legislators as to how they would operate in the 
governance model. They argued this had led to the current position, where few 
people had real confidence in their effectiveness.  
There was a strong demand for greater role clarity, training and resources for 
panels, which have all been covered at length in this research. Some respondents 
argued for the role of independent panel members to be enhanced. Others thought 
panels should be empowered to require cooperation from their commissioners. 
There was also a call for the introduction of an intermediary body, such as an 
ombudsman, to whom panels could refer disputes. One PCC, in acknowledging 
the existence of some maverick commissioners, suggested the selection process 
needed to be strengthened. This has also been identified elsewhere in this study. 
There were also questions about the term, ‘independent’, from some practitioners. 
They felt that it was impossible to be truly independent. One PCC suggested the 
term was used to conceal their real identity as a Liberal Democrat.4 
                                                
4	The	51	respondents	comprised	21	councillor	PCP	members	(16	Labour,	four	Tory	&	one	Green),	twelve	independent	PCP	members,	
ten	PCCs	(five	Labour,	two	Tory	&	three	independent),	seven	panel	clerks	and	one	chief	executive	of	a	PCC’s	office	
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Chapter	8	
Summary	and	Observations	
This research has revealed a compelling need for urgent reform of the current 
governance model. Significantly, the desire for reform came from panel members, 
PCCs and panel clerks, with 92% overall claiming that some change was 
necessary. Not only was this response emphatic, there is also evidence that panel 
members are losing confidence, primarily through the absence of role clarity but 
also because of insufficient powers and inadequate resourcing. 
Evidence from this research points to significant issues affecting PCP 
effectiveness.  These include panel composition, high turnover of panel members 
and tenure, funding and resourcing, the need for additional powers, training, panel 
management and political influence.  
Although the current governance model is quite different from police authorities, 
which preceded it, there are striking similarities between the identified weaknesses 
of both systems. Police authorities were deemed to be invisible and impotent, with 
significant challenges in respect of high member turnover, low status of the 
authority among councillors, poor resourcing and inadequate training.  The 
absence of legal clarity, lack of effective powers and poor information were also 
factors. These criticisms all featured in this research in respect of PCPs. The 
evidence from the literature around health service scrutiny paints a similar picture, 
particularly in respect of limited funding, inadequate training and ineffectual 
scrutiny. 
 
The composition of PCPs, as well as the extent to which they were representative 
of their wider communities, has an impact on panel effectiveness. A significant 
majority of panel members are local councillors, who are appointed by their host 
authorities. Given that panels are unable to select their councillor members, they 
have no ability to recruit the most suitable people. As with local councillors, panel 
members are unrepresentative of the wider public and tend to be middle-aged to 
elderly white men.  
 
The position is different with independent members, who are recruited through a 
rigorous selection process, which identifies their relevant background skills. They 
are also considerably more diverse and can better represent the wider community 
in terms of age, gender, ethnicity and class. Politically neutral, they are unaffected 
by party politics, something highlighted by many of the independent panel 
members in this study. Their overall effectiveness was praised by the panel clerks.  
 
While this research demonstrates independent panel members have greater 
commitment and remain in post longer, the present political model dictates that 
most panel members will continue to be local councillors. The evidence from this 
research would, however, support the appointment of additional independent 
members to panels. 
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High turnover of panel members and limited tenure in post were also identified as 
significant problems. This research found that councillor panel members, unlike 
their independent colleagues, spent less time on their panels. There are two 
principal reasons. First, the electoral process itself and second, portfolio changes 
at council Annual General Meetings. Moreover, the ineffective use of substitutes, 
lack of preparation and a misunderstanding of their role by panel members, are 
also significant factors. This means that panels suffer from a lack of continuity, 
consistency and authority. The small number of independent members are unable 
to compensate for the disruption to panel meetings.  
Inadequate financial support has led to a reliance on the good will and support of 
panel members, officers and their commissioners, without which most panels 
would be unable to function. For panels to be truly effective, they need to be able 
to undertake their own proactive scrutiny programmes. This is something rarely 
possible under the present funding arrangements. 
 
This research also sought the views from participants about the need for additional 
powers. The four-yearly election cycle for PCCs was seen by most panel members 
as an unacceptable mechanism for public accountability. Panels, with the requisite 
powers and resources, should undertake that role between elections. However, 
given that some panels have just four meetings a year, this was also seen as an 
obstacle to effective scrutiny.  
 
While some panel members felt there was a need for additional powers to require 
cooperation from PCCs, many argued for effective sanctions, particularly in 
respect of referral to a higher authority, such as the Home Secretary or an 
ombudsman. This was supported by one of the PCCs. Another argued that, given 
their lack of real powers, panels were suffering from a democratic deficit and that 
they should be given both more powers and additional resources. 
 
The absence of training is a problem for both panel members and PCCs. It 
constrains their effectiveness and it also undermines the whole governance model. 
Whilst there was a general acknowledgement that monitoring and assessment 
should be on-going for all panel members, there was little enthusiasm shown by 
the panel clerks for its introduction. There could be many reasons for this apparent 
complacency and these could emanate from insufficient funding and a lack of 
resources. 
Ineffectual panel leadership was also highlighted as a problem, particularly in 
relation to developing clear panel objectives on scrutiny. Evidence from this study 
suggests that panel chairs can be unduly influenced by their own personal and 
political agendas. Given their pivotal role, more thought needs to be given to their 
selection, training and performance. 
Although many respondents recognised political influence as a potential problem, 
there were no claims from panel members that it had affected their impartiality. 
However, one PCC claimed that he had been given undue leeway by panel 
members from his own party. This is a potentially serious allegation and raises 
major concerns about effective Commissioner scrutiny where one party 
dominates. 
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PCCs are central to the new governance model and this research explored some 
of the key issues around their suitability as candidates, as well as the ways in 
which they can help improve panel relationships. 
There was a call from some respondents to introduce a more rigorous selection 
process for PCCs to reduce the risk of attracting maverick candidates. At present, 
the only selection criteria, in the case of politicians, are provided by the political 
parties. Independent candidates are self-selecting and there are no external 
safeguards in place. Evidence from this research suggests that consideration 
should be given to setting up a neutral panel, perhaps through the Home Office, 
whereby all PCC candidates could be assessed as to their suitability for the role. 
Approved candidates would then be able to go forward to the election process. 
Evidence from this research clearly shows that where PCCs and PCPs engage 
collaboratively, there is less friction and greater trust. This enables panels to 
exercise more influence on the policy programmes of PCCs. 
This research has demonstrated an urgent need for reform of the current 
governance model. Not only is there a danger of a public loss of confidence, there 
is also a significant risk of panel members becoming disillusioned because of their 
perceived impotence and low status. Unless PCPs are given the role clarity, 
additional powers and resources they seek, PCC accountability can only be further 
diminished. 
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Appendix	1	 	 Interview	questions	for	PCP	members	
 
 
 
 
Institute of Criminal 
Justice  Studies 
Researcher: Roy Bailey  
Email: up710610@myport.ac.uk  
Tel: 07717 755146 
Supervisor: Barry Loveday   
Email: barry.loveday@port.ac.uk    
Tel: 023  9284 3458 
Course Director: Dr Andy Williams   
       Email:  andy.williams@port.ac.uk 
       Tel: 023 9284 3067 
 
 
 
 
 
Study title: 
Policing the PCCs: An examination of the current statutory and political frameworks for 
holding Police and Crime Commissioners to account. 
Name of researcher and supervisor: Researcher – Roy Bailey; Supervisor – Barry 
Loveday 
Contact details: Please see above. 
Invitation 
Thank you for reading this. I am conducting this research study as a student of the 
Professional Doctorate programme at the university of Portsmouth and would like 
to invite you to take part by agreeing to be interviewed. It is entirely up to you 
whether you participate but your responses would be valued.  As a member of the 
Police and Crime Panel, your views are pivotal. My study is aimed at determining 
the effectiveness of the Police and Crime Panel in holding the Police and Crime 
Commissioner to account. Critics of the current model have argued that the dual 
role of support for, and scrutiny of, the Police and Crime Commissioner has served 
to blur the focus and priorities of the scrutiny role. The Home Affairs Select 
Committee, in acknowledging this issue, has pointed to the need for PCPs to 
redouble their scrutiny effort. There are also other criticisms and this research is 
designed to look closely at each of them in seven PCPs across the country. 
Although I will be asking for your name and role, I will take all reasonable steps to 
ensure anonymity throughout the research and in the references and citations. No 
information gleaned from this study can be used for Human Resources in respect 
Interview Questionnaire 
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of performance issues. However, should any information emerge which suggests 
practice that places an individual at risk, or is illegal, will not be covered by the 
confidentiality clause and will be reported appropriately. Responses from 
completed questionnaires will be collated for analysis and, once this is complete, 
the original questionnaires will be retained until the completion of my doctorate. Up 
to this stage, completed questionnaires will be stored in a locked filing cabinet.  If 
you wish to learn more about the results of the research please contact me at my 
university email address – up710610@myport.ac.uk. Should the study be 
published, you will be forwarded a copy. It may be necessary to retain the data 
from this interview until the conclusion of my doctorate. Should that be the case, I 
will first seek your consent, unless you are able to provide that now.   
  Y/N 
 
Questionnaire	instructions	
	
Although	in	questionnaire	form,	I	shall	be	conducting	these	interviews	and	will	explain	
carefully	the	questions	as	we	go	through	the	questionnaire.	
	
 
	
1. Name: 
 
2. Gender        M/F 
 
3. Age: 
 21 to 30 
 31 to 40 
 41 to 50 
 51 to 60 
 61 to 70 
 71 to 80 
 
4. What is your ethnic group? 
 
Choose one option that best describes your ethnic group or background 
 
White 
1. English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British / Irish 
2. Any other White background, please describe 
 
Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups 
 
Asian / Asian British 
 
Black / African / Caribbean / Black British 
 
5. Occupation: 
 
6. Councillor:        Y/N 
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7. If Yes, how many years have you been a councillor? 
  
 1 to 5  
 6 to 10  
 11 or more 
 
8. If a local councillor, what experience do you have? 
 
 Cabinet member       Y/N 
 Scrutiny body       Y/N 
 Policing and community brief      Y/N 
 
9. Political affiliation: (Please tick against your answer below) 
 
 Conservative 
 Labour 
 Lib Dem 
 UKIP 
 Independent 
 Other 
 No political affiliation 
 
10. Independent member of PCP?    Y/N 
 
11. Relevant experience  
 
 Former Police Authority member     Y/N 
 If Yes, detail experience: 
 
  Role held: 
  Number of years in that role: 
 
   1 to 5 
   6 to 10  
   11 or more 
 
 Other relevant experience : 
   
  Police       Y/N 
  Probation      Y/N 
  Social Services     Y/N 
  Lawyer or legal training    Y/N 
  Magistrate      Y/N 
  Other – Please describe 
 
12. Local authority for which you are a councillor 
 
13. Position/role on PCP: 
 
14. How long have you been a member of the PCP? 
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  Since the outset     Y/N 
  2 to 3 years      Y/N 
  1 to 2 years      Y/N 
  Less than 1 year     Y/N 
 
15. Is there a problem with high turnover of PCP members? 
 
  No, there have been few changes in members Y/N 
  Yes, there have been problems.   Y/N 
  If yes, please outline those problems below 
 
16. Have you received any training for your PCP role?    Y/N 
 
17. What did that training entail? 
 
18. How effective are the independent experts on the panel? 
  Highly effective with relevant expertise   Y/N 
  Not especially effective     Y/N 
  Difficult to assess      Y/N 
 
19. Does the PCP have a clear policy on identifying and appointing 
independent expert members? 
  Yes 
  No 
  Unclear 
 
20. What procedures and processes are in place to identify and appoint 
independent expert members? 
 
21. What procedures and processes are in place to monitor the effectiveness of 
independent members?          
 
22. Does the PCP have a clear understanding of its role?  Y/N 
 
23. If No, have you or other PCP members sought clarification and, if so, from 
whom? 
 
24. Does the PCP have sufficient powers to fulfil its role?  Y/N 
 
25. If no, what additional powers are required? 
 
26. Is there a tension between scrutinising and supporting the PCC?  
           Y/N 
 
27. Should more emphasis be given to the scrutinising role?   
           Y/N 
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28. Do you consider that proactive scrutiny is affected by funding constraints?   
            
           Y/N 
 
29. How would you describe the leadership of the PCP: 
 
  Strong and decisive 
  Good but hampered by poor guidelines 
  Poor 
 
30. How would you describe the management of the PCP: 
 
  Strong, clear and supportive 
  Good but hampered by poor guidelines 
  Poor 
 
31. Are the processes of formal inquiry for the PCP: 
 
  Clear, simple and effective 
  Unclear and ineffectual 
 
32. How visible is the PCP? 
 
  High profile 
  Low profile 
 
33. What impact do you think the PCP is having on holding the PCC to 
account? 
 
  Significant 
  Difficult to assess 
  Limited 
 
34. Would your ability to scrutinise the PCC be made easier if he/she were 
independent?         Y/N 
 
35. Would interference be a problem where the scrutinisers and the scrutinised 
are from  the same political party?       
          Y/N 
 
36. How confident are you in the current model of democratic police 
governance? 
 
  Very confident 
  Present model needs improvement 
  Not confident 
   
  Please outline your views 
 
Thank	you	for	participating	in	this	interview.	
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If	you	have	any	concerns	regarding	this	research,	please	contact	me	or	my	supervisor	in	
the	first	instance.		If	you	are	not	entirely	happy	with	a	response,	please	contact		Dr	Francis	
Pakes	(see	contact	details	above)	
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Institute of Criminal 
Justice  Studies 
Researcher: Roy Bailey  
Email: up710610@myport.ac.uk  
Tel: 07717 755146 
Supervisor: Barry Loveday   
Email: barry.loveday@port.ac.uk    
Tel: 023  9284 3458 
Course Director: Dr Andy Williams   
       Email:  andy.williams@port.ac.uk 
       Tel: 023 9284 3067 
 
 
 
 
 
Study title: 
Policing the PCCs: An examination of the current statutory and political frameworks for 
holding Police and Crime Commissioners to account. 
Name of researcher and supervisor: Researcher – Roy Bailey; Supervisor – Barry 
Loveday 
Contact details: Please see above. 
Invitation 
Thank you for reading this. I am conducting this research study as a student of the 
Professional Doctorate programme at the university of Portsmouth and would like 
to invite you to take part by agreeing to be interviewed. It is entirely up to you 
whether you participate but your responses would be valued.  As the Police and 
Crime Commissioner, your views are relevant. My study is aimed at determining 
the effectiveness of the Police and Crime Panel in holding the Police and Crime 
Commissioner to account. Critics of the current model have argued that the dual 
role of support for, and scrutiny of, the Police and Crime Commissioner has served 
to blur the focus and priorities of the scrutiny role. The Home Affairs Select 
Committee, in acknowledging this issue, has pointed to the need for PCPs to 
redouble their scrutiny effort. There are also other criticisms and this research is 
designed to look closely at each of them in seven PCPs across the country. 
Although I will be asking for your name and role, I will take all reasonable steps to 
ensure anonymity throughout the research and in the references and citations. No 
information gleaned from this study can be used for Human Resources in respect 
of performance issues. However, should any information emerge which suggests 
Interview Questionnaire 
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practice that places an individual at risk, or is illegal, will not be covered by the 
confidentiality clause and will be reported appropriately. Responses from 
completed questionnaires will be collated for analysis and, once this is complete, 
the original questionnaires will be retained until the completion of my doctorate. Up 
to this stage, completed questionnaires will be stored in a locked filing cabinet.  If 
you wish to learn more about the results of the research please contact me at my 
university email address – up710610@myport.ac.uk. Should the study be 
published, you will be forwarded a copy. It may be necessary to retain the data 
from this interview until the conclusion of my doctorate. Should that be the case, I 
will first seek your consent, unless you are able to provide that now.   
  Y/N 
Questionnaire	instructions	
	
Although	in	questionnaire	form,	I	shall	be	conducting	these	interviews	and	will	explain	
carefully	the	questions	as	we	go	through	the	questionnaire.	
	
 
	
1. Name: 
 
2. Gender        M/F 
 
3. Age: 
 21 to 30 
 31 to 40 
 41 to 50 
 51 to 60 
 61 to 70 
 71 to 80 
 
4. What is your ethnic group? 
 
Choose one option that best describes your ethnic group or background 
 
White 
1. English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British / Irish 
2. Any other White background, please describe 
 
Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups 
 
Asian / Asian British 
 
Black / African / Caribbean / Black British 
 
5. Occupation: 
 
6. Past Political affiliation: 
 Conservative 
 Labour 
 Lib Dem 
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 UKIP 
 Independent 
 Other 
 No political affiliation 
 
7. Relevant experience  
 
 Former Police Authority member     Y/N 
 If Yes, detail experience: 
 
  Role held: 
  Number of years in that role: 
 
   1 to 5 
   6 to 10  
   11 or more 
 
 Other relevant experience : 
   
  Police       Y/N 
  Probation      Y/N 
  Social Services     Y/N 
  Lawyer or legal training    Y/N 
  Magistrate      Y/N 
  Other – Please describe 
 
8.     How long have you been the PCC? 
 
  Since the outset     Y/N 
  2 to 3 years      Y/N 
  1 to 2 years      Y/N 
  Less than 1 year     Y/N 
 
9. Have you received any training for your PCC role?    Y/N 
 
10. What did that training entail? 
 
11. Does the PCP have a clear understanding of its role in holding the PCC 
 to account?        Y/N 
 
12. Does the PCP have sufficient powers to fulfil its role?  Y/N 
 
13. If no, what additional powers are required? 
 
14. Is there a tension between scrutinising and supporting the PCC?  
           Y/N 
 
15. Should more emphasis be given to the scrutinising role?   
           Y/N 
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16. Do you consider that proactive scrutiny is affected by funding constraints?   
            
           Y/N 
 
18. Is there a problem with high turnover of PCP members? 
 
  No, there have been few changes in members Y/N 
  Yes, there have been problems.   Y/N 
  If yes, please outline those problems below 
 
19. How effective are the independent experts on the panel? 
  Highly effective with relevant expertise   Y/N 
  Not especially effective     Y/N 
  Difficult to assess      Y/N 
     
 
 
20. How would you describe the leadership of the PCP: 
   
  Strong and decisive 
  Good but hampered by poor guidelines 
  Poor 
 
21. How would you describe the management of the PCP: 
 
  Strong, clear and supportive 
  Good but hampered by poor guidelines 
  Poor 
 
22. Are the processes of formal inquiry for the PCP: 
 
  Clear, simple and effective 
  Unclear and ineffectual 
 
23. How visible is the PCP? 
 
  High profile 
  Low profile 
 
24. What impact do you think the PCP is having on holding the PCC to 
account? 
 
  Significant 
  Difficult to assess 
  Limited 
 
25. Would the ability to scrutinise the PCC be made easier because he/she 
were  independent?           
         Y/N 
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26. Would interference be a problem where the scrutinisers and the scrutinised 
are from the same political party?        
          Y/N 
 
27. How confident are you in the current model of democratic police 
governance? 
 
  Very confident 
  Present model needs improvement 
  Not confident 
   
  Please outline your views 
 
Thank	you	for	participating	in	this	interview.	
	
If	you	have	any	concerns	regarding	this	research,	please	contact	me	or	my	supervisor	in	
the	first	instance.		If	you	are	not	entirely	happy	with	a	response,	please	contact		Dr	Francis	
Pakes	(see	contact	details	above)	
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Appendix	3		 	 Ethical	Narrative	
 
Introduction 
There is widespread critical concern about the ability of Police and Crime Panels 
(PCPs) to subject Police and Crime  
Commissioners (PCCs) to effective and robust scrutiny. Often cited by the critics, 
are examples of ‘maverick’ behaviour by PCCs, which have frequently gone 
unchecked by PCPs. Although some of these ‘celebrated’ examples, such as the 
dismissal of Gwent’s chief constable by the PCC, have attracted national attention, 
there is now a growing body of evidence that PCPs are unable to exercise even a 
modest degree of scrutiny, leaving PCCs free to ignore advice or censure 
(Loveday, Lewis and Bailey, 2014). Some have seen an ironic twist in the new 
model of democratic oversight in that the only effective scrutiny of PCCs has 
occurred at a national, rather than local level, something not intended by the 
legislators (Chambers, 2013)  
 
Several issues are at the heart of this disquiet, all of which will require 
thoroughgoing examination. First, the statutory framework does not empower 
PCPs to exercise full disciplinary authority, despite explicit criticism from the Home 
Affairs Select Committee prior to the legislation being enacted. It has been 
suggested that PCPs were forced upon a ‘reluctant’ policing minister, Nick 
Herbert, by the Liberal Democrats since the main (Conservative) focus had been 
on the democratic governance of the police by the PCC, rather than ‘policing the 
PCC’ by the PCP (Loveday and Lewis, 2014). Moreover, it may also be that PCPs 
were explicitly constrained by the legislators in their scrutiny role and this needs to 
be examined.  
 
Second, PCPs have a dual support and scrutiny role and this may cause conflict 
and ambiguity. The evidence gleaned from the researcher’s case study of the 
Surrey PCP points to both a lack of clarity, and confusion, about its role and 
responsibility as a ‘critical friend’. 
 
Third, the political dimension is important since there is a concern that it might 
have an impact on the scrutiny role. Evidence from local government scrutiny 
suggests that oversight may be less critical when the scrutiniser and the 
scrutinised are from the same political party and this will need to be tested in 
respect of PCCs and PCPs. The political nature and composition of PCPs 
therefore needs further exploration, particularly in respect of the role played by the 
independent ‘expert’ members. The research will examine the procedures used to 
identify and appoint independent members, together with a focus on what is meant 
by ‘expertise’. This will entail a critical review of PCP structure and the rationale 
used to identify both the independent members and their expertise. It will also be 
important to establish how expert members are used in the scrutiny role and how 
their contributions are measured.  
 
Leading on from this is the fourth issue, the appointment of panel members, their 
suitability, their training and their retention. Some PCPs have suffered from high 
turnover of members and this needs investigation. Are issues such as time 
commitment and recompense for their time important? Are the panel members 
representative of the wider community and is there a gender imbalance? Should 
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there be a clear job or role description with a list of required skills and 
experiences? Can, or should, party affiliation override a requirement for minimum 
skills and experience? What do panel members think of their remit? Should they 
have more authority in their scrutiny role and should that role also be extended to 
include democratic oversight of the police?  
 
Fifth, what is meant by political balance – both within the PCP and between the 
PCC and PCP? Can political influence usurp ‘professional objectivity’? One 
example often cited by critics is in Thames Valley, where the PCC has made rural 
crime a priority and it will be important to test whether that decision and others like 
it, impede the professional objectivity of the police.  
 
Sensitivity of research topic 
 
There is some potential for political sensitivity but I’m confident this can be 
managed without too much difficulty. PCP members would quickly discover, via 
Google, that I’m a former senior police officer in Thames Valley and a former 
Labour councillor in Bracknell. I will need to make this very clear to all respondents 
and provide strong reassurance that my research would be conducted 
dispassionately and transparently. 
 
Permission from host organisation 
 
I have established contact with all seven PCPs (Kent, Hampshire, Thames Valley, 
Avon and Somerset, South Wales, Merseyside and South Yorkshire) and they 
have all given permission, in principle, for this research to be undertaken, on the 
understanding that a formal written approach will follow. My draft letter is attached. 
 
Reputational issues 
 
I anticipate no reputational issues for either the university or the seven PCPs. As 
for myself, I will need to be mindful at all times of my political bias and ensure my 
research is demonstrably objective. See earlier paragraph. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
 
It’s important that all PCP members are reassured that their comments will be 
anonymised.  It is clear that not all PCP members believe the current model is 
without fault and my belief is that responses will be more forthright if their identities 
are withheld. This will be made clear both in my introductory letter and at the start 
of each interview. As for confidentiality, much, if not all, of the quantitative data is 
already in the public realm. I do not envisage any confidentiality issues in the 
qualitative aspect of my research but should any emerge, I will ensure they are 
handled appropriately. I will also need to reassure respondents that nothing they 
divulge during the course of their interviews will be passed on.  
 
Data protection and storage 
 
I will ensure that all data collected by me for this research is secured on my laptop 
and not released to any third parties. 
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Role conflict 
 
I do not envisage any role conflict, save for my earlier comments above. 
 
Access to privileged data and privileged resources – and action to mitigate risks and 
concerns arising from accessing this type of data 
 
I will not be accessing any privileged data or resources. 
 
Risks posed by research – to participants and researcher 
 
I do not anticipate any risks. 
 
Ownership of research data 
 
The University of Portsmouth and I will jointly own all data obtained during this 
research. 
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Appendix	4	 	 Form	UPR16	
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Appendix	5	 	 Ethical	approval	letter	
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Appendix	6	 	 List	of	research	participants	(anonymised)	
 
 
Participant Role Area Age  Gender Ethnicity Party Reform 
Y/N 
PCP1 PCP 
member 
Avon & 
Somerset 
31 - 
40 
Male White 
English 
Independent Y 
PCP2 PCP 
member 
Avon & 
Somerset 
71 - 
80 
Male White 
English 
Conservative Y 
PCP3 PCP 
member 
Avon & 
Somerset 
51 - 
60 
Female White 
English 
Green Y 
PCP4 PCP 
member 
Devon & 
Cornwall 
61 - 
70 
Female White 
English 
Independent Y 
PCP5 PCP 
member 
Kent 51 - 
60 
Female White 
English 
Independent Y 
PCP6 PCP 
member 
Kent 41 - 
50 
Male British 
Asian 
Independent Y 
PCP7 PCP 
member 
Kent 61 – 
70 
Male Northern 
Irish 
Labour Y 
PCP8 PCP 
member 
Kent 71 - 
80 
Male Northern 
Irish 
Conservative Y 
PCP9 PCP 
member 
Hampshire 61 – 
70 
Male Black 
British 
Independent Y 
PCP10 PCP 
member 
Hampshire 51 - 
60 
Male White 
English 
Conservative Y 
PCP11 PCP 
member 
Hampshire 31 - 
40 
Male White 
English 
Labour Y 
PCP12 PCP 
member 
Hampshire 31 - 
40 
Female White 
English 
Independent Y 
PCP13 PCP 
member 
Hampshire 51 - 
60 
Male White 
English 
Labour Y 
PCP14 PCP 
member 
Thames 
Valley 
41 - 
50 
Female White 
English 
Conservative Y 
PCP15 PCP 
member 
Thames 
Valley 
21 – 
30 
Male Mixed 
race 
Independent N 
PCP16 PCP 
member 
Thames 
Valley 
61 - 
70 
Female White 
English 
Labour Y 
PCP17 PCP 
member 
Thames 
Valley 
61 - 
70 
Male White 
English 
Labour Y 
PCP18 PCP 
member 
South 
Wales 
61 - 
70 
Male White 
British 
Independent Y 
PCP19 PCP 
member 
South 
Wales 
71 - 
80 
Male White 
Welsh 
Labour Y 
PCP20 PCP 
member 
South 
Wales 
71 – 
80 
Male White 
Welsh 
Labour Y 
PCP21 PCP 
member 
South 
Wales 
61 - 
70 
Male White 
English 
Labour Y 
PCP22 PCP 
member 
South 
Wales 
41 – 
50 
Male Mixed 
race 
Independent Y 
PCP23 PCP 
member 
South 
Wales 
51 – 
60 
Male White 
Welsh 
Labour Y 
PCP24 PCP 
member 
Merseyside 51 - 
60 
Male White 
English 
Independent Y 
PCP25 PCP 
member 
Merseyside 21 - 
30 
Female White 
British 
Labour Y 
PCP26 PCP 
member 
Merseyside 51 - 
60 
Female White 
English 
Labour Y 
PCP27 PCP 
member 
South 
Yorkshire 
51 - 
60 
Male White 
English 
Labour Y 
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PCP28 
 
PCP 
member 
 
South 
Yorkshire 
 
31 - 
40 
 
Female 
 
White 
British 
 
Labour 
 
Y 
PCP29 PCP 
member 
South 
Yorkshire 
51 - 
60 
Male White 
British 
Labour Y 
PCP30 PCP 
member 
South 
Yorkshire 
61 - 
70 
Male White 
English 
Labour Y 
PCP31 PCP 
member 
South 
Yorkshire 
51 - 
60 
Female White 
Welsh 
Labour Y 
PCP32 PCP 
member 
South 
Yorkshire 
71 – 
80 
Male White 
English 
Independent Y 
PCP33 PCP 
member 
Greater 
Manchester 
41 – 
50 
Male Asian 
British 
Independent Y 
Clerk1 PCP clerk  N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
Clerk2 PCP clerk  N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
Clerk3 PCP clerk  N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
Clerk4 PCP clerk  N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
Clerk5 PCP clerk  N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
Clerk6 PCP clerk  N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
Clerk7 PCP clerk  N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
PCC1 PCC  61 - 
70 
Male White 
English 
Conservative Y 
PCC2 PCC  71 – 
80 
Female White 
English 
Independent Y 
PCC3 PCC  61 - 
70 
Male White 
English 
Conservative Y 
PCC4 PCC  61 - 
70 
Male White 
British 
Labour Y 
PCC5 PCC  51 - 
60 
Female White 
British 
Labour N 
PCC6 PCC  71 – 
80 
Male White 
English 
Labour N 
PCC7 PCC  61 - 
70 
Male White 
British 
Labour Y 
PCC8 PCC  51 - 
60 
Female White 
English 
Independent Y 
PCC9 PCC  61 - 
70 
Female White 
English 
Labour N 
PCC10 PCC  51 - 
60 
Male White 
English 
Independent Y 
OS1 Other 
stakeholder 
 N/A N/A N/A N/A Y 
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Appendix	7		 	 Letter	of	introduction	to	panel	members	
 
 
Institute of Criminal 
 Justice Studies 
Researcher: Roy Bailey  
Email: up710610@myport.ac.uk  
Tel: 07717 755146 
Supervisor: Barry Loveday   
Email: barry.loveday@port.ac.uk    
Tel: 023  9284 3458 
Course Director: Dr Andy Williams   
       Email:  andy.williams@port.ac.uk 
       Tel: 023 9284 3067 
 
 
Police and Crime Panel members 
 
 
Study Title: Policing the PCCs: An examination of the current 
statutory and political frameworks for holding Police and Crime 
Commissioners to account. 
 
Dear Panel member, 
 
Further to our previous telephone conversations, I’m writing formally to seek 
approval for me to conduct a research study on the effectiveness of Police and 
Crime Panels in holding the Police and Crime Commissioner to account. Yours is  
one of seven targeted panels. 
 
A former senior police officer in Thames Valley, I’m a criminal justice professional 
doctorate student with the university of Portsmouth, where my main focus is on the 
democratic governance of the police. I’m a former local Labour councillor in 
Bracknell but would like to reassure you that my research will be scrupulously 
objective and politically neutral at all times. 
 
For this study, I’m proposing a mixed methodology, using both quantitative and 
qualitative tools. For example, I’d like to determine the number of meetings the 
PCP has had with the PCC and the frequency of certain items that appear on 
meeting agendas, in order to build a better quantitative understanding of the 
nature of the relationships. This would be supplemented with a more qualitative 
account, where I might attend meetings, read minutes for previous meetings, 
search for media reports on the PCP and conduct interviews with PCP members 
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and the PCC. This could then be put into a qualitative data analysis programme, 
where I could pull out various themes about the power balance between key 
actors.  
 
The reason I have chosen PCPs is that there is currently considerable academic 
interest in their dual role of scrutiny and support, which some suggest is 
antagonistic, in that it blurs the focus and priorities of the scrutiny role. Recurring 
themes from local government literature suggest that where the scrutinised and 
scrutinisers are from the same political party, scrutiny may be less robust.  Current 
literature points to problems that include a lack of understanding of the PCP role, 
weak leadership, poor management, ineffectual processes of inquiry, low profile 
and perceptions of limited impact. The political nature and composition of PCPs 
therefore needs further exploration, particularly in respect of the role played by the 
independent ‘expert’ members. Leading on from this is another issue; the 
appointment of panel members, their suitability, their training and their retention. 
Some PCPs have suffered from high turnover of members and this needs 
investigation. What do they think of their remit? Should they have more authority in 
their scrutiny role and should that role also be extended to include democratic 
oversight of the police? 
 
I have enclosed a copy of the questions to be put to members of the PCP and can 
reassure you that all responses will be anonymised. No information gleaned from 
this study can be used for Human Resources for performance issues. However, 
should any information emerge which suggests practice that places an individual 
at risk, or is illegal, this will not be covered by the confidentiality clause and will be 
reported appropriately. The interviews, which will be done in groups of four to five 
individuals, will be conducted by me and should take no longer than thirty minutes 
per group. In addition, it would be helpful if all panel members completed and 
returned a questionnaire prior to the interview.  
 
I would welcome your advice on the organisation of an interview schedule. I’m 
very conscious of the time pressures on Panel members and will do what I can to 
avoid adding excessively to their diaries. Should this research be published, I will 
ensure copies are made available for you and the PCP members. 
 
I’m most grateful for your kind offer of help. Perhaps it might be useful if we had a 
telephone discussion soon in order to agree a timescale? I will, of course, keep 
you up to date with all developments from my end. In the meantime, don’t hesitate 
to call me if you have any remaining questions or concerns. 
 
I look forward to receiving your approval. 
 
Thanks again for all your help and encouragement. It is much appreciated. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Roy Bailey 
Professional Doctorate student 
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Appendix	8		 	 Letter	of	introduction	to	PCCs	
 
 
Institute of Criminal 
 Justice Studies 
Researcher: Roy Bailey  
Email: up710610@myport.ac.uk  
Tel: 07717 755146 
Supervisor: Barry Loveday   
Email: barry.loveday@port.ac.uk    
Tel: 023  9284 3458 
Course Director: Dr Andy Williams   
       Email:  andy.williams@port.ac.uk 
       Tel: 023 9284 3067 
 
 
Police and Crime Commissioners 
 
 
Study Title: Policing the PCCs: An examination of the current 
statutory and political frameworks for holding Police and Crime 
Commissioners to account. 
 
Dear Police and Crime Commissioner, 
 
Further to our previous telephone conversations, I’m writing formally to seek 
approval for me to conduct a research study on the effectiveness of Police and 
Crime Panels in holding the Police and Crime Commissioner to account. Yours is 
just one of seven targeted areas. 
 
A former senior police officer in Thames Valley, I’m a criminal justice professional 
doctorate student with the university of Portsmouth, where my main focus is on the 
democratic governance of the police. I’m a former local Labour councillor in 
Bracknell but would like to reassure you that my research will be scrupulously 
objective and politically neutral at all times. 
 
For this study, I’m proposing a mixed methodology, using both quantitative and 
qualitative tools. For example, I’d like to determine the number of meetings the 
PCP has had with the PCC and the frequency of certain items that appear on 
meeting agendas, in order to build a better quantitative understanding of the 
nature of the relationships. This would be supplemented with a more qualitative 
account, where I might attend meetings, read minutes for previous meetings, 
search for media reports on the PCP and conduct interviews with PCP members 
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and the PCC. This could then be put into a qualitative data analysis programme, 
where I could pull out various themes about the power balance between key 
actors. 
  
The reason I have chosen PCPs is that there is currently considerable academic 
interest in their dual role of scrutiny and support, which some suggest is 
antagonistic, in that it blurs the focus and priorities of the scrutiny role. Recurring 
themes from local government literature suggest that where the scrutinised and 
scrutinisers are from the same political party, scrutiny may be less robust.  Current 
literature points to problems that include a lack of understanding of the PCP role, 
weak leadership, poor management, ineffectual processes of inquiry, low profile 
and perceptions of limited impact. The political nature and composition of PCPs 
therefore needs further exploration, particularly in respect of the role played by the 
independent ‘expert’ members. Leading on from this is another issue; the 
appointment of panel members, their suitability, their training and their retention. 
Some PCPs have suffered from high turnover of members and this needs 
investigation. What do they think of their remit? Should they have more authority in 
their scrutiny role and should that role also be extended to include democratic 
oversight of the police? 
 
I have enclosed a copy of the questions to be put to the PCC and can reassure 
you that all responses will be anonymised. No information gleaned from this study 
can be used for Human Resources of performance issues. However, should any 
information emerge which suggests practice that places an individual at risk, or is 
illegal, this will not be covered by the confidentiality clause and will be reported 
appropriately. The interview will be conducted by me and should take no longer 
than thirty minutes Should this research be published, I will ensure copies are 
made available for you and the PCC. 
 
I’m most grateful for your kind offer of help. Perhaps it might be useful if we had a 
telephone discussion soon in order to agree a timescale? I will, of course, keep 
you up to date with all developments from my end. In the meantime, don’t hesitate 
to call me if you have any remaining questions or concerns. 
 
I look forward to receiving your approval. 
 
Thanks again for all your help and encouragement. It is much appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Roy Bailey 
Professional Doctorate student 
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Appendix	9		 	 Participant	information	sheet	
 
 
 
Institute of Criminal 
 Justice Studies 
Researcher: Roy Bailey  
Email: up710610@myport.ac.uk  
Tel: 07717 755146 
Supervisor: Barry Loveday   
Email: barry.loveday@port.ac.uk    
Tel: 023  9284 3458 
Course Director: Dr Andy Williams   
       Email:  andy.williams@port.ac.uk 
       Tel: 023 9284 3067 
 
 
 
	
Study	title:	
Policing the PCCs: An examination of the current statutory and political frameworks for 
holding Police and Crime Commissioners to account. 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in my research study. Before you decide, I would like 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Talk 
to others about the study if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear  
The study is aimed at determining the effectiveness of Police and Crime Panels in holding 
Police and Crime Commissioners to account. 
 
What	is	the	purpose	of	the	study?		
There is widespread critical concern about the ability of Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) to 
subject Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to effective and robust scrutiny. Often 
cited by the critics, are examples of ‘maverick’ behaviour by PCCs, which have frequently 
gone unchecked by PCPs. Although some of these ‘celebrated’ examples, such as the 
dismissal of Gwent’s chief constable by the PCC, have attracted national attention, there is 
now a growing body of evidence that PCPs are unable to exercise even a modest degree of 
scrutiny, leaving PCCs free to ignore advice or censure (Loveday, Lewis and Bailey, 
2014). Some have seen an ironic twist in the new model of democratic oversight in that the 
only effective scrutiny of PCCs has occurred at a national, rather than local level, 
something not intended by the legislators (Chambers, 2013) 
  
Several issues are at the heart of this disquiet, all of which will require thoroughgoing 
examination. First, the statutory framework does not empower PCPs to exercise full 
disciplinary authority, despite explicit criticism from the Home Affairs Select Committee 
Participant Information Sheet 
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prior to the legislation being enacted. It has been suggested that PCPs were forced upon a 
‘reluctant’ policing minister, Nick Herbert, by the Liberal Democrats since the main 
(Conservative) focus had been on the democratic governance of the police by the PCC, 
rather than ‘policing the PCC’ by the PCP (Loveday and Lewis, 2014). Moreover, it may 
also be that PCPs were explicitly constrained by the legislators in their scrutiny role and 
this needs to be examined.  
 
Second, PCPs have a dual support and scrutiny role and this may cause conflict and 
ambiguity. The evidence gleaned from the researcher’s case study of the Surrey PCP points 
to both a lack of clarity, and confusion, about its role and responsibility as a ‘critical 
friend’. 
 
Third, the political dimension is important since there is a concern that it might have an 
impact on the scrutiny role. Evidence from local government scrutiny suggests that 
oversight may be less critical when the scrutiniser and the scrutinised are from the same 
political party and this will need to be tested in respect of PCCs and PCPs. The political 
nature and composition of PCPs therefore needs further exploration, particularly in respect 
of the role played by the independent ‘expert’ members. The research will examine the 
procedures used to identify and appoint independent members, together with a focus on 
what is meant by ‘expertise’. This will entail a critical review of PCP structure and the 
rationale used to identify both the independent members and their expertise. It will also be 
important to establish how expert members are used in the scrutiny role and how their 
contributions are measured. 
  
Leading on from this is the fourth issue, the appointment of panel members, their 
suitability, their training and their retention. Some PCPs have suffered from high turnover 
of members and this needs investigation. Are issues such as time commitment and 
recompense for their time important? Are the panel members representative of the wider 
community and is there a gender imbalance? Should there be a clear job or role description 
with a list of required skills and experiences? Can, or should, party affiliation override a 
requirement for minimum skills and experience? What do panel members think of their 
remit? Should they have more authority in their scrutiny role and should that role also be 
extended to include democratic oversight of the police? 
  
Fifth, what is meant by political balance – both within the PCP and between the PCC and 
PCP? Can political influence usurp ‘professional objectivity’?  
 
Why	have	I	been	invited?		
As a member of the Police and Crime Panel, your views are absolutely essential. 
 
Do	I	have	to	take	part?		
The decision to participate is yours. I will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet. If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to sign a consent form. 
  
What	will	happen	to	me	if	I	take	part?		
I	will	be	collecting	and	analysing	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	data	from	the	seven	
participating	panels.	For	example,	I	would	like	to	determine	the	number	of	meetings	the	PCP	has	
had	with	the	PCC	and	the	frequency	of	certain	items	that	appear	on	meeting	agendas,	in	order	to	
build	a	better	quantitative	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	relationships.	This	would	be	
supplemented	with	a	more	qualitative	account,	where	I	might	attend	meetings,	read	minutes	for	
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previous	meetings,	search	for	media	reports	on	the	PCP	and	conduct	interviews	with	PCP	
members	and	the	PCC.	The	interview	is	an	important	component	and	will	last	about	thirty	
minutes.	I’m	sure	none	of	the	questions	will	come	as	any	surprise	to	you.	Interview	responses,	
together	with	other	data,	will	be	fed	into	a	qualitative	data	analysis	programme,	from	which	I	
hope	to	identify	various	themes	about	the	power	balance	between	key	actors.		Responses	will	be	
anonymised	so	that	individuals	will	not	be	able	to	be	recognised	in	any	published	material	that	
follows.	Your	specific	consent	will	be	needed	if	published	material	identifies	you.	I	may	ask	your	
permission	to	record	the	interview.	
 
Expenses	and	payments		
I’m not in a position to provide funding for expenses and hope that any additional costs 
incurred by you, for this interview, will be met by your Council. 
What	will	I	have	to	do?		
Your participation and cooperation with the study is all that is requested. 
What	are	the	possible	disadvantages	and	risks	of	taking	part?		
I’m	aware	that,	for	some,	this	is	a	controversial	area	and	that	personal	views	may	not	always	
coincide	with	the	wider	Panel	and/or	political	group	formal	views.	There	is	a	slight	risk	that	some	
of	these	tensions	will	emerge,	although	I	will	do	my	utmost	to	conceal	identities.	
	
What	are	the	possible	benefits	of	taking	part?		
You	will	be	providing	valuable	insights	into	the	work	of	PCPs,	particularly	in	respect	of	the	
important	role	of	scrutinising	the	PCC.	
	
Will	my	taking	part	in	the	study	be	kept	confidential?		
Unless	you	state	otherwise,	my	intention	is	to	keep	all	your	responses	anonymised.	
	
If	you	join	the	study,	it	is	possible	that	some	of	the	data	collected	will	be	examined	by	Portsmouth	
University	academics	to	check	that	the	research	is	being	carried	out	correctly.	All	will	have	a	duty	
of	confidentiality	to	you	as	a	research	participant	and	will	do	their	best	to	meet	this	duty.		
	
Confidentiality	will	be	safeguarded	during	and	after	the	study	and	my	procedures	for	handling,	
processing,	storage	and	destruction	of	data	will	be	overseen	by	my	supervisor.	Data	will	be	
collected	on	my	personal	laptop	(password	protected)	and	completed	questionnaires	will	be	
stored	safely	by	me	up	to	twelve	months	after	the	conclusion	of	my	doctorate	and	then	
destroyed.	
	
Should	it	be	necessary	to	retain	the	data	for	use	in	future	studies	your	consent	will	first	be	sought.	
	
The	only	people	having	access	to	view	identifiable	data	will	be	authorised	persons,	such	as	
researchers,	supervisors,	regulatory	authorities	&	R	&	D	audit	(for	monitoring	of	the	quality	of	the	
research).	You	will	be	informed	of	both	the	additional	time	it	is	proposed	to	hang	onto	the	data	
and	the	anticipated	date	of	its	destruction.	
 
Participants	have	the	right	to	check	the	accuracy	of	data	held	about	them	and	correct	any	errors.	
	
What	will	happen	if	I	don’t	want	to	carry	on	with	the	study?		
Before,	and	during,	the	interview,	you	will	have	every	right	to	withdraw.	However,	it	may	not	be	
possible,	or	desirable,	for	data	to	be	extracted	and	destroyed	after	the	interview.	Once	the	
interview	data	have	been	analysed,	it	might	prove	impossible	to	withdraw	any	individual’s	
Appendices	
 156 
personal	contribution.		The	position	on	retention	and	destruction	of	data,	should	you	withdraw	
from	the	study,	is	as	described	previously	(above).	
 
What	if	there	is	a	problem?	
If	you	have	a	concern	about	any	aspect	of	this	study,	you	should	ask	to	speak	to	me,	or	my	
supervisor,	Barry	Loveday,	and	we’ll	do	our	best	to	answer	your	questions.	You	can	reach	me	on	
07717	755146	and	Barry	on	023	9284	3458.	If	you	remain	unhappy	and	wish	to	complain	formally,	
you	can	do	this	by	calling	Dr	Andy	Williams,	the	course	director,	on	023	9284	3067.	
	
What	will	happen	to	the	results	of	the	research	study?	
It	is	proposed	to	publish	the	findings	of	this	study,	and	arrangements	will	be	made	for	all	
participants	to	be	given	a	copy	of	the	report.	Unless	you	explicitly	tell	me	otherwise,	none	of	your	
comments	will	be	attributed	to	you.	
	
Who	is	organising	and	funding	the	research?		
The	University	of	Portsmouth	is	sponsoring	this	research	and	no	other	sponsors	are	involved.		
	
Who	has	reviewed	the	study?	
Research	in	the	University	of	Portsmouth	is	looked	at	by	independent	group	of	people,	called	an	
Ethics	Committee,	to	protect	your	interests.	This	proposed	study	has	been	reviewed	and	given	a	
favourable	opinion	by	the	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	Ethics	Committee.	
 
Further	information	and	contact	details		
1.	The	course	director	for	the	professional	doctorate	in	criminal	justice	(DCrimJ)	is	Dr	Andy	
Williams.	He	can	be	telephoned	on	023	9284	3067	and	his	email	address	is	
andy.williams@port.ac.uk	For	more	information	about	Portsmouth’s	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	
Studies,	see	http://www.port.ac.uk/institute-of-criminal-justice-studies	
	
2.	This	research	project	forms	the	major	part	of	my	criminal	justice	doctorate.	My	supervisor	is	
Barry	Loveday,	a	well	known	and	highly	respected	academic	commentator	on	police	governance.	
Barry	can	be	contacted	on	023	9284	3607	and	his	email	address	is	barry.loveday@port.ac.uk		
3.	As	a	member	of	the	PCP,	your	participation	would	be	greatly	appreciated.	I	hope	sincerely	
you’ll	agree	to	participate.	
Concluding	statement	
Thank	you	for	taking	the	time	and	trouble	to	read	this	information	sheet,	regardless	of	your	
decision	to	participate	or	not.	Should	you	agree	to	take	part,	you	will	be	given	a	copy	of	this	sheet	
to	keep	and	your	consent	will	be	sought.	
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Appendix	10		 Consent	form	
 
 
Institute of Criminal 
 Justice  Studies 
 
Researcher: Roy Bailey  
Email: up710610@myport.ac.uk  
Tel: 07717 755146 
Supervisor: Barry Loveday   
Email: barry.loveday@port.ac.uk    
Tel: 023  9284 3458 
Course Director: Dr Andy Williams   
       Email:  andy.williams@port.ac.uk 
       Tel: 023 9284 3067 
 
 
Study Title: Policing the PCCs: An examination of the current statutory 
and political frameworks for holding Police and Crime Commissioners to 
account. 
 
Name of Researcher: Roy Bailey       Please initial 
box  
 
1. I	confirm	that	I	have	read	and	understand	the	information	sheet		
for	the	above	study.	I	have	had	the	opportunity	to	consider	the	information,	
ask	questions	and	have	had	these	answered	satisfactorily.		
	
2. I	understand	that	my	participation	is	voluntary	and	that	I	am	free	to	
	withdraw	at	any	time,	up	to	the	point	of	data	analysis	without	giving	any	reason.	
	
3. I	understand	that	data	collected	during	the	study,	may	be	looked	at	by		
individuals	from	the	university	of	Portsmouth	or	from	regulatory	authorities.		
I	give	permission	for	these	individuals	to	have	access	to	my	data	
	
	
	
4. 	 I	agree	to	my	interview	being	audio	recorded	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	
5.	 I	agree	to	the	data	I	contribute	being	retained	for	future,	REC	approved,	research
	 	 	
	
	
Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices	
 158 
	
6.		 I	agree	to	take	part	in	the	above	study.		
	
 
Name of Participant:    Date:    Signature: 
 
Name of Person taking consent:   Date:   Signature: 
 
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher‘s file;  
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Appendix	11		 Data	spreadsheet	(anonymised)	
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Appendix	12	 	 Interview	schedule	
 
Participant Date interviewed Type of interview Comments 
PCP1 3/3/2016 Telephone  
PCP2 14/3/2016 Face to face  
PCP3 23/3/2016 Telephone  
PCP4 4/2/2016 Telephone  
PCP5 12/1/2016 Face to face  
PCP6 12/1/2016 Face to face  
PCP7 20/1/2016 Face to face  
PCP8 20/1/2016 Face to face  
PCP9 30/11/2015 Face to face  
PCP10 7/1/2016 Face to face  
PCP11 19/1/2016 Telephone  
PCP12 16/12/2015 Telephone  
PCP13 9/12/2015 Face to face  
PCP14 12/5/2016 Telephone  
PCP15 27/11/2015 Face to face  
PCP16 27/11/2015 Face to face  
PCP17 8/6/2016 Face to face  
PCP18 15/12/2015 Focus group  
PCP19 15/12/2015 Focus group  
PCP20 15/12/2015 Focus group  
PCP21 15/12/2015 Focus group  
PCP22 15/12/2015 Focus group  
PCP23 15/12/2015 Focus group  
PCP24 29/1/2016 Face to face  
PCP25 29/1/2016 Focus group  
PCP26 29/1/2016 Focus group  
PCP27 26/1/2016 Face to face  
PCP28 27/1/2016 Focus group  
PCP29 27/1/2016 Focus group  
PCP30 27/1/2016 Focus group  
PCP31 27/1/2016 Focus group  
PCP32 27/1/2016 Focus group  
PCP33 25/5/2016 Face to face  
PCC1 3/3/2016 Telephone  
PCC2 22/3/2016 Face to face  
PCC3 21/1/2016 Face to face  
PCC4 23/3/2016 Telephone  
PCC5 1/12/2015 Face to face  
PCC6 26/1/2016 Face to face  
PCC7 12/1/2016 Face to face  
PCC8 N/A Questionnaire  
PCC9 N/A Questionnaire  
PCC10 10/11/2015 Face to face  
Clerk1 14/3/2016 Face to face  
Clerk2 18/3/2016 Telephone  
Clerk3 26/2/2016 Telephone  
Clerk4 18/3/2016 Telephone  
Clerk5 18/3/2016 Telephone  
Clerk6 27/1/2016 Face to face  
Clerk7 23/3/2016 Telephone  
OS1 26/1/2016 Face to face  
 
